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1.1 thE EmErGEncE oF GoVErnmEnt Facilitation
the brouwersdam case
What can the involved authorities do so that private actors can create a viable 
business case? What conditions should be met?1
I want to say to the government: ‘find the necessary budget (…) show your great-
ness and do it!’ (…) Private actors are not able to finance this. The matter is being 
shuffled back and forth. What we need is government steering, facilitation is not 
enough.2
Since 2010, there have been plans to install a tidal power plant, an installation to generate 
renewable energy from flowing water, in the Brouwersdam. The Brouwersdam is a public 
dam in the southwest of The Netherlands. It closes the land and the water behind the 
dam off from the tide, and this has led to a severe deterioration in the water quality. Now, 
the dam needs to be partly reopened by making an breach and bring back the tide in the 
inland lake to enhance the water quality. Initially, it was believed that the breach could 
be financed with the revenues from energy generation, but even after research showed 
that this would not be the case, public authorities were still in favour of the realisation of a 
power plant. They believed that it would contribute to sustainability and innovation, boost 
the (regional) economy, and be good for the international reputation of The Netherlands 
as a forerunner in delta technology.
The authorities were not, however, willing to finance, commission, or exploit a power 
plant themselves. They aimed to facilitate a private initiative. They wanted a private con-
sortium to finance, realise, and run the power plant out in its own interest and on its own 
account. The authorities were willing to facilitate such an initiative, meaning that they were 
prepared to provide the location, give the necessary permits, and subsidise the project. 
They set up a joint project bureau and conducted an extensive market consultation and 
pre-competitive dialogue with potential private initiators to explore the possibilities and 
stimulate them to take action. There were, however, no private actors willing to take the 
lead in such a project.
The first quote at the start of this introduction is from the market consultation document 
in which the authorities asked private actors to specify the conditions that the authorities 
1 ‘Hoe kunnen de betrokken overheden er voor zorgen dat marktpartijen aan de Brouwersdam een goed 
project met een robuuste business case aan hebben? En in het bijzonder: aan welke randvoorwaarden 
moet [worden voldaan]?’ (Rijkswaterstaat et al., 2013: 8).
2 “En eigenlijk zeg ik: ‘Overheid doe dat nu, maak middelen vrij (…) Dus overheid toon nu je grootsheid 
en doe dat’ (…) We schuiven het balletje maar op en neer. Dus we hebben veel meer sturing nodig. De 
overheid moet meer sturing geven. Niet faciliteren, dat is onvoldoende” (Interview with representative of 
private firms in the water sector).
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should create to attract the private sector to realise a power plant. They asked ‘how can 
we facilitate you?’ The quote underneath the authorities’ statement is a reaction from a 
representative of the private sector. According to him, the government should not facilitate 
a private initiative but should take the lead itself, put the work out to tender, and fully 
finance it. This opinion was shared by many of the private actors involved, as can be read 
in the report on the market consultation.
The Brouwersdam tidal power plant is one of the cases in this thesis. The public 
authorities in this case, and their struggles, are exemplary of many of today’s authori-
ties that are exploring new forms of collaboration with non-governmental – public and 
private – actors. Instead of taking the lead themselves in the production of public goods 
and services, they entice non-governmental actors to do this, and the authorities aim to 
facilitate their actions. Facilitation and related terms, such as enabling and giving space, 
are widespread in modern governments’ discourse. What this facilitation exactly entails, 
however, does often not become clear.
Facilitation in governments’ discourse
The socio-political relations between the government, the private sector, and so-
ciety are changing radically. This has consequences for the actions of governors 
and civil servants of the public administration. More often citizens and social entre-
preneurs are active in the public domain, for example in the role of co-governor or 
co-producer of public value. The government (…) wants to give initiators a better 
position (…) This means more control, ownership, and space for initiators and ad-
ditionally a government that is a partner, gives space, and creates the conditions 
for initiative. (doedemocratie.net, accessed April 2018)
On its ‘do democracy’ web page, the Dutch Ministry of the Interior states that society 
has a growing ‘self-organising capacity’ and, in reaction to that, the government has the 
ambition to ‘let go, facilitate and give space’ to societal initiatives (idem). In the accompa-
nying newsletter, one reads that nowadays, instead of ‘citizen participation’, it is better to 
speak of ‘government participation’ (Rijksoverheid, 2013a). This stance follows the King’s 
speech in 2013, written by the government at that time, stating that The Netherlands 
is becoming a ‘participation society’ with a ‘compact’ public administration that offers 
‘space and opportunities’ (Rijksoverheid, 2013b). Subsequent government agreements 
echo this discourse on ‘giving space’ to societal actors (Rijksoverheid, 2012, 2017), and 
the agreements of the major Dutch cities also envision modest governors that await 
non-governmental initiative (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2014, 2018; Gemeente Rotterdam, 
2014). In this discourse, there is a focus on the actions of non-governmental actors. The 
government describes its own role as a small one, it presents itself as an outside facilita-
13
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tor that plays mainly a coordination role. It generally does not act on its own account but 
in reaction to others’ initiatives.
This focus of Dutch governments on societal action and a facilitative state mirrors 
developments in other Western democracies. In 2010 in the UK for example, the then 
Prime Minister David Cameron advocated a ‘Big Society’ in which societal actors promote 
the public good (Kisby 2010: 484). It is the government’s task to ‘empower communities, 
redistribute power and promote a culture of volunteering’ (Kisby 2010: 484). Cameron’s 
government envisioned a state that ‘facilitates, supports and enables active communities’ 
that ‘do things for themselves’ (Blunkett, 2003: 43). The promotion of societal initiatives 
is shaping the agendas and the rhetoric of governments all over the world (Taylor, 2003). 
What traditionally have been public policies are assigned to non-governmental actors 
(Edelenbos, Van Meerkerk & Schenk, 2018). Like the UK government, governments 
worldwide ‘present a re-conceptualisation of citizen engagement in which individuals, the 
private sector, and third sector groups are set to gain a variety of responsibilities for the 
management of civic space and the provision of public services’ (Buser, 2013: 3).
research into government facilitation
The aim of modern states to give non-governmental actors a more prominent role in the 
creation of public value and public service delivery does not go unnoticed in the Public Ad-
ministration literature. Scholars speak of a ‘responsibilisation’ of non-governmental actors 
(Garland, 2001); of ‘a stepping back of the state and a concern to push responsibilities 
onto the private and voluntary sectors’ (Stoker 1998: 21).
There are various ideas about the reasons behind governments’ focus on societal 
initiatives. Some consider it a response to a more ‘energetic’ society (Hajer, 2011) or a 
way to enhance democratic legitimacy (Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk, 2016). Others think 
that it is primarily an austerity measure (Pestoff, 2012; Meijer, 2016). Whatever the motive 
behind modern governments’ aim to facilitate, there is reason enough to study this type 
of facilitating government. Authorities increasingly seem to choose for the facilitation of 
external initiatives (Buser, 2013; Taylor, 2003) and there is relatively little research into 
the phenomenon.
In Public Administration studies, the emergence of less state-centred forms of gov-
erning is described as the shift from government to governance (Osborne, 2010; Pierre 
& Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1997). The literature discusses several forms of governance 
in which the government collaborates with non-governmental actors, such as network 
governance (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016), public–private partnerships (Greve & Hodge, 
2013), interactive governance (Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk, 2016; Torfing & Triantafillou, 
2011), co-creation and co-production (Brandsen & Honingh, 2016; Voorberg, Bekkers & 
Tummers, 2015), collaborative governance (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2012), and 
collaborative innovation (Sørenson & Torfing, 2011, 2012).
14
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However, this literature does not fully grasp the phenomenon of government fa-
cilitation because, in the governance forms discussed, the government still plays a very 
prominent role. In public–private partnerships for example, governments act as the main 
initiator, agenda setter, principal, and financier (Greve & Hodge, 2013). In collaborative 
governance, ‘the forum is initiated by public agencies or institutions’ (Ansell & Gash, 
2008: 544), and ‘public agencies have a distinctive leadership role’ in it (Ansell & Gash, 
2008: 546). The same holds for other ‘new’ forms of governance, such as co-creation 
and collaborative innovation (Sørensen & Torfing, 2012): the government invites non-
governmental actors to participate in their work. The literature thereby focuses mainly on 
participation of and collaboration with non-governmental actors and not so much on the 
facilitation of external actors’ own initiatives (e.g. Sørensen & Torfing, 2011, 2012).
More applicable to the study of government facilitation is the growing body of literature 
on citizen initiatives and self-organisation (e.g. Edelenbos et al., 2018; Nederhand, Bek-
kers & Voorberg, 2016; Swyngedouw 2005). This literature, however, concentrates on 
citizens as initiators of public value creation, but government facilitation is not limited 
to citizens and civic communities. Governments’ aim to facilitate applies also to private 
actors and, for example, NGOs (Bode & Brandsen, 2014; Buser, 2013; Nikolic & Koontz, 
2008; Westerink et al., 2017). Another limitation of this body of literature is that it analyses 
government facilitation mainly from the non-governmental actors’ perspective. Scholars 
study, for example, how initiatives emerge and develop and how they relate to public 
authorities (e.g. Edelenbos et al., 2018); governments’ perspective on the phenomenon 
is much less studied (Warbroek & Hoppe, 2017).
Furthermore, the available literature on government facilitation is mainly theoretical, 
and descriptions of what facilitation exactly entails are rather general (e.g. Salamon, 
2001; Vigoda, 2002). There are as yet few empirical studies into public authorities that 
(aim to) act as facilitator and, for example, the motives they have and the difficulties that 
they encounter. The empirical observation of public authorities’ focus on the facilitation of 
non-governmental actors, combined with the (lack of accurate) academic knowledge on 
this topic, led to the formulation of the following research question for this thesis:
Why, how, and with what effects do governments facilitate the actions of non-governmental 
actors to create public value?
Public value can be defined as ‘what adds value to the public sphere’ and ‘what the 
public values’ (Bennington, 2009: 233; Hartley, 2010). It relates to goods, services, and 
commodities that are valuable for more than just the producer and are ‘non-rival and non-
excludable in consumption’ (Michael & Pearce II, 2009: 287). What government facilitation 
is exactly, what it is not, and what different actors in the public sphere consider it to be, is 
the subject of this thesis. It is hard to demarcate it precisely as this point. We conduct a 
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comparative case study into five non-governmental initiatives in the Dutch water sector. 
This choice of research design is further discussed in section 1.4.
Sub-research questions
The main research question of this these will be answered through five sub-research 
questions. The first question concerns the concept of facilitation and its characteristics in 
comparison to other governance models. Several scholars describe a form of government 
facilitation although they might use different terms, for example ‘societal self-organization’ 
(Van der Steen, Van Twist & Bressers, 2018: 392) or ‘citizenry coerciveness’ (Vigoda, 
2002: 531). Most of these studies are however not empirical. From the available literature, 
it seems that facilitation contains overlaps with other government models, for example 
with network governance (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016) as authors describe the facilitating 
government as a network manager (Sørenson & Torfing, 2011). Therefore, the first sub-
research question is:
1 What is and is not facilitation? How does government facilitation relate to government 
models such as Traditional Public Administration, New Public Management, and New 
Public Governance?
As our discussion of the literature in section 1.3 will show, there is not much empiri-
cal research yet into the facilitating government in action. Little is known about what a 
government that aims to facilitate societal initiatives actually does and does not do. The 
second sub-research question relates, therefore, to how exactly authorities facilitate:
2 What do (and do not) public authorities do when they facilitate the actions of non-
governmental actors? What tools do they use? What forms of facilitation can be distin-
guished?
Third, there is are a variety of ideas on the motives or explanations for authorities’ choice 
of facilitation. Is it primarily a reaction to changes in society, an attempt to enhance 
democratic legitimacy, or merely an austerity measure? (Bang, 2009; Edelenbos & Van 
Meerkerk, 2016; Meijer, 2016). The third sub-research question is:
3 Why do public authorities (choose to) facilitate the actions of non-governmental actors? 
What are the explanations behind such a strategy?
Different scholars point to the difficulties that authorities face when they facilitate non-
governmental initiatives (e.g. Brownill & Carpenter, 2009; Edelenbos, Van Meerkerk & 
Koppenjan, 2017b; Matos Castaño, Hartmann & Dewulf, 2017). We explore under what 
16
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conditions government facilitation can be a successful governance model despite these 
difficulties:
4 What are the conditions for successful government facilitation? What capacities, re-
sources, relations, and networks do public authorities need in order to facilitate?
Our analysis of the literature in section 1.3 also shows that much is still unknown about 
both the intended and the unintended effects of governments choosing to facilitate non-
governmental initiatives. Therefore, the last set of sub-research questions for this thesis 
is:
5 With what effects do public authorities facilitate non-governmental actors? How does 
the choice of specific forms of facilitation affect the governance processes?
In the next section of this introductory chapter, we discuss the status of government 
facilitation as a distinct government model. Then, we explore the available literature and 
examine what is already known about our research questions. In the last section, we 
present our research and give an overview of the structure of this thesis.
1.2 GoVErnmEnt Facilitation aS a DiStinct GoVErnmEnt 
moDEl
From traditional public administration to new public management to 
new public Governance
Public Administration scholars generally divide the historical development of administra-
tion over the last century into three phases. It is common practice to distinguish an old, 
traditional, or Weberian public administration under the hegemony of the state. The rule 
of law was dominant, and bureaucracy was central in policymaking and implementa-
tion (Weber, 1922; Wilson, 1991). From the 1970s, New Public Management became 
prominent, with a greater involvement of the private sector and private sector techniques 
(Hood, 1991). Authors describe how policymaking and policy implementation were sepa-
rated; governments were supposed to do less rowing and more steering, and parts of 
the public service delivery were contracted out to the market (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).
To characterise the last decennia’s developments in public administration, scholars 
use different terms. The term New Public Governance (Osborne, 2006; 2010) is popular; 
others use Network Governance (Klijn & Koppenjan 2016), Public Value Governance 
(Bryson, Crosby & Bloomberg, 2014), or describe a development from an overloaded to 
a hollowed-out to a congested state (Skelcher, 2000). Regardless of the exact term used, 
17
INTRODUCTION
they all mention more or less the same developments, which can be described as a shift 
from government to governance. This shift includes a shift from hierarchies to networks 
and from command and control to negotiation and persuasion (Salamon, 2001). Govern-
ments are more horizontally organised and work together with a wide range of public and 
private actors; ‘instead of relying exclusively on government to solve public problems, a 
host of other actors is being mobilized’ (Salamon 2001: 1610). This trend towards more 
collaboration became manifest in new governance forms like interactive decision making, 
co-creation, and public–private partnerships (Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk, 2016; Greve & 
Hodge, 2013; Voorberg et al., 2015).
Scholars describe how the role and degree of modern governments’ involvement dif-
fer from case to case. The government has a pragmatic approach, it will be ‘sometimes 
steering, sometimes rowing, sometimes partnering, and sometimes staying out of the 
way’ (Alford & Hughes, 2008; Bryson et al., 2014: 448). The existing literature, how-
ever, focuses mainly on practices in which the government still takes the lead. Forms 
of governance in which the government really ‘stays out of the way’ and chooses solely 
facilitation of non-governmental actors are underrepresented in the literature. There are 
a few exceptions, however, of public administration scholars that describe societal self-
organisation and government facilitation as a distinct form of government (although they 
might name it differently), which we discuss in the next section.
Government facilitation distinguished by others
Back in 1969, Arnstein created the ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’. The ladder visualises 
the relation between government and citizens, varying from manipulation in which there 
is no citizen participation at all, via consultation and partnership, to citizens’ control in 
which citizens have full power. Vigoda (2002: 531) also presents a continuum of public 
administration-citizen interaction. According to his model, this interaction has developed 
from coerciveness, via delegation and responsiveness, to collaboration between govern-
ment and citizen, which is the current status. In the new generation, there will be citizenry 
coerciveness. Citizens transform from partners to owners of the governance process, and 
governments become subjects.
More recently, Edelenbos et al. (2017b: 56–57) speak of three models of democ-
racy: representative, participative and self-organising. In the representative model, the 
electorate votes, after which they are governed by the elected politicians. In the partici-
pative model, societal actors are involved in policymaking and decision making by the 
politicians. In a self-organising democracy, an active civil society solves public problems 
by themselves, facilitated by the government. Comparably, Span, Luijkx, Schalk, and 
Schols (2012) distinguish three governance roles for local governments: commissioner, 
co-producer, and facilitator. When the government acts as facilitator, societal actors self-
steer and initiate public problem solving on their own terms.
18
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Based on, among others, Bourgon (2011) and Van der Steen et al. (2015), Van der 
Steen et al. (2018) add societal self-organisation as a fourth governance perspective to 
the traditional categorisation of Traditional Public Administration, New Public Manage-
ment, and Network Governance. The authors describe how, in the Network Governance 
perspective, the government and societal actors work together and, in the case of soci-
etal self-organisation, the production of public value is fully in the hands of a self-reliant 
citizenry. Government’s actions in this perspective are limited to facilitating, letting go, 
blocking, or simply doing nothing (Van der Steen et al., 2018: 392).
Government facilitation as a sub-form of new public Governance
In line with the above authors, we conceptualise government facilitation at this point as a 
distinct model of government. Not however, as Van der Steen et al. (2018) do, as a fourth 
model, but as a sub-form of New Public Governance, as the counterpart of government 
collaboration. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the characteristics, derived from the litera-
ture, of government facilitation compared to Traditional Public Administration, New Public 
Management, and government collaboration. Collaboration and facilitation together make 
up New Public Governance.
In both government collaboration and facilitation, non-governmental actors have a 
prominent role, they work together with the government to produce public value. Steering 
mechanisms and policy tools can be alike. It is, however, important to make a conceptual 
divide between the two because the role division between the government and non-
governmental actors is substantially different in the models. In the case of government 
collaboration, the government acts as the main definer of public needs and goods (as it 
does in Traditional Public Administration and New Public Management), although it does 
this in collaboration with non-governmental actors. The government is a partner in a policy 
network alongside other public and private actors (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). In the case 
of government facilitation, the government does not function as principal, as definer, and 
as main producer of public value. Non-governmental actors set the agenda and take the 
initiative in the production of public value. The government has a humbler, less dominant 
role, holding back, solely facilitating, and enabling the actions of others (Edelenbos et al., 
2017b; Van der Steen et al., 2018).
19
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table 1.1 Government facilitation in relation to other government models3
traditional public 
administration
new public 
management
new public Governance
Government 
collaboration
Government 
facilitation
Principal, definer 
of public needs
government government government, in 
collaboration with 
market, citizens, 
and other non-
governmental 
actors
market, citizens, 
and other non-
governmental 
actors
producer of 
public goods
government market government in 
collaboration with 
market, citizens, 
and other non-
governmental 
actors
market, citizens, 
and other non-
governmental 
actors, facilitated 
by government
Government role ruler, trustee, 
definer of public 
needs
principal, contract 
manager, definer of 
public needs
partner of non-governmental actors
network manager, 
co-producer of 
public value
subject, facilitator, 
enabler, participant
civil servant 
behaviour
neutral, focus 
on equality and 
integrity
results oriented, 
focus on efficiency, 
customer focused, 
managerial
active, networking, 
focus on 
collaboration, 
sensitive to 
environment
humble, holds 
back, enabling, 
facilitating
Steering 
mechanisms
bureaucracy, 
policy, command- 
and-(coercive) 
control
performance 
measurement, 
contract 
management, 
holding 
accountable
collaboration, partnerships, negotiation 
and persuasion, compromises, 
trust, incentives, institutional design, 
modulation, connect to societal 
initiatives
role of non-
governmental 
actors
subject, voter, 
taxpayer, passive 
receiver
client, active 
customer
partner of the government
stakeholder, 
participant, co-
producer of public 
value
initiator, producer 
of public value
citizen–
government 
relation
government 
coerciveness
delegation, 
responsiveness
collaboration citizenry 
coerciveness
Based on Edelenbos et al. (2017b); Meijer (2016); Nederhand et al. (2016); Salamon (2001); Skelcher (2000); 
Sørenson & Torfing (2011, 2012); Van der Steen et al. (2018); Vigoda (2002).
3 These models are of course a simplification (as all scientific models). They are theoretical constructs 
and some scholars even suggest that they are no more than that (Imrie & Raco, 1999; Kjær, 2011; 
Schillemans, 2013). The models are archetypes at least, and, in reality, elements of them overlap and 
often coexist (Osborne 2006: 378).
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1.3 GoVErnmEnt Facilitation in thE pUblic 
aDminiStration litEratUrE
how do governments facilitate?
How does the facilitating government actually facilitate societal initiatives? Stoker (1998: 
24) points to public administration scholars’ difficulty in describing the new role of govern-
ment: ‘The literature is striving hard to find adjectives to describe the new ‘light-touch’ 
form of government.’ Still, a handful of scholars have written about the roles, tasks and 
tools of the facilitating government.
Sørenson (2006), Sørenson and Torfing (2011, 2012) and Torfing and Triantafillou 
(2011) use the term metagovernance, literally meaning the governance of governance, 
to describe the new role of the government. They differentiate between hands-on and 
hands-on metagovernance. Hands-on metagovernance resembles active network man-
agement, hands-off metagovernance is more about facilitation. Both, however, mainly 
relate to the involvement of citizens in policymaking and implementation, and not so much 
to the facilitation of societal – public and private – initiatives. The term metagovernance 
indicates that, instead of participating in the governance process itself, the government 
is governing the process in which others take part. Through metagovernance, the gov-
ernment ensures that the self-regulated actions of non-governmental actors are ‘in line 
with the overall goals of the government’ (Dean, 1999; Torfing & Triantafillou, 2011: 8). 
Besides metagovernor, the role of the facilitating government is described by others as 
‘enabler’, ‘catalytic agent’, and ‘commissioner’ (Page & Wright, 2007; Stoker, 1998: 24). 
According to Vigoda (2002), the new generation government is a subject, whereas the 
citizen becomes the owner of the governance process.
The main task or act of the facilitating government, which follows logically from this 
role description, is to ‘organize the self-organization’ of non-governmental actors (Van 
der Steen et al., 2018: 392). The government can mobilise the relevant actors around a 
certain public problem (Sørenson & Torfing (2011, 2012). For this mobilisation, it can use, 
for example, persuasion (Page & Wright 2007; Salamon, 2001), stimulation (Edelenbos et 
al., 2017b), activation (Page & Wright, 2007), and encouragement (Healy, 2006). The gov-
ernment enables the collaboration between these actors that it has brought together and 
shapes the collaboration context (Sørenson, 2006). It orchestrates and modulates their 
work, for example by negotiation (Salamon, 2001) and ‘relieving bottlenecks’ (Warbroek 
& Hoppe, 2017: 6). Edelenbos et al. (2017b: 59) call this ‘procedural monitoring’. Van der 
Steen et al. (2018: 392) point to some other important tasks of the facilitating government, 
namely, ‘block’, ‘let go’, or ‘do nothing’ to let non-government actors truly self-organise.
More concretely, some authors describe specific tools or instruments that a facilitating 
government can use in performing its tasks. Salamon (2001: 1645) identifies social and 
economic regulation. Sørensen and Torfing (2009) identify institutional design, subsidy 
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schemes, network and process management, and framing and storytelling. Bakker, Dent-
ers, Oude Vrielink, and Klok (2012: 400–401) differentiate between tools for network 
structuration and tools for process management. Laws, statutes, and formal and informal 
rules can be used to structure the ‘playing field’ for non-governmental initiatives. By 
building trust, developing interpersonal contacts, creating a sense of commitment, creat-
ing a shared understanding, and agenda control, authorities can manage the process. 
Nederhand et al. (2016: 1067–1068) further identify monitoring, formulating playing rules, 
imposing strategic frameworks, playing with fear, and offering support, for example by 
providing legal assistance or financial help.
This overview shows that there is quite some overlap between government collabora-
tion and facilitation, and that most authors do not differentiate between the two. Therefore, 
it is hard to pinpoint what a facilitating government actually does and does not do based 
on this literature.
Explanations for a shift to government facilitation
Why do authorities opt for government facilitation, what are the explanations for a shift 
to this form of governance? Some scholars see governments’ choice of facilitation as a 
reaction to a perceived democratic deficit of representative democracy, more assertive 
citizens and a growing call in society for more participation in decision making and poli-
cymaking (Barnes, Newman & Sullivan, 2004; Meijer, 2016; Michels, 2011). Facilitating 
societal initiatives is then seen as a way to increase democratic legitimacy (Edelenbos 
& Van Meerkerk, 2016). Other scholars consider the shift to facilitation as a response 
to a more active or ‘energetic’ society (Hajer, 2011): to a growth in civic engagement 
and community self-organisation (Bang, 2009; Marien, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2010). They 
argue that governments are more facilitative because societal actors are more proactive 
about creating public value by themselves (Edelenbos et al., 2018).
Another recurring explanation is that public authorities have no choice but to facilitate 
and collaborate with non-governmental actors because of an ‘ever growing societal di-
versity and complexity’ (Kooiman & Jentoft, 2009: 820). Public problems are increasingly 
‘wicked’ and can no longer be solved by the government alone, it is argued. Authorities 
have to work with a wide variety of private and public actors to resolve them. These actors 
bring in new resources, financial resources but also such things as knowledge that the 
government lacks (Bode & Brandsen, 2014; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). Facilitation, just 
like collaboration, is seen as a way to increase the availability of resources and enhance 
productivity and public innovation (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2006).
Not all scholars share the view that governments’ choice to facilitate is a logical and 
inevitable response to societal changes. Some consider it primarily a deliberate, politi-
cal choice of governors (Dickinson & Sullivan, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2005). Meijer (2016: 
603), for example, states that ‘the new structure of relations cannot just be regarded as 
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something that political activists demanded – more democracy! – but also as a change 
that was imposed on citizens from the perspective of declining government budgets – 
less cost!’ Governments’ focus on societal initiative is considered an austerity measure in 
reaction to ongoing fiscal stress (Pestoff, 2012). Lastly, there are scholars who ascribe the 
shift to facilitation to the state’s reputation as being bureaucratic, inflexible, and inefficient. 
A widespread believe is that ‘the state is bad and almost anything else—the free market, 
charities, volunteers—is better’ (Kisby, 2010: 485). By taking a step back and giving space 
to these non-governmental actors, the government might hope to enhance its reputation.
The difficulties of government facilitation
The literature discusses several factors that can cause difficulties for authorities that aim 
to facilitate non-governmental initiatives. First, there are historical factors. Path dependen-
cies, institutions, and bureaucratic values that ensure continuity and stability prevent the 
emergence of innovative collaborations between authorities and non-governmental actors 
(Van Buuren, Eshuis & Bressers, 2015). Authorities in participatory spatial planning, for 
example, have a hard time adapting to societal initiatives. They hold on to policy instru-
ments that keep them in a central position, and planning proposals remain controlled by 
the government (Boonstra & Boelens, 2011). Regarding local energy initiatives, authori-
ties manifest an impromptu and opportunistic response because of path dependencies 
and institutional legacy (Warbroek & Hoppe, 2017). The historically grounded structure 
of the political system makes politicians also fall back on traditional roles. A lack of trust-
ful relationships between them and external initiators and a lack of boundary spanning 
between the two further hinders politicians from facilitating non-governmental initiatives 
(Edelenbos et al., 2017b).
Second, there are contextual factors that form a barrier to government facilitation, such 
as the under-development of metagovernance tools. These tools are often inadequate 
and energy and time consuming, thereby impeding the facilitation process (Haveri et al., 
2009). Besides politicians, civil servants also have to adapt to a new role. They have to 
develop from ‘inward-looking bureaucratic clerks, and passive servants to their political 
masters’ to ‘stewards of public assets with restless value-seeking imaginations’ (Bening-
ton & Moore, 2010: 3). Another reason why facilitation can be difficult for authorities is that 
the government is ultimately held accountable for the satisfactory delivery of public goods 
and services, and this obstructs a transfer of responsibilities to non-governmental actors 
(McGuire, 2006; Meijer, 2016; Reynaers & De Graaf, 2014; Thaler & Levin-Keitel, 2016).
Third, there are factors related to the content of governments’ policy goals. In this 
regard, Matos Castaño et al. (2017) discuss the intervention dilemma as a hindrance 
to government facilitation. This is a dilemma that authorities encounter when they aim 
to encourage non-governmental initiatives but at the same time control the initiatives to 
safeguard predetermined policy goals. Similarly, there are tensions between governability 
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and flexibility for the facilitating government, between co-operation and competition for 
resources between societal initiators, between accountability and efficiency, and between 
openness to an unrestricted number of participants and closedness to reach the policy 
goal (Brownill & Carpenter, 2009). All these tensions make government facilitation a form 
of governance that is hard for authorities to sustain (Jessop, 2000). Research shows that 
despite many authorities’ intention to facilitate non-governmental initiatives, a lot of them 
eventually fall back on traditional, top-down forms of governing (Brownill & Carpenter, 
2009; Haveri, Nyholm, Røiseland & Vabo, 2009; Whitehead, 2003).
The effects of government facilitation
The intended results of government facilitation listed in the literature mirror the motives 
discussed earlier. Some of the intended results, such as enhancing democratic citizen-
ship, social cohesion, and solidarity, apply specifically to the facilitation of the citizens’ 
initiatives (Lowndes & Sullivan, 2008). Others, such as the enhancement of the legitimacy 
of government policies, are more general and relate to the facilitation of all sorts of non-
governmental initiatives (Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk, 2016; Thaler & Levin-Keitel, 2016). 
More innovative solutions to ‘wicked’ public problems can be another intended result (Klijn 
& Koppenjan, 2016; Peters & Pierre, 1998), as also cost reduction (Pestoff, 2012; Meijer, 
2016) and enhancing the state’s reputation (Kisby, 2010).
Besides these intended results, multiple scholars point to the undesirable side ef-
fects of government facilitation, for example in terms of inequality and legitimacy (Meijer, 
2016; Taylor, 2007). Although one of the aims of the facilitation of societal initiatives can 
be to increase democratic legitimacy, the opposite might happen (Alexander, Priest & 
Mees, 2016; Haveri et al., 2009). Swyngedouw (2005) calls new, horizontal governance 
arrangements Janus-faced because they privilege certain social actors and ignore the 
ideas of less well-organised groups. Westerink et al. (2017: 17) suggest that govern-
ments should find additional mechanisms to include the voice of stakeholders other than 
the initiators. Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith (2005: 589) highlight the tension between the 
imperatives of democracy and delivery. Edelenbos et al. (2018: 18) find that, because 
politicians question the legitimacy and representativeness of societal initiatives, they are 
hesitant to facilitate them.
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1.4 prESEntation oF thE rESEarch: caSES, mEthoDS, 
StrUctUrE oF thE thESiS
case study design
We chose to study government facilitation by conducting five in-depth case studies. In 
the following chapters of this theses, which have been or are going to be published as 
international peer-reviewed journal articles, different sets of these cases are discussed 
and compared to answer the research questions. A multiple case study design fits the 
topic and the type of questions that we aim to answer in this thesis. Because relatively 
little is yet known about the facilitating government in action, this study is explorative 
(Blatter & Haverland, 2012; Flyvbjerg, 2001). The case study design allows in-depth 
knowledge to be gained on the complex phenomenon that government facilitation is, 
and the facilitating government and its environment can be studied as a whole (Stake, 
1998; Yin, 2014, 2018). It provides a detailed and contextualised understanding of the 
research object (Edelenbos et al., 2018); it does not allow for direct generalisations or 
readymade solutions to public problems (Hufen & Koppenjan, 2015). The aim is to gain a 
better insight into the dynamics of government facilitation by studying a small number of 
cases in detail. A consequence of our research design, our study will not lead to empirical 
knowledge that is easy to generalise.
case selection
Through strategic sampling, we selected five cases in which Dutch water authorities facili-
tate, or aim to facilitate, non-governmental initiatives. The initiatives are taken by private 
actors and by an NGO. By making this selection, we add to the existing literature, which 
focuses mainly on citizen initiatives facilitated by local governments. Local governments 
have a tradition of facilitating societal initiatives; for national governments it is a more 
novel approach. We therefore chose to focus also on these other governments. The fa-
cilitating authorities in our cases are municipalities, provinces, ministries, and the national 
government’s executive organisation for infrastructure and water, Rijkswaterstaat.
The Dutch water sector is an interesting sector in which to study government facilita-
tion for several reasons. Traditionally, the sector is government-led, publicly funded, and 
strongly anchored in laws and regulations (Van Buuren et al., 2015). Water management 
focuses primarily on controlling water, safety, and risk avoidance (Van Buuren et al., 2015; 
Roovers & Van Buuren, 2014). Values that are important in government facilitation, such 
as adaptation, flexibility, and responsiveness, thus seem at odds with the dominant values 
in the Dutch water sector. The selected cases can therefore be considered extreme cases 
(Yin, 2018) compared to other cases of government facilitation. In the Dutch water sector 
collaboration with non-governmental actors is generally seen as a threat to decisive and 
uncompromised action (Warner, 2006). Recently however, the sector has been gradu-
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ally opening up to more collaboration (Van Buuren, Grotenbreg, Duijn & Roovers, 2019; 
Van Buuren, Klijn & Edelenbos, 2012), leading to interesting cases to study authorities’ 
exploration of facilitation.
The case selection includes four cases in which the authorities aim to facilitate 
sustainable energy generation by private actors at public water works (Afsluitdijk, Ooster-
scheldekering, Brouwersdam tidal power plant, and Grevelingendam tidal test centre) 
and one case in which an NGO (Natuurmonumenten) took the initiative to realise a new 
nature reserve (Marker Wadden) in a freshwater lake. Because the initiatives are located 
at public assets, owned and managed by the government and vital for flood protection, 
the government cannot stand aside and let the non-governmental actors do their thing; 
the authorities’ involvement is indispensable. The authorities also want to be involved and 
support the initiatives because the latter are believed to be beneficial for nature develop-
ment, innovation, sustainability, and regional economic development, among other things. 
The authorities are not willing, however, to realise and finance the projects themselves, 
therefore they opt for facilitation and accommodate non-governmental initiatives.
Our case selection enables a multiple case study because the cases are comparable 
but different. The sector, authorities involved, and time path are, to a certain degree, alike. 
The characteristics of the non-governmental initiatives, the strategy choices of the au-
thorities, and the outcomes are different. Furthermore, the case selection covers various 
forms of facilitation allowing an exploration of the differences. The fact that our findings 
cannot be generalised to others sectors than the Dutch water sector one-to-one does 
not mean that they cannot be useful for practitioners and scholars studying government 
facilitation in other sectors. We elaborate on the generalisability of our findings in section 
6.8 of the conclusion of this thesis.
Data collection
We collected our data through a combination of document analysis, interviews, and 
(participant) observations. The first step of the data collection on a case was generally 
an extensive search for relevant documents. These could include newspaper articles, 
governmental policy briefs and notes, permit and subsidy applications and allocations, 
statements of the actors involved, agreements between these actors, project and com-
pany websites, and tender and market consultation documents. In the Marker Wadden 
case, we also analysed a large number of documents – disclosed under the Freedom of 
Information Act – containing the confidential communications between the government 
and NGO Natuurmonumenten. We also consulted scientific work of others on the cases 
under study, for example of Lenferink, Leendertse, Arts, and Tillema (2012) and Janssen, 
Mol, Van Tatenhove and Otter (2014) on the Afsluitdijk case and Waterhout, Zonneveld 
and Louw (2014) on the Marker Wadden case. The document analysis was, among other 
things, used to reconstruct the timeline of the cases and identify the actors involved and 
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their positions. In one of the sub-studies, we used the policy documents on two of our 
cases to conduct a qualitative content analysis; the specifics of this analysis can be found 
in Chapter 3.
We conducted around 10 in-depth semi-structured interviews per case and used the 
transcripts of more than 20 interviews conducted by students writing their master thesis. 
We aimed to interview at least one representative of all the key players in each case. 
These included civil servants in municipalities, provinces, ministries, and Rijkswaterstaat, 
project managers, and (potential) non-governmental initiators, including the directors of 
the private firms that generate renewable energy at the public water works and of Natuur-
monumenten. We further interviewed a representative of an autonomous public agency 
providing subsidies and the chairman of an umbrella organisation representing private 
firms in the water sector, among others. For all in-depth and semi-structured interviews, 
we prepared a list of talking points ahead of the interviews but generally only used these 
at the end to check that we had not missed any important topics. Most interviews lasted 
between one and two hours. Further specifics of the people interviewed per case and 
their associations and the topics discussed can be found in the methodology sections of 
the relevant chapters. Besides the document analysis and the interviews, we attended 
several meetings in which public authorities, potential private initiators, and other stake-
holders met to discuss the realisation of projects. More elaborate descriptions of the cases 
and of the research design of the sub-studies can be found in the relevant chapters.
Structure of the thesis
The multiple case studies of which our study on government facilitation in the Dutch water 
sector consist are reported on in the following chapters. In Chapter 2, four initiatives to 
realise integrated energy and water works are analysed. We examine how the authorities 
facilitate these initiatives and differentiate between four administrative capacities that 
authorities can employ to do this. In Chapter 3 we conduct a content analysis of the 
discourse of authorities that aim to facilitate external initiatives. We compare the govern-
ment’s communication in the Afsluitdijk and Brouwersdam cases and find 10 facilitation 
frame elements that combine into two forms of facilitation. In Chapter 4, we compare 
the Brouwersdam case with the Marker Wadden case to determine the difficulties and 
dilemmas encountered by facilitating authorities when they employ different forms of fa-
cilitation. We find out how authorities deal with these dilemmas, with what consequences. 
In Chapter 5 we study the dynamics in the strategy of authorities that aim to facilitate, 
and we formulate explanations for the frequent strategy changes. We end with overall 
conclusions in Chapter 6. Table 1.2 gives an overview of the thesis chapters and articles. 
Table 1.3 shows in which empirical chapters the research questions are addressed.
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table 1.2 Structure of this thesis
chapter article title research question Empirical work outlet
1 Introduction
2 Realizing innovative 
public waterworks: 
Aligning administrative 
capacities in 
collaborative innovation 
processes
What capacities 
are employed by 
public authorities to 
support public–private 
innovation and with what 
consequences?
Multiple case study 
of four integrated 
energy and water 
works
Published 
in Journal 
of Cleaner 
Production
3 Facilitation as 
a governance 
strategy. Unravelling 
government’s 
facilitation frames
How do governments 
use discursive framing to 
activate non-governmental 
actors to produce public 
goods (in this case, energy 
from water)?
Multiple case study 
of Afsluitdijk and 
Brouwersdam tidal 
power plant
Published in 
Sustainability
4 Government facilitation 
of external initiatives: 
how Dutch water 
authorities cope with 
value dilemmas
What dilemmas do water 
authorities encounter when 
they choose to facilitate 
external initiatives; how 
do they deal with these 
dilemmas; and with what 
results?
Multiple case study 
of Brouwersdam 
tidal power plant 
and Marker 
Wadden
Published in 
International 
Journal of 
Water Resource 
Development
5 The U-turn in 
government facilitation: 
how Dutch water 
authorities facilitate 
non-governmental 
initiatives
How does the strategy of 
public authorities regarding 
non-governmental initiatives 
change over time and what 
are the explanations for 
these changes of strategy?
Multiple case study 
of Afsluitdijk and 
Marker Wadden
Accepted for 
publication in 
Public Works 
Management & 
Policy
6 Conclusions and 
discussion
table 1.3 Sub research questions addressed in empirical thesis chapters
chapter 2 chapter 3 chapter 4 chapter 5
1 concept
2 tools, forms
3 motives
4 conditions
5 Effects

2 Realizing Innovative Public Waterworks: Aligning Administrative 
Capacities in Collaborative Innovation 
Processes
30
CHAPTER 2
abStract
The importance of government support for innovation is widely acknowledged, but the 
way governments support innovation is changing. We discern three trends: local inno-
vation policies are gaining importance; governments increasingly choose a bottom-up, 
tailor-made approach to support specific innovations; and there is more collaboration 
between public and private actors. We analyse these trends and investigate how modern 
governments employ their administrative capacities to support innovation. We conduct 
a comparative case study of four attempts to realize integrated energy and waterworks, 
combining water safety and sustainable energy generation. Despite broad support, at-
tempts to realize such innovative, multifunctional works in The Netherlands have had 
varying degrees of success. We examine the governmental support for these attempts 
and assess how governments’ actions affect the innovation process. We conclude that all 
governmental administrative capacities have to be employed, and that public alignment is 
crucial for a synchronized endeavour. We elucidate the growing importance and special 
role of local authorities in innovation and demonstrate how modern governments spur in-
novation with tailor-made support in close collaboration with the private sector. We further 
conclude that ‘encouraging interaction’ is an insufficient public contribution to innovation 
and that expectations must be carefully managed to avoid role confusion in public-private 
innovation.
This chapter has been published as Grotenbreg, S., & Van Buuren, A. (2018). Realizing 
innovative public waterworks: Aligning administrative capacities in collaborative innova-
tion processes. Journal of Cleaner Production, 171 Supplement, S45-S55. doi:10.1016/j.
jclepro.2016.08.128
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2.1 trEnDS in GoVErnmEntal SUpport For innoVation
It has become common practice to understand innovation as a result not solely of a 
private firm’s research and technology activities (Smith, 2000), but also of the complex 
interaction between private producers, public policy, consumers, research and education, 
politics and infrastructure (Lundvall, 2010). The important role of governmental action in 
the generation, diffusion and adoption of innovation is widely acknowledged (Etzkowitz, 
2003). This role is changing however. Different trends can be discerned in the way gov-
ernments support innovation.
First, there is a gradual dispersal of innovation policy away from the national govern-
ment towards regional and transnational (European) authorities, leading to a more multi-
level setting (Partzsch, 2009: 986). Public research, technology and innovation are no 
longer exclusively in the hands of national authorities (Kuhlmann, 2001: 953). Reacting 
to the perceived failure of national governments to address environmental challenges, 
local governments are for example implementing their own policies to support innovation 
for sustainability, in a ‘rebirth of regionalism’ (Garret-Jones, 2004: 3). The emergence of 
‘smart’ cities is one example (Cohen & Amorós, 2014). Local governments are seeking 
to attract the creative class, establish innovation districts and profit from the job creation 
that innovation brings (Cohen & Amorós, 2014; Doh & Kim, 2014). The local environment 
is an important determinant of a private firm’s capacity to innovate, and research shows 
that R&D intensity and innovation activity vary more across regions than across national 
states (Oughton, Landabaso & Morgan 2002).
Related to this trend towards localization is the trend towards more applied, tailor-
made governmental support for innovation. Increasingly, policy measures are developed 
in interaction with industry and universities (Etzkowitz & Klofsten, 2005). This results in 
‘smart regulation, a new type of negotiated settlement in which improved procedures 
allow for better, institutionally assured cooperation, more ambitious goals and limited 
administrative costs’ (Partzsch, 2009: 985). Instead of ‘sponsoring grand technology 
citadels’, governments increasingly choose a more bottom-up approach, aimed at estab-
lishing local clusters, knowledge hubs and innovation districts (Garret-Jones, 2004: 3).
The third trend is the focus on collaborative governance and a more coordinating 
role for governments. Modern governments increasingly rely on collaboration to realize 
their policy goals. A host of non-governmental actors, public and private, are mobilized to 
solve today’s ‘wicked’ public problems (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; Salamon, 2001). This 
also applies to the field of environmental innovation policymaking. Now that the state’s 
capacity to deal with environmental challenges is diminishing, ‘other actors and insti-
tutional arrangements are stepping in’ (Francesch-Huidobro, 2015: 11). The role of the 
government in innovation processes shifts to ‘encouraging interaction and cooperation 
between institutional spheres’ (Etzkowitz, 2003; Lundberg, 2013: 213). A result of this 
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trend towards collaborative governance is the blending of public and private innovation. 
Governments often involve private actors to address (traditionally) public problems. They 
try, for example, to increase private investments in innovation in the water sector (World 
Bank, 2004).
The vast literature on government support for innovation generally distinguishes 
between supply-oriented and demand-oriented policy instruments (Aschhoff & Wolfgang, 
2009; Guerzoni & Raiteri, 2015). The former stimulate the supply side of innovation, for 
example by providing subsidies to private firms to support their R&D activities. Demand-
side instruments stimulate the market for innovative products and services, for example 
by public procurement or mandatory standards. Many studies test the effectiveness of a 
specific policy instrument for innovation, for example public procurement (Uyarra et al., 
2014) or R&D project subsidies (Kang & Park, 2012). Recently, growing attention has 
been given to the combined effect of various policy instruments (Rogge & Reichardt, 
2013). The term policy mix is used to refer to the ‘set of different and complementary 
policy instruments to address the problems identified’ (Borrás & Edquist, 2013: 1514). 
The current literature, however, still focuses predominantly on traditional governmental 
support for innovation. There is a dearth of research exploring how local governments 
support innovation (Mazzarol et al., 2014) and, although innovation in the public and the 
private sector are melding, the literature on public and the literature on private innovation 
are still largely separated. There are, in other words, few studies that cover the new ways 
in which governments support innovation and the capacities they employ in doing this. 
Therefore we formulated the research question: What capacities are employed by public 
authorities to support public-private innovation and with what consequences?
To answer this question, we analyse four cases that reflect the trends in governmental 
support for innovation. We compare four regional projects in which public and private 
actors collaborate to add innovative techniques for sustainable energy generation (tidal 
energy, salinity gradient power) to public waterworks. Not only are these techniques in-
novative. Also the fact that public waterworks are used for commercial goals is novel, as is 
the way in which public and private actors have to collaborate to realize the implementa-
tion of the innovative techniques.
Transnational, national and local governments are involved in the projects, and their 
role differs per case. We unravel how the authorities contribute to the innovation pro-
cesses by mobilizing different administrative capacities. We do not focus on the support 
of one sole government or policy instrument, but rather analyse the actual mix of different 
instruments and resources in a multi-level and multi-actor setting, thereby zooming in on a 
tailor-made form of governmental support for specific innovation projects. We investigate 
what extra activities authorities undertake to spur the adoption of innovations, in addition 
to the institutional framework of policies, rules and regulations at national level. Instead 
of comparing national systems, we thereby analyse variation within one such system to 
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determine whether different mixes of employed capacities result into different outcomes. 
In Section 2.2, we further elaborate the public-private nature of integrated energy and 
waterworks and the special position of authorities in realizing them.
2.2 oUr rESEarch: intEGratED EnErGy anD WatErWorkS 
aS pUbic-priVatE innoVation
Innovation can be defined as ‘the successful exploration of new ideas’ (Francis & Bessant, 
2005: 171) or, more elaborately, as ‘the recognition of opportunities for profitable change 
and the pursuit of those opportunities all the way through to their adoption in practice’ 
(Baumol, 2002). The technologies used in our cases, such as the turbines that generate 
tidal energy and the membranes for osmotic energy, are typical, private sector innovations 
developed by private firms for ‘cost reduction, market expansion and profit maximization’ 
(Schumpeter, 1934; Stoneman, 1983). These techniques are implemented, however, 
in public infrastructure, in dams, sluices, levees and dikes that normally are used only 
for flood risk safety and water management. As these waterworks are publically owned 
and managed, realizing integrated energy and waterworks thus inevitably has a public 
component. Such works could therefore be called public-private innovations.
In the water sector governmental support is of great importance to achieve innovation, 
because, compared to other sectors, the R&D intensity and innovation rate is relatively 
low (Ipektsidis et al., 2014). Innovation in the water sector is driven predominantly by 
regulatory developments and social and environmental factors and much less by market 
demand and competitiveness (European Commission, 2014: 275). The relatively low 
profitability is one of the reasons for the lagging private investments in water innova-
tion (World Bank, 2004). The same holds for the renewable energy sector; technology 
development for renewable power generation is largely driven by governmental support 
(Cantner, Graf, Hermann & Kalthaus, 2014).
To realize integrated energy & waterworks besides the cooperation of public asset 
managers is essential. Their cooperation is not straightforward however, because the 
infrastructure used in energy and waterworks is vital for flood protection and the supply 
of fresh water. Dutch water management, anchored in laws and regulations, focuses on 
risk avoidance, and public asset managers have a strict, monofunctional task orientation 
(Roovers & Van Buuren, 2014; Van Buuren et al., 2015). It is therefore not easy to accom-
modate other functions at waterworks, as required in integrated energy and waterworks.
Governments generally promote innovation because it fosters economic growth 
(Aschhoff & Wolfgang, 2009: 1235; Smith, 2000: 75). Innovation is believed to increase 
competition, create jobs and generate wealth for individuals and the nation (Michael & 
Pearce II, 2009: 285). These objectives also apply to governments’ support for integrated 
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energy and waterworks. In addition however, the realization of such works contributes 
to climate adaptation, sustainability and the transformation towards a green economy; 
and local governments hope that the innovative constructions will attract tourists and 
international businesses to their region.
The factors described combine into a complex position for authorities in the realization 
of integrated energy and waterworks. In our study, we take a closer look at this special po-
sition and investigate how authorities’ contributions influence the attempts to realize such 
works. In Section 2.3, we discuss the literature on the different capacities governmental 
actors can employ to support innovation.
2.3 aDminiStratiVE capacitiES to SUpport innoVation
administrative capacities of the modern state
There is a huge literature on organizations’ capacities and capabilities. Most authors take 
a resource-based view (Nelson & Winter, 1982), wherein institutional capacities are con-
sidered the core competences of organizations, built up over a long period of interaction 
and collaboration in which actors develop routines and competences that are essential for 
their joint effectiveness (Spekkink, 2013; Wehn de Montalvo & Alaerts, 2013). We focus 
solely on the level of government organizations and take a more instrumental view on 
capacities as the resources and instruments an organization uses to realize its ambitions.
To investigate the extra activities undertaken by governments to support the realiza-
tion of integrated energy and waterworks, we use Lodge and Wegrich’s (2014) theoretical 
framework on the administrative capacities of the modern state. Lodge and Wegrich’s 
administrative capacities relate to the four principal governing resources: treasure, no-
dality, organization and authority (Hood, 1986; Howlett, 2000). In line with Lodge and 
Wegrich, we define administrative capacities as the sets of skills and competencies that 
authorities employ to address today’s governance challenges, distinguishing between 
delivery capacity, analytical capacity, coordination capacity and regulatory capacity. In 
the rest of this section, we further define these four capacities and how they are used by 
authorities to support the adoption innovation.
Delivery capacity to support innovation
Delivery capacity is an authority’s capability to make things happen; it consists of the 
resources that governments use to perform their primary tasks at the policy frontline 
(Lodge & Wegrich, 2014). A state’s delivery capacity relates to its treasure; it includes for 
example grants and loans and, in modern times, research funding (Hood, 1986; Howlett, 
2000: 420). Government funding is an important stimulus for innovation (Guerzoni & 
Raiteri, 2015; Hyytinen & Toivanen, 2005). In collaborative innovation processes, access 
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to resources is one of the fundamental conditions brought in by governmental actors 
(Sørensen & Torfing, 2012: 8). Authorities use their delivery capacity to spur innovation 
by providing ‘funds, human resources (…) risk capital and base capital’ (Moon & Bretsch-
neider, 1997: 61). With their delivery capacity, they can support both the supply side 
of innovation, e.g. with R&D subsidies, and the demand site, by purchasing innovative 
products in public procurement procedures (Caerteling, Halman & Dorée, 2008; Cantner 
et al., 2014).
analytical capacity to support innovation
Authorities’ analytical capacity is based on the information that authorities have at their 
disposal and use to make policy choices; it is the knowledge that informs decision making. 
This form of capacity ‘addresses demands on forecasting and intelligence that informs 
policy making under conditions of uncertainty’ (Lodge & Wegrich, 2014: 14). Analytical 
capacity relates to the governing resource nodality and stems for example from the 
state’s access to networks of expertise. Examples of nodality-based policy instruments 
are advice and training, education and information provision (Hood, 1986; Howlett, 2000).
Governments can use their analytical capacity to support innovation by providing 
knowledge and information. This can be done in an indirect way by financing universities 
that generate knowledge spill-overs to the private market (Aschhoff & Wolfgang, 2009: 
1237; Moon & Bretschneider, 1997) or in more direct ways by bringing data into innovation 
processes. In collaborative innovation, one of the roles of governmental actors is to bring 
‘new knowledge into play (…) and encourage transformative learning and out of the box 
thinking’ (Sørensen & Torfing, 2012: 8). In the case of integrated energy and waterworks, 
access to governmental data on water streams and environmental conditions is essential 
for successful realization.
coordination capacity to support innovation
Coordination capacity is the capacity to ‘bring the necessary actors together to achieve 
problem-solving’ (Lodge & Wegrich, 2014: 13). Besides being one of the participants in 
collaborative governance, government can act as the organizer or facilitator of the pro-
cess, bringing participants together and ‘aligning organizations from different backgrounds 
under often tricky conditions’ (Lodge & Wegrich, 2014: 13). Salamon (2001: 1638) speaks 
of the ‘new government’s orchestration skills’. In modern times, governments do not ‘play 
all the instruments alone’ and they cannot depend on ‘control and demand’; instead, they 
use their coordination capacity to enable the orchestra’s performance.
In innovation the government’s role as network manager, boundary spanner, broker 
and intermediary is also gaining importance (Gregersen, 1992; Howells, 2006; Partzsch, 
2009). Modern governments promote innovation by encouraging interaction among 
institutional spheres (Etzkowitz, 2003; Lundberg, 2013: 213). Authorities have to ‘cre-
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ate, institutionalize, and manage open and flexible arenas for collaborative interaction 
with other relevant and affected actors’ to make innovation possible (Nambisan, 2008; 
Sørensen & Torfing, 2011: 16).
regulatory capacity to support innovation
Regulatory capacity (Lodge & Wegrich, 2014: 11) is the modern state’s capacity to pro-
hibit or permit and refers to the government’s power to constrain economic and social 
activities. Regulatory capacity is based on the governing resource, authority; associated 
policy instruments are regulations and licences, and in modern states, labelling, treaties 
and political agreements (Hood, 1986; Howlett, 2000: 420).
Authorities can use their regulatory capacity to spur innovation by adding, improving 
or removing regulation (Aschhoff & Wolfgang, 2009; Cohen & Amorós, 2014; Gregersen, 
1992). The literature on innovation often identifies rules and regulations as a hindrance 
to innovation (Sørensen & Torfing, 2012). One function of regulations is to eliminate 
risk, whereas the acceptance of risk is a precondition for innovation (Brown & Osborne, 
2013). Rules can, however, also be necessary to make innovation possible. In the case 
of integrated energy and waterworks, there is on the one hand an overload of rules; 
there are many, often conflicting, laws and regulations concerning water safety, energy 
generation and nature conservation. On the other hand however, there is an institutional 
vacuum, there are no rules yet specifically aimed at integrated energy and waterworks. 
Governments can thus stimulate innovation by using their regulatory capacity to abolish 
or adjust rules or draft new ones, for example in the form of new ‘organizational or juridical 
arrangement, additional contracts, temporary permissions or bilateral agreements or new 
policy rules’ (Van Buuren et al., 2015: 694).
2.4 mEthoDoloGy
case selection
The cases selected are The New Afsluitdijk, Tidal Power Plant Brouwersdam, Ooster-
scheldekering and Testing Centre Grevelingendam. As stated, these cases were selected 
because they display the three trends in governmental support for innovation discerned 
from the literature. The technologies used, the membranes and tidal turbines, are private 
sector innovations. Their implementation in public waterworks, that are essential for flood 
protection and are managed by water authorities with a monofunctional task orientation, 
is as much as an innovation however. We can learn much from these cases because 
they can be considered as most extreme cases in water innovation (Seawright & Ger-
ring, 2008). On the one hand, there is a strong shared belief that the Dutch have to 
invest in their world-leading position with regard to innovative delta technology. Both the 
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national government (with innovation policies aimed at stimulating innovation in a couple 
of top sectors, including water) and the regional authorities emphasize the importance 
of making the Dutch Delta the worldwide window of innovative delta solutions. At the 
same time-as elaborated in Section 2.2-the collaboration of the responsible water author-
ity is indispensable to realize this kind of innovation because it necessitates the use of 
public waterworks. That makes these cases very relevant from this article’s perspective, 
as these innovation processes necessitate the employment of different administrative 
capacities by various public actors with different and even conflicting interests.
The national authorities involved are the same in all four cases and the other au-
thorities involved have comparable capacities. Although the resources and administrative 
capacities that could be employed by the authorities thus do not differ significantly, the 
capacities that they employ in reality do differ. The cases further differ with regard to their 
(tentative) success, making them suitable for exploring the relation between administra-
tive capacities employed and innovation success. Much research on innovation is biased 
towards best practices; by selecting cases with different levels of success we avoid this 
(Borins, 2001).
Because of our research design, our results cannot be directly generalized to all 
processes of (water) innovation. Innovation processes all have ‘their own dynamisms and 
are influenced by, among other things, the features of technologies, the specific organi-
zational and institutional settings, legal frameworks etc.’ (Meijer, 2014: 206). Although 
our research does not lead to generalized empirical knowledge, it does enhance our 
understanding of the role of public authorities in water innovations and leads to a detailed 
understanding of the relation between the capacities they employ and the success of 
innovations. Our case studies thus can contribute to further theory development on this 
topic (Walton, 1992).
Data collection
We gathered data by in-depth semi-structured interviews, document analysis and ob-
servations. We studied relevant documents such as newspaper articles, governmental 
policy briefs and notes, agreements between actors, permit and subsidy applications 
and allocations. This document analysis was used to reconstruct the planning process, 
the relevant actions of involved actors and their formal agenda. We attended several 
public meetings where stake and shareholders discussed specific issues concerning the 
projects (such as the business case or the contract arrangement).
Between February and December 2014, we conducted 17 interviews. We also made 
use of the transcripts of 23 more interviews conducted by master students writing their 
theses. The interviews were equally distributed among the cases. We interviewed all key 
players in the four cases: public professionals of national and local authorities, directors 
of the private firms involved and representatives from other public organizations. The 
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interviews were used to deepen our understanding of the process and the agenda of the 
actors involved, the perception of the authorities’ contribution to that process and actors’ 
perceptions about the relative impact of this contribution. Finally, our reconstruction of 
capacities and their impact was checked by one key representative per case (in all cases 
a public policy official).
operationalization and measurement
On the basis of the literature on administrative capacities and innovation policy, we 
constructed Table 2.1 containing possible public contributions to energy and waterworks. 
We use this table to determine the capacities employed by the public authorities in our 
cases. To assess the extent to which these capacities are actually employed, we make a 
distinction between low, medium or high use, which we define as follows:
Low: Almost no elements of this type of capacity are employed;
Medium: Various elements of this type of capacity are employed;
High: (Almost) all different elements of this type of capacity are employed.
table 2.1 possible governmental support for integrated energy and waterworks ordered by 
administrative capacities
administrative 
capacity
Government support for innovation indicators. authorities:
Delivery 
capacity
Financial support, subsidy and funding 
schemes, risk and base capital, 
R&D support, public procurement, 
organizational and human resources
- Provide R&D subsidies, grants or research 
funding
- Act as launching customer
- Stand surety for loan
- Adjust assets for multifunctional use
Analytical 
capacity
Information provision, advice, training, 
public networks of expertise, policy 
analyses, cost-benefit and impact 
analyses, open data
- Commission studies
- Share public information and expertise
- Supply information for permit application
- Support subsidy or grant application
- Investigate possibilities for innovation
- Conduct market consultation
Coordination 
capacity
Network management, bringing actors 
together, boundary spanning, initiating 
and maintaining intermediary platforms
- Organize workshops and meetings
- Involve relevant actors
- Maintain relations with actors involved
- Negotiate and lobby
- Ease entrance to organization for private 
initiators (e.g. by 1 single window)
- Synchronize actions and collaborate with 
other authorities involved
Regulatory 
capacity
Constrain economic and social 
activities, prohibit and permit via 
regulations and licences, labelling, 
treaties, political agreements
- Abolish, adjust and/or develop policy, rules 
and regulations to support innovation
- Sign agreements
- Give (temporary) permissions, accept risks
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We are interested in the effect of the capacities employed on the success of the attempt 
to realize energy and waterworks. We acknowledge that success is subjective, difficult to 
define and hard to assess, even more so because the attempts in our study are ongoing. 
We define success as the realization of an integrated energy and waterworks and we take 
into account interim results, such as permits granted, subsidies obtained or construction 
started. These are milestones on the way to full realization. We distinguish between four 
aspects of success: (perceived) progress, feasibility, institutional fit and legitimacy. We 
define feasibility as the availability of (financial) resources to realize the innovative works, 
and progress as the satisfaction of the involved actors about how fast the project is pro-
ceeding. Institutional fit stands for the fit of the project within the institutional framework 
and organizational values of public authorities involved, and legitimacy is the support the 
project receives from authorities, other stakeholders and the general public.
2.5 caSE DEScription: FoUr attEmptS to rEalizE 
intEGratED EnErGy anD WatErWorkS
In this section, we briefly summarize the four attempts to realize integrated energy and 
waterworks in The Netherlands. Table 2.2 gives an overview of the main characteristics 
of the cases, followed by a narrative description of the stimulus, the involved actors’ 
interests, and dependences and progress in all four cases.
table 2.2 main characteristics of the cases
the new 
afsluitdijk
tidal power 
plant 
brouwersdam
oosterscheldekering testing centre 
Grevelingendam
Water work 32 kilometre-
long dam, north 
Netherlands
6.5 kilometre-long 
dam, southwest 
Netherlands
8 kilometre storm surge 
barrier, southwest 
Netherlands
6 kilometre-
long inland 
dam, southwest 
Netherlands
project 
content
15–25 turbines 
in 8–12 shafts + 
blue energy pilot 
installation
Large number 
of turbines in 
100 metre-long 
breach in dam
3–5 turbines in 1–2 shafts Test location for 
tidal turbines
Estimated 
power
~2–3 MW* ~5–45 MW ~1 MW Varying
Estimated 
costs for 
realization
~€20–25 m* ~€60–250 m** ~€9 m ~€10–30 m
Stimulus Renovation dam 
for water safety
Breach in dam for 
water quality
Need for turbine 
showcase
Reopening sluice 
for water quality
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table 2.2 (continued)
the new 
afsluitdijk
tidal power 
plant 
brouwersdam
oosterscheldekering testing centre 
Grevelingendam
initiator Private actors 
and local 
governments
National and local 
governments
Private actors Local governments
asset 
manager
Focuses on 
renovation, 
facilitates private 
initiatives
Actively 
investigates 
possibilities of 
power plant
Facilitates private 
initiatives
Invests in reopening 
sluice
local 
governments
Support private 
initiatives
Act alongside 
national asset 
manager
Support private initiatives Initiated, aims to 
facilitate private 
initiative
private actors Initiated projects Participate 
in market 
consultation
Initiated projects Some take initiative, 
some wait-and-see
public–private 
collaboration
Local 
governments 
support, national 
government 
facilitates private 
initiative
Market 
consultation, 
private actors 
wait-and-see
Local governments 
support, national 
government facilitates 
private initiative
Governments want 
to facilitate, private 
actors wait-and-see
Drivers Ambition and 
support local 
governments
Broad-
mindedness 
asset manager
Public subsidy, support 
local governments
Perseverance public 
and private initiators
barriers Energy projects 
small re 
renovation, no 
integration
High costs, 
dependence 
on other local 
developments
No private investors Little interest from 
private investors 
and costumers
progress 
(august 2016)
Tender 
renovation, 2 
energy projects 
realized, 1 
working on 
business case
Market 
consultation 
closed, tender in 
preparation
1 of 2 initiated projects 
realized
Private consortium 
works on business 
case and permits
*Tidal energy Den Oever, tidal energy Kornwerderzand and blue energy together
**Additional costs for tidal plant in breach, range for different options
the new afsluitdijk
The Afsluitdijk (Enclosure Dam) was constructed in 1927-1933; the dam is essential for 
water safety, and the adjacent lake is an important source of fresh water. The dam no 
longer meets the safety criteria and needs extensive renovation. The asset manager, the 
national Department of Waterways and Public Works (RWS) is in charge of this renova-
tion. The national government decided to focus solely on water safety and finance only 
essential renovation. Complementary ambitions, e.g. in relation to nature development, 
tourism and sustainable energy generation, are left to local authorities and private actors. 
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For them, the complementary plans are very important because it is believed that they will 
generate a much needed boost to the local economy.
Local governments and private firms therefore hope to seize the opportunity of the 
renovation to realize and expand pilot installations for sustainable energy generation. The 
asset owner, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, has a somewhat ambiguous 
attitude towards the energy projects. It prescribes (and solely pays for) essential renova-
tion but, at the same time, the minister is enthusiastic about the Afsluitdijk becoming an 
integrated energy and waterworks. Therefore, RWS feels unofficially obliged to support 
the local ambitions and has agreed to help the private actors and local authorities to 
implement their plans.
Since 2008, a turbine constructor has been operating a pilot installation in one of the 
shafts of an outlet sluice. In 2015, partly financed by public subsidies, the firm expanded 
its installation with three more turbines. Together with the local authorities, it wants to 
realize a second pilot installation. There have been talks with different possible investors 
and participants, but to date (August 2016) without success. In 2014, another private firm 
opened a pilot installation for the generation of blue energy, using the difference in salinity 
between fresh and salt water, at the Afsluitdijk. Realizing the installation was a shared 
ambition of the local authorities, and the firm received subsidies from national and local 
authorities.
tidal power plant brouwersdam
The Brouwersdam, constructed in 1971, encloses a saltwater inlet of the North Sea, 
creating the lake Grevelingenmeer. Since the enclosure, the water oxygen level has 
gone down, damaging nature and the local economy. Therefore, the public authorities 
developed plans to breach the Brouwersdam to restore estuarine dynamics and improve 
the water quality in the Grevelingenmeer. With this plan, the idea emerged to realize a 
tidal power plant in the breach. The authorities hoped that the alteration to the dam, a very 
costly undertaking, could be financed with the revenues from energy generation. In 2013, 
local authorities and RWS set up a project bureau to investigate the feasibility of a power 
plant in the Brouwersdam. They conducted an extensive market consultation and joint 
fact-finding with market actors to investigate different options and costs. They concluded 
that it was not possible to finance the renovation with the revenues from energy genera-
tion; rather, the realization of a power plant would entail additional costs.
The local authorities nevertheless see great benefits in the realization of a power 
plant. They expect great benefits for local employment, the knowledge economy and at-
tracting visitors to the region. They have small budgets, however, and are willing nor able 
to make large financial investments in a power plant. RWS advocates for a power plant 
but is also unable to make extensive financial contributions. RWS is now (August 2016) 
preparing a concession-based tender in which the realization and the exploitation of the 
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power plant are combined. The private actors in this case have a somewhat wait-and-see 
attitude. They consider the power plant a public ambition and hope to be given the job to 
build the plant at public expense.
oosterscheldekering
The Oosterscheldekering (Eastern Scheldt storm surge barrier) is part of the delta works 
in the southwest of The Netherlands, built after a flood in 1953 as protection from the 
North Sea. In 2008, a consultancy firm and a turbine constructor both took the initiative 
to install tidal turbines in one of the breaches in the dam. Their primary goal is to create 
a showcase for potential customers. Both firms applied to RWS for a permit and for sev-
eral local, national and European subsidies. The Province of Zeeland is an enthusiastic 
advocate and promoter of tidal energy. The region is known worldwide for its innovative 
delta works. Zeeland now hopes to update this status by combining the waterworks with 
sustainable energy generation. The Province expects many financial and social spin-
offs for the region. RWS aims to contribute to the multifunctional use of infrastructure, 
sustainability and technology development. Therefore, RWS decided to deliberate jointly 
with the firms and help them to formulate a viable permit application. In an intensive, 
collaborative process, the private firms and RWS came to an agreement about the terms 
and conditions under which the firms could install their installations and generate energy 
at the dam. Both projects received several public subsidies but had a hard time finding 
additional private investors. Consequently, the project was postponed multiple times. 
The two initiatives merged, and in September 2015 the turbine constructor and partners 
successfully realized one of the projects by installing five turbines in one of the dam’s 
breaches. It is uncertain whether it will also realize the second project. In 2016 the firm 
applied for an additional V2 m in subsidies to expand the project.
testing centre Grevelingendam
The Grevelingendam is a 6 km-long dam in the southwest of The Netherlands, built in 
1958 as part of the delta works. The Grevelingendam is not a primary flood defence and 
its water safety function is no longer clear. The dam has a road connection and several 
recreational functions. Because the water quality in the adjacent lake, the Grevelingen-
meer, is low since its enclosure, plans were developed to reopen the sluice in the dam 
to restore estuarine dynamics in the lake. With this plan to reopen the sluice, the idea 
emerged to realize a testing centre for tidal turbines in the sluice. The local authorities 
see great benefits in establishing a testing centre. The region aims to become ‘the home 
of the tidal energy industry’, and a testing centre would contribute to this ambition. They 
are unwilling, however, to realize (and finance) such a centre themselves. The Province 
of Zeeland therefore took the initiative to find private initiators. It funded engineering and 
a consultancy firm to organize a series of workshops to bring together interested actors. 
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The local authorities hoped that private firms and knowledge institutes would unite in 
these workshops to realize the test location without governmental participation, but the 
workshops did not have the hoped-for result. One obstacle is that it is unclear whether 
there is any need for a test location on the private market. The asset owner, the Ministry 
of Infrastructure and Environment, is willing to reopen the sluice earlier than planned to 
facilitate the realization of a tidal testing centre. The work has been put out to tender, and 
the reopening of the sluice is planned in 2017. The consultancy firm formed a consortium 
of private partners that is now (August 2016) trying to obtain the necessary permits and 
public and private funding.
2.6 analySiS
We now take a closer look at the public authorities’ contributions to the four attempts to 
realize the integrated energy and waterworks. We categorize the capacities used and 
indicate to what element of the innovation processes (feasibility, progress, institutional fit 
or legitimacy) the authorities contributed (see Tables 2.3-2.10).
the administrative capacities employed per case
The New Afsluitdijk
In The New Afsluitdijk case, the local authorities employ a wide range of administrative 
capacities to contribute to the sustainable energy projects (see Table 2.3). The effective-
ness of their effort, however, often proves insufficient. The innovation process is very 
time-consuming, and the realization of the various projects is uncertain. To a certain 
extent, there is public alignment between the different authorities involved; the national 
asset manager and the local authorities have regular contact and keep one another in-
formed about their activities, but they fail to synchronize their activities in such a way that 
the implementation of the local agenda is connected to the national government’s renova-
tion work. Furthermore, despite requests from the local authorities, RWS is not willing to 
complement the capacities that the local authorities lack. These include, for example, 
more delivery capacity (in the form of directly purchasing the generated electricity) and 
regulatory capacity. An important barrier is the fact that RWS is not willing to adjust its 
rules with regard to the planning or the scope of the dam renovation. Table 2.4 gives an 
overview of the administrative capacities employed by the different authorities involved.
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table 2.3 public authorities’ contributions to innovation process the new afsluitdijk
public authority authorities’ action contributing to 
energy and waterworks
administrative 
capacity
positively 
contributed to
Ministry Economic 
Affairs
Subsidy for projects, per amount of 
energy generated
Delivery Feasibility
Ministry I&M €20 m (total) financial contribution to 
local sustainability projects
Delivery Feasibility
Asset manager RWS Established 1 single window for all 
requests from the region
Coordination Progress, 
institutional fit
Participates in multiple local deliberative 
bodies
Coordination Progress
Supported private initiators to formulate 
admissible permit application
Analytical Institutional fit
Negotiated with private initiators about 
permit requirements and adjusted 
standard requirements
Regulatory Institutional fit
Informed local actors about its own 
activities, advised local actors about 
theirs
Coordination Progress, 
institutional fit
Offered opportunity to include local 
projects in tender for renovation
Coordination Progress, 
institutional fit
Obliges the renovation contractor to take 
into account the local project plans
Regulatory Institutional fit
Local authorities 
(united in project 
bureau)
Support private project initiators in finding 
financial investors
Coordination Progress, 
feasibility
Support private projects initiators to 
formulate admissible subsidy applications
Analytical Institutional fit, 
feasibility
Lobbied asset manager to purchase 
generated energy directly from initiators
Coordination Feasibility
Contributed financially to projects through 
local funds
Delivery Feasibility
Stand surety/pre-finance projects, 
thereby taking financial risks
Delivery Progress
Negotiated with asset manager about 
conditions for including projects in 
renovation tender
Coordination Progress,
institutional fit
Secure coherence/relation between 
individual projects
Coordination Progress
table 2.4 overview of administrative capacities employed in the new afsluitdijk case
Delivery
capacity
analytical 
capacity
coordination 
capacity
regulatory 
capacity
EU/national government Medium Low Low Low
national asset manager Low Medium Medium Medium
local authorities Medium Medium Medium Low
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Tidal Power Plant Brouwersdam
In this case, there has been great public alignment. RWS and the local authorities, united 
in a project bureau, employed a lot of analytical and coordination capacity researching 
the possibilities and feasibility of a power plant (see Table 2.5). The authorities worked 
closely with private actors, and the employment of their administrative capacities has 
been fine-tuned in order to fit the private ambitions. It is too early to conclude whether the 
authorities’ effort will be successful; the exploration of the feasibility of a tidal energy plant 
is ongoing. Currently (August 2016), RWS is exploring how it can employ its coordination 
and regulatory capacity with an innovative, integrated tender in which the realization and 
the exploitation of the power plant are combined. Much effort is being made to align what 
the public authorities can further contribute to realization, but it is uncertain whether the 
necessary public funds will become available. The employment of delivery capacity in 
the form of a substantial public financial contribution will be essential for realization but it 
is uncertain if this becomes available. Table 2.6 gives an overview of the administrative 
capacities employed in this case.
table 2.5 public authorities’ contributions to innovation process tidal power plant brou-
wersdam
public authority authorities’ action contributing to 
energy and waterworks
administrative 
capacity
positively 
contributed to
Asset manager RWS Entered collaboration with local 
authorities, became member of project 
bureau
Coordination Progress,
legitimacy
Will give initiators the chance to realize 
an energy plant in waterworks
Regulatory, 
delivery
Institutional fit
Prepared innovative integrated tender for 
realization and exploitation of power plant
Regulatory Feasibility
Local governments 
(united in project 
bureau)
Researched financial, technical and 
social feasibility and affordability of 
different power plants
Analytical Feasibility,
institutional fit, 
progress
Organized meetings with potential stake- 
and shareholders
Coordination Legitimacy
Conducted market consultation, joint 
fact-finding and red flag analysis
Analytical Institutional fit, 
progress
Lobbied Ministry of Economic Affairs to 
financially contribute
Coordination Feasibility
Province Zuid-
Holland
Suggested the idea of a power plant Coordination Progress
Set realization of power plant as 
condition for financial contribution to 
renovation for water quality
Coordination Progress,
feasibility
Province Zeeland Willing to contribute financially to power 
plant
Delivery Feasibility
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table 2.6 overview of administrative capacities employed in the tidal power plant brou-
wersdam case
Delivery
capacity
analytical 
capacity
coordination 
capacity
regulatory 
capacity
national asset manager Low High High Medium
local authorities Low High High Low
Oosterscheldekering
Table 2.7 contains all the public contributions made to the Oosterscheldekering project. In 
this case, there was effective alignment between the public authorities involved; Table 2.8 
shows that together they employed all four capacities. RWS employed its analytical and 
regulatory capacity in a very explorative mode, deliberating with the initiators and adjust-
table 2.7 public authorities’ contributions to innovation process oosterscheldekering
public authority authorities’ action contributing to 
energy and waterworks
administrative 
capacity
positively 
contributed to
EU €3,250,000 subsidy for regional 
development
Delivery Feasibility
Ministry Economic 
Affairs
€1,750,000 subsidy Delivery Feasibility
Subsidy, per amount of energy generated Delivery Feasibility
Ministry I&M Gave RWS permission to support the 
privately initiated projects
Delivery Institutional fit
Asset manager RWS Actively investigated possibilities for 
privately initiated projects
Analytical Institutional fit
Supplied information necessary for 
permit application
Analytical Progress,
institutional fit
Had monthly talks with initiators, helped 
them to formulate admissible permit 
application
Analytical Institutional fit
Negotiated with initiators about permit 
requirements and adjusted standard 
requirements
Regulatory Progress, 
institutional fit
Extended standard permit period to 
improve private business case
Regulatory Feasibility
Granted a provisional permit before all 
necessary research was conducted
Regulatory Progress,
feasibility
Accepted (financial and safety) risk of 
damage to the waterworks
Regulatory Institutional fit
Extended monitoring programme for new 
infrastructure (costs for private initiator)
Regulatory Institutional fit
Province Zeeland €500,000 subsidy Delivery Feasibility
Compensated potential objectors to 
prevent notice of objection procedure
Coordination Legitimacy,
progress
Lobbied other authorities to support the 
initiatives
Coordination Legitimacy
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ing its permitting rules. The Province of Zeeland acted as network manager and applied a 
lot of coordination capacity to achieve public alignment and broad public support. Zeeland 
closely monitored the barriers in the innovation process, employed the capacities that 
were missing and removed obstacles for the private initiators. All levels of government 
employed their delivery capacity; this resulted in large subsidies. This case is therefore 
relatively successful: in September 2015 one of the two privately initiated projects was 
realized; five tidal turbines have been installed in the dam.
table 2.8 overview of administrative capacities employed in the oosterscheldekering case
Delivery
capacity
analytical 
capacity
coordination 
capacity
regulatory 
capacity
EU/national government High Low Low Low
national asset manager Low High Low High
local authorities High Low High Low
Testing Centre Grevelingendam
In this case, the local authorities, especially the Province of Zeeland, employed a lot of 
coordination capacity (see Table 2.9), thereby hoping to bring together private actors who 
then together would take the initiative to realize a testing centre, but the sole employment 
of coordination capacity proved an insufficient public contribution. Only after substantial 
financial support is a private consortium now making an attempt to realize a testing centre. 
RWS has limited its contribution to renovating and reopening the sluice. It has not been 
necessary to employ regulatory capacity because there have been no permit applications 
yet. Table 2.10 gives an overview of the administrative capacities employed in this case.
table 2.9 public authorities’ contributions to innovation process testing centre Grevelingen-
dam
public authority authorities’ action contributing to 
energy and waterworks
administrative 
capacity
positively 
contributed to
Asset manager RWS Renovated and reopened sluice to make 
testing centre possible (estimated costs 
€8,300,000, commissioned by Ministry 
I&M).
Delivery Institutional fit
Province Zeeland Searched for private initiators Coordination Legitimacy, 
progress
Paid €100,000 to draw up programme of 
requirements
Delivery,
analytical
Institutional fit, 
progress
Made testing centre part of EU research 
project, paid for workshops to support 
realization of the test centre
Delivery,
coordination
Legitimacy, 
progress
Financed €100,000 revolving fund for 
private initiators to start up project
Delivery Feasibility, 
progress
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table 2.10 overview of administrative capacities employed in the testing centre Grevelingen-
dam case
Delivery 
capacity
analytical 
capacity
coordination 
capacity
regulatory 
capacity
national asset manager Medium Low Low Low
local authorities Medium Low High Low
case comparison
Table 2.11 gives an overview of the capacities employed and the success of the four 
cases. To date (August 2016), the Oosterscheldekering case is the most successful; one 
of the two initiated projects has been realized. In this case, all administrative capacities 
have been employed. Several authorities have made substantial financial contributions, 
and the province employed a lot of coordination capacity to ensure public alignment and 
broad support. The asset manager employed its analytical and regulatory capacity to 
support the private initiatives. In the other cases, one or more of these success factors 
are missing, resulting in moderate to no success (yet).
table 2.11 comparison of the administrative capacities employed in the four cases
Delivery 
capacity
analytical 
capacity
coordination 
capacity
regulatory 
capacity
Success
the new 
afsluitdijk
Medium Medium Medium Medium Moderately successful, 
all capacities employed, 
little public alignment, 
insufficient feasibility, 
moderate institutional fit
tidal power plant 
brouwersdam
Low High High Medium Relatively promising, 
low feasibility, slow but 
steady progress, moderate 
institutional fit, high 
legitimacy
oosterschelde-
kering
High High High High Successful, high feasibility, 
slow but steady progress, 
moderate institutional fit, 
high legitimacy.
testing centre 
Grevelingendam
Medium Low High Low Moderate success, low 
feasibility, slow progress, 
moderate institutional fit, 
high legitimacy.
Delivery capacity in the innovation process
The employment of delivery capacity, in the form of financial contributions, is an important 
stimulus for innovation (Guerzoni & Raiteri, 2015; Hyytinen & Toivanen, 2005); our cases 
confirm this. Public funding is, at least at the current stage of technology development, 
essential to realize integrated energy and waterworks. The availability of a large subsidy 
was a driver of success in the Oosterscheldekering case, and the absence of public 
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funding is an important barrier in the other cases. Allowing public infrastructure to be 
used by external actors is another, essential form of employing delivery capacity to enable 
this public-private innovation. The financial contributions made by the authorities in our 
cases are all one-time contributions. Governments are hesitant to make long-term invest-
ments and become partners in these projects. Neither are they willing to act as launching 
customers to support the demand side of this innovation (Aschhoff & Wolfgang, 2009; 
Gregersen, 1992). The Oosterscheldekering case shows that this does not necessarily 
have to be a problem; the works can successfully be initiated, owned and run by private 
actors. This, however, must be clear from the beginning of the innovation process. In 
the Grevelingendam case, public authorities incessantly expressed their ambition for a 
testing centre. This left the private actors in a wait-and-see position; they expected the 
public authorities to take the lead and supply the necessary resources. The authorities’ 
failure to do so led to deadlock.
Analytical capacity in the innovation process
In the Oosterscheldekering case, the asset manager’s willingness to share governmen-
tal data on water streams and environmental conditions with the private initiators and 
pro-actively deliberate jointly about the possibilities was an important success factor. In 
The New Afsluitdijk, the asset manager is more hesitant to share information and work 
together with the private initiators. In the Brouwersdam case, the asset manager and the 
regional authorities not only shared information, but also went a step further by conduct-
ing research to generate new information from which private partners in the innovation 
process could benefit.
Coordination capacity in the innovation process
Our analysis illustrates that the role of the government as network manager and boundary 
spanner in innovation is essential (Etzkowitz, 2003; Howells, 2006; Partzsch, 2009). To 
realize integrated energy and waterworks, the authorities’ coordination capacity proved 
especially important to ensure public alignment and shared ambitions. For the Tidal Power 
Plant Brouwersdam, the national and local authorities worked closely together in a project 
bureau, and this led to broad support. In the Afsluitdijk case, the lack of alignment between 
national and local authorities is a barrier to success. Innovation processes benefit from 
public authorities that work together, know one another’s capacities and are willing to step 
in when others cannot deliver. Coordination capacity is also important to involve possible 
share- and stakeholders, keep track of the process and eliminate possible obstacles, as 
the Province of Zeeland did in the Oosterscheldekering and Grevelingendam cases. The 
Grevelingendam case, however, also shows that the sole employment of coordination 
capacity, bringing relevant actors together and facilitating their collaboration, is an insuf-
ficient public contribution to realize innovation.
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Regulatory capacity in the innovation process
The initiators of integrated energy and waterworks have to work with different legal frame-
works concerning water safety, energy generation, technology development and regional 
development. Besides the rules and regulations, dominant values such as efficiency, ef-
fectiveness and risk aversion can form a barrier to innovation. To realize integrated energy 
and waterworks, organizational fit has to be created between the dominant institutional 
framework and the aimed-for innovations (Van Buuren et al., 2015). To do this, public 
authorities have to employ their regulatory capacity to abolish or adjust existing rules and 
draw up new ones (Aschhoff & Wolfgang, 2009; Gregersen, 1992; Moon & Bretschneider, 
1997). However, in our cases, this capacity is hardly employed. To realize energy and 
waterworks, customization of organizational rules and tailor-made agreements are es-
sential. As with the employment of analytical capacity, it is important that public authorities 
use their regulatory capacity in a positive, open and learning way. Only when the asset 
manager is willing to collaborate with initiators and exchange wishes and ideas is it pos-
sible to come to arrangements that safeguard public values and enable innovation. This is 
in line with the literature on innovation, which states that regulation created in interaction 
with relevant actors leads to ‘a negotiated settlement of smart regulation’ (Lundberg, 
2013; Partzsch, 2009: 985).
Because of the low number of cases, it is not possible to discern clear patterns in the 
various capacity mixes and related success rates. In all four cases however, it proved 
crucial for the authorities to be able to combine their capacities in such a way that an 
optimal mix was formed that enabled realization of the innovations. The national asset 
manager had an important role in organizing the formal opportunity, providing access 
to the infrastructure and supplying the necessary information about on-site physical 
conditions. The local authorities provided the necessary network facilities and could give 
access to the (much needed) public funds. The Oosterscheldekering case shows how the 
asset manager and local authorities align their efforts and together successfully support 
the realization of an innovation. The national asset owner and the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, however, are nearly absent in the cases. This is unfortunate, as the first has the 
regulatory capacity essential for multifunctional use of public infrastructure and the latter 
has the delivery capacity crucial to enable this kind of innovation. The aloofness of these 
two authorities makes it difficult for the other actors to achieve successful innovation, as 
they have to deal with quite restrictive conditions.
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2.7 conclUSion
The importance of governmental support for innovation is widely acknowledged. In the 
water sector, the involvement of authorities in the innovation process is of even greater 
importance (Krozer et al., 2010). The way governments support innovation is changing 
however. Local innovation policies are gaining importance (Cohen & Amorós, 2014); 
governments increasingly choose a bottom-up, tailor-made approach to support specific 
innovations (Garret-Jones, 2004); and public and private actors collaborate more, leading 
to a blend of public and private sector innovation (Francesch-Huidobro, 2015). We anal-
yse these trends and investigate how modern governments employ their administrative 
capacities to support innovation by adjusting their own routines and by facilitating private 
actors to implement their innovative techniques.
Our study shows the combined effect of various policy mixes (Borrás & Edquist, 2013). 
For complex, public-private innovations such as integrated energy and waterworks to suc-
ceed, no single policy instrument can do the job. The authorities have to employ all their 
capacities: regulatory capacity to adjust their own policies and regulations; delivery capac-
ity for to enhance the feasibility of implementing techniques currently not fully developed; 
analytical capacity to provide the necessary information about possible consequences 
and impacts; and coordination capacity to reach public alignment and build a strong 
public-private coalition. The four capacities, however, do not have to be employed by one 
and the same public actor; ideally, authorities complement one another. The authorities all 
employ their capacities in a way that fits their own procedures and ambitions, but public 
alignment is crucial. Public-private innovation necessitates the synchronized deployment 
of authorities’ capacities in a contextualized, dedicated way because each situation is 
unique (even when the same technological innovation is pursued). The framework of 
Lodge and Wegrich (2014) can help authorities to make an inventory of the available and 
the necessary administrative capacities.
Our analysis confirms the growing importance and special role of local authorities in 
innovation support (Kuhlmann, 2001). Local authorities foresee great benefits of innova-
tion for their region and develop tailor-made support for regional innovative industries 
(Doh & Kim, 2014). Local authorities’ capacities are limited, but they are an important 
actor in the innovation process. With their coordination capacity, they act as network 
managers, bringing together relevant share- and stakeholders, achieving public align-
ment and public support. They work in close collaboration with private project initiators, 
keep track of potential barriers and smooth the innovation process.
Our study shows the extra activities that modern governments can undertake to spur 
innovation, in addition to the existing national framework of policies, rules and regulations. 
The authorities employ their capacities to support specific innovation projects. Through 
interaction and negotiation, public and private partners achieve tailor-made solutions 
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and successful public-private innovation in these projects. Our study further shows how 
the government’s role as pacer in innovation, ‘encouraging interaction and cooperation 
between institutional spheres’ (Lundberg, 2013: 213), works out in practice. Bringing the 
relevant actors together and subsequently facilitating their collaboration are tasks that 
modern governments are very keen to undertake. We find, however, that often this is too 
small a public contribution for innovation to succeed. A substantial financial contribution, 
for example, is often needed.
Our study demonstrates another pitfall of collaborative public-private innovation. 
Authorities tend to express great ambitions, even when they do not intend to take a 
prominent role in the innovation process or to act as launching customer. Deadlock can 
occur when articulated public ambitions do not match their actual ability or willingness to 
act. When authorities are trying to activate the private sector with their enthusiasm and 
support and arrange a series of interactions, they can unintentionally accomplish the 
opposite: a wait-and-see private sector that expects the government to take the lead. To 
avoid this role confusion, managing expectations is crucial. There has to be clarity about 
actors’ aspirations, the capacities they are willing to employ and their expectations of 
other, public and private, actors. Integrated energy and waterworks are realized under 
challenging conditions. In general, public-private collaboration for innovation is a sensitive 
process, an ongoing search in which the actors involved continuously have to exchange 
wishes and opportunities to reach solutions that are acceptable for all.
3 Facilitation as a Governance Strategy: Unravelling Governments’ 
Facilitation Frames
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abStract
Governments increasingly choose facilitation as a strategy to entice others to produce 
public goods and services, including in relation to the realisation of sustainable energy 
innovations. An important instrument to implement this governance strategy is discursive 
framing. To learn how public authorities use discursive framing to implement a facilitation 
strategy, we conducted a comparative case study on two Dutch examples in which the 
government aims to facilitate non-governmental actors to exploit public waterworks for the 
production of renewable energy. Using content analysis, we identify ten ‘facilitation frame’ 
elements. We find two configurations of elements: restrained facilitation and invitational 
facilitation, which both have their advantages, ambivalences and drawbacks. It is often 
unclear what governments want to achieve and what they have to offer in terms of facilita-
tion. The (discursively) offered support, ranging from ‘giving space’ to ‘creating beneficial 
conditions’, is often elusive. We conclude that, to avoid deadlock, false expectations 
and the inactiveness of external actors, the government’s communication should both 
enthuse and inform these actors about what they can expect. If, however, the potential, 
non-governmental initiators just lack the necessary capacity to act, there is only so much 
discursive framing can do. Then authorities should reconsider their ‘facilitative’ role.
This chapter has been published as Grotenbreg, S., & Van Buuren, A. (2017). Facilitation 
as a Governance Strategy: Unravelling Governments’ Facilitation Frames. Sustainability, 
9 (1), 160. doi:10.3390/su9010160
55
FACILITATION AS A GOVERNANCE STRATEGY
3.1 introDUction
Undoubtedly, the most encompassing shift in public administration in the last decennia 
is the shift from government to governance (Osborne, 2010; Pierre & Peters, 2000). 
The shift includes a shift from ‘hierarchies to networks’ and from government ‘command 
and control to negotiation and persuasion’ (Salamon, 2001: 1632–1634). In hybrid and 
dynamic network constellations, public agencies collaborate with a wide range of public 
and private actors to address today’s ‘wicked problems’ (Emerson et al., 2012; Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2016; Peters & Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1997).
In the wake of this development, governmental agencies also increasingly choose 
facilitation as a governance strategy (Kisby, 2010; Vigoda, 2002). Instead of producing 
public goods and services (commissioned) by themselves or in collaboration with others, 
governments try to entice non-governmental actors to take the lead in public service de-
livery. Authorities aim to ‘facilitate’ the actions of these non-governmental actors. This can 
be seen, for example, in governments’ plea for ‘active citizenship’ and ‘self-organisation’ 
of societal actors (Swyngedouw, 2005). Scholars speak of a ‘responsibilisation’ of non-
governmental actors (Garland, 2001). There is ‘a shift in responsibility, a stepping back 
of the state and a concern to push responsibilities onto the private and voluntary sec-
tors’ (Stoker, 1998: 21). This shift is clear, for example, in then-UK Prime Minister David 
Cameron’s plea for a ‘Big Society’ and for a state that solely acts to ‘facilitate, support and 
enable’ (Blunkett, 2003: 43; Taylor, 2007).
The aim of modern states to give non-governmental actors a more prominent role in 
the accomplishment of public value and public service delivery is also visible in the fields 
of planning, infrastructure development and sustainability (Francesch-Huidobro, 2015; 
Roodbol-Mekkes & Van den Brink, 2015). Public agencies increasingly turn to the market 
and to non-profit organisations for the creation of public goods (Westerink et al., 2017). 
They want to go beyond the traditional principal–agent relation in public–private partner-
ships (PPPs). Instead of procuring the public good or service, in our case sustainable 
energy generation at public waterworks, or commissioning market parties, governments 
want market parties to take the lead in the realisation and exploitation of such innova-
tive infrastructure (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2018). They expect ‘initiating leadership’ 
from non-governmental actors (Emerson et al., 2012; Westerink et al. 2016). This leaves 
authorities in a rather ambivalent position: they want something to be done but do not 
want to do it themselves or (fully) pay others to do it.
There is not much research yet into these governance processes in which the govern-
ment acts, or aims to act, as facilitator (Westerink et al., 2017). In a lot of the ‘new’ 
governance practices that are frequently studied, such as PPPs, the government still 
acts as initiator, principal and/or the main financier. The literature that comes closest to 
the phenomenon at stake is the literature on metagovernance. Metagovernance is an 
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‘attempt to govern interactive governance arenas without reverting too much to traditional 
statist governing tools based on command and control’ (Torfing & Triantafillou, 2011: 
2). Through metagovernance, the government ensures that ‘self-regulated’ actions of 
non-governmental actors are ‘in line with the overall goals of the government’ (Dean, 
1999; Torfing & Triantafillou, 2011: 8). However, besides rather general and theoretical 
descriptions of metagovernance, there is relatively little research into the exact strategies 
the government exploits as a facilitator and how successful it is in doing this.
The energy sector is one of the sectors in which authorities are searching for new 
ways to relate to non-governmental, private and societal initiatives, especially when they 
are striving for a transition towards sustainable energy. The sector is characterised by 
rapid technological developments and more bottom-up and regional action. National 
and regional authorities are searching for the right responses to these developments, 
sometimes leading to adjusted regulatory frameworks, new policy instruments and 
collaborations. In our study, we investigate two Dutch cases in which the government 
chooses the role of facilitator as it aims to facilitate sustainable energy generation at 
public waterworks. The government, the owner of these waterworks, is in favour of this 
kind of innovative energy generation but is not willing to realise it itself, and is not willing 
or able to enforce it by way of regulation. Instead, the government tries to activate private 
actors to take the lead in this and tries to suffice with creating the right conditions for these 
actors to enable these initiatives (Frantzeskaki, Jhagroe & Howlett, 2016). A government 
that aims to facilitate non-governmental initiatives can use different strategies. One of 
them is discursive framing: enticing non-governmental actors to take action and legitimis-
ing the government’s own inaction. In our study, we analyse this strategy in more detail.
We are interested in the configuration of frames used by a facilitating government; the 
variety of frames that the government uses in different situations; and the potential incon-
sistencies and ambiguities within these frames in relation to the government’s role and 
resources. How does the government ‘communicate facilitation’, how does it persuade 
others to take action and justify its own restraint? We formulate our research question 
as: How do governments use discursive framing to activate non-governmental actors to 
produce public goods (in this case, energy from water)?
We conduct a comparative case study of two cases in which the national government 
aims to facilitate non-governmental actors to generate energy at public waterworks. We 
systematically analyse the policy documents on this topic to learn about the discursive 
(diagnostic, prognostic and motivational) frames that the government uses to activate a 
non-governmental actor to take action and to legitimise its own (absence of) action. In the 
next section, we discuss the relevant literature on facilitation and discursive framing. In 
Section 3.3, we present our research design, followed by a description of our two cases 
in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 includes our (comparative) analysis. We end with a conclusion 
in Section 3.6 and a discussion in Section 3.7.
57
FACILITATION AS A GOVERNANCE STRATEGY
3.2 thEory
The role of government in governance networks is generally described as ‘metagover-
nance’, literally meaning the ‘governance of governance’ (Torfing & Triantafillou, 2011: 
9). As metagovernor, the government mobilises the relevant actors, public and private, 
governmental and non-governmental, around a certain public problem and structures their 
interaction. The government creates a forum for horizontal interaction and collaboration 
between these actors and enables collaborative decision making and policy implementa-
tion. Metagovernance is a new ‘light-touch form of government’ (Stoker, 1998: 24), in 
which authorities do not revert to ‘traditional statist governing tools based on command 
and control’ (Torfing & Triantafillou, 2011: 2). Instead, the government uses, for example, 
institutional design, coordination, subsidy schemes, network and process management, 
or framing and storytelling to achieve its policy goals (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; Salamon, 
2001; Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). The actual strategies employed by the government 
differ from case to case. In pragmatic terms, the government as metagovernor will be 
‘sometimes steering, sometimes rowing, sometimes partnering, and sometimes staying 
out of the way’ (Bryson et al., 2014: 448).
The degree of government involvement in governance processes differs from case 
to case. One can make a distinction between hands-on and hands-off metagovernance 
(Sørensen, 2006). When the government conducts hands-on governance, it participates 
actively in the governance process as, for example, network manager (Klijn & Koppenjan, 
2016: Sørensen & Torfing, 2012). When the government chooses hands-off metagov-
ernance, its involvement is limited to shaping the collaboration context by, for instance, 
formulating general policy goals or creating an institutional framework that is beneficial 
for the self-organisation of non-governmental actors (Haveri et al., 2009; Sørensen, 
2006). If the government aims to ‘responsibilitate’ non-governmental actors to produce 
public goods and reduce its own role solely to facilitation, it has various policy instruments 
available, such as subsidies, open data and framing (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2018; 
Westerink et al., 2017). In our study, we focus on how governments use framing to realise 
their goals.
Discursive framing as an instrument of power
Framing and storytelling are important instruments of hands-off metagovernance (Sø-
rensen & Torfing, 2011; 2012). With ‘persuasive’ framing, the government mobilises 
relevant actors (Partzsch, 2009; Paschen & Ison, 2014: 1084) and with ‘political, legal 
and discursive’ framing, it sets the interactive arena in which the governance process 
takes place (Torfing & Triantafillou, 2011: 14). The government gives a certain meaning to 
a network of actors through framing and storytelling. It can influence the ‘the main story 
underlying a network’ and the way network members understand their efforts and goals 
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(Haveri et al., 2009: 542). Framing thus serves as a forceful hands-off way to influence 
self-governing actors (Sørensen, 2006). Many of the instruments and strategies that the 
government as facilitator uses are not new; they are just used in a new way. Subsidy 
schemes or institutional design, for example, are now used to activate non-governmental 
actors and support self-organisation for public value creation. This also holds for discur-
sive framing.
Framing is a well-known instrument of power. Those whose frames are dominant 
are the ones in power (Foucault, 1991; Stone, 1997). Framing is sense making; through 
framing, a certain social reality is constructed: ‘A frame is a perspective from which an 
amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made sense of and acted on’ (Rein & 
Schön, 1993: 146). Authorities use framing to achieve their policy goals. Through framing, 
authorities influence what is considered a public problem, how problems are cognitively 
defined and experienced by the public (Schön & Rein, 1994). The frames that govern-
ments construct consist of ‘a cluster of inextricably intertwined casual and normative 
beliefs’ (Schön & Rein, 1994: xiii). The frames give meaning and a normative direction to 
people’s thinking and acting (Schön & Rein, 1994). Government framing thus affects how 
people conceptualise an issue and act upon it (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Van Buuren & 
Warner, 2014: 1000). Paschen and Ison (2014: 1084) speak of ‘persuasive’ framing: the 
intentional use of language to influence opinion and behaviour around an issue.
A distinction can be made between diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and moti-
vational framing (Benford & Snow, 2000). Diagnostic framing refers to the identification 
and classification of a specific policy problem in terms of possible and relevant causes 
(Bekkers & Moody, 2011: 459). Diagnostic frames define what the problem is. Prognostic 
framing refers to the identification of possible and relevant solutions and approaches 
(Bekkers & Moody, 2011). Prognostic frames thus define how the problem should be dealt 
with. Motivational framing involves ‘a rationale for engaging in collective action’ (Benford 
& Snow, 2000: 617). Motivational frames mobilise the actors that should deal with the 
problems defined.
Discursive framing by the facilitating government
The kind of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames that authorities use depends 
largely on their policy goals. Both the preferred solution and the envisaged way to get 
there, including the task division between the different actors involved, influence the 
frames that authorities employ. When authorities, for example, take far-reaching mea-
sures to protect people from flooding, they will probably use diagnostic frames that stress 
the severity of the problem and prognostic frames that justify the measures taken (Warner 
& Van Buuren, 2011). If authorities choose not to act, they can use framing to downplay 
the issue at stake.
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We expect authorities that aim for a facilitating role to use a particular way of discursive 
framing. Authorities whose aim is to facilitate perceive a public problem, an opportunity, 
any situation that might benefit from change. Instead of intervening themselves, they 
want other, non-governmental actors to take the lead in this change. The authorities 
themselves are willing to facilitate the actions of these external initiators. They do want 
something to happen, because they believe that it is in the public’s interest, but they do 
not want to act as the main designer or financier of the action taken and do not fall back 
on traditional statist forms of government (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011).
We therefore expect facilitating authorities to use framing to legitimise their own 
abstention from action and to mobilise external actors to take action. More specifically, 
we expect that, using diagnostic frames, authorities will identify a specific situation that 
needs or merits change. The frames might refer to a public interest but will send the 
message that it is not (solely) a government issue. With diagnostic framing, the situation 
can be presented as a great opportunity for external actors (e.g., for private actors to 
make money). We expect prognostic framing to be used to propose certain actions to be 
taken by non-governmental actors. The government’s role in the proposed solutions will 
be facilitative. With motivational framing, the suggested task division is legitimised by, for 
example, presenting it as a matter of course, a natural way of doing things. We expect the 
motivational frames to further emphasise the benefits for non-governmental actors and 
the government’s reasons to help. An overview of our expectations regarding facilitation 
frames is presented in Table 3.1.
table 3.1 hypothesised characteristics of frames used by the facilitating government
type of frame characteristics of frame
Diagnostic frames ∙ Identify situation that will benefit from change
∙ Present problem as opportunity for external actors
Prognostic frames ∙ Propose actions that could be taken by external actors
∙ Propose facilitative, modest role for authorities
Motivational frames ∙ Emphasise benefits for external actors
∙ Elaborate the facilitation external actors will receive from the government
∙ Present public-private role division as a matter of course
We aim to unravel the facilitation frames that the government employs to realise its goals. 
A government that aims to solely facilitate is in a precarious position: it wants something 
to be done but does not want to do it itself or take full financial responsibility for others to 
do it. We wonder how the facilitating government manages the expectations of external 
actors about the government’s input into the governance process. From previous research 
(Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2018; Westerink et al., 2017), we expect some ambiguity and 
inconsistency in the government’s communication regarding its role and the resources it 
is willing to employ, and we try to unravel this in more detail.
60
CHAPTER 3
3.3 rESEarch DESiGn
case selection
The aim of our study is explorative because not much is yet known about how authorities 
in their new metagovernance role as facilitator use discursive framing. Because we want 
to gain in-depth knowledge about the specific configuration of frames, we conducted a 
comparative case study of two cases (Flyvberg, 2001; Yanow, 1996). We selected two 
Dutch cases in which the national government aspires to the role of facilitator of external 
initiatives in the field of sustainable energy production: the Afsluitdijk and Brouwersdam 
Tidal Power Plant. The facilitation of energy generation at public waterworks fits in the 
trend towards multi-functionality of public infrastructure. Solar panels, for example, can 
be added to dikes or sound barriers alongside highways.
Compared to the wider population of multi-functional use of public infrastructure, our 
cases can be considered as extreme cases for different reasons. Non-governmental ini-
tiatives are not a matter of course in this sector. As further elaborated in Section 3.4, the 
envisioned places of action are publically managed and owned waterworks, with a legally 
anchored function to guarantee safety against floods. Renewable energy has never before 
been generated at these works on this scale in the Netherlands. The techniques used are 
innovative and not yet commercially exploitable. Such projects thus cannot be realised 
without government support. The government is not willing, however, to initiate these 
projects by procuring the technologies. It does, however, acknowledge the importance 
of developing such innovations and using the world-famous delta works to showcase 
these technologies to a wider audience. The facilitation of energy generation is thus not a 
straightforward act is these cases.
In the Netherlands, there are a couple of comparable energy-from-water projects at 
national level and multiple projects at local level conducted by the regional water boards. 
Our two cases can be considered exemplary for this population of projects in which en-
ergy from water is generated at public waterworks. We deliberately selected two cases 
that are comparable but different, making them fit for a search for differences in framing 
in differing situations. The sort of actors involved and the project content in the two cases 
are alike; the relation between the public and the private actors is one of the things that 
differ. Obviously, the design of our research does not allow for drawing generic conclu-
sions. It will, however, enhance our understanding of the facilitating government and its 
use of discursive framing.
method: content analysis of policy documents
To analyse the authorities’ discursive framing in our cases, we conducted a qualitative 
content analysis of the relevant policy documents (Krippendorff & Bock, 2009), thus per-
forming case study research in the form of in-depth desk research of written material (Yin, 
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1994). Content analysis of policy documents is recognised as an adequate method for 
analysing the use of frames and framing by authorities (Goffman, 1974; Paschen & Ison, 
2014: 1084). In January and February 2016, we selected all the national government’s 
documents that mention energy generation at the waterworks and give any information 
about the problems or opportunities at the sites and/or the actions that could be taken 
by different actors. Our selection consists of 24 documents: 13 from the Afsluitdijk case, 
eight from the Brouwersdam case and three documents that contain information about 
both cases. The documents were issued between 2007 and 2016 by the Cabinet of 
Ministers; the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment that serves as asset owner 
of the waterworks; the executive organisation that serves as the asset manager of the 
waterworks; and the project organisations comprised of national authorities and local 
authorities. See Appendix B for an overview of the selected documents.
Between February and August 2016, we carried out an inductive, qualitative coding 
process using the software ATLAS.ti (ATLAS.ti, Berlin, Germany). We read the docu-
ments closely and selected all the text that refers to energy generation at the sites. In the 
first step of our analysis, we then identified the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational 
frames in the selected text. Text that identifies a certain situation as a problem or op-
portunity (either for governmental or non-governmental actors), we coded as ‘diagnostic 
frame’. Text that mentions possible solutions or actions that can be taken, we coded as 
‘prognostic frame’. We made a distinction between text referring to the role or actions 
of non-governmental actors and text referring to the role and/or possible actions that 
authorities (will or can) take. Text that explains why actors should or should not take 
certain actions, we coded as motivational frame.
In the second step of our analysis, we coded the selected diagnostic, prognostic and 
motivational frames for a second time. Analysing the content of the text fragments, we 
identified ten facilitation frame elements—more about these in Section 3.5. See Appendix 
C for an overview of the number of text fragments coded.
In addition to the content analysis, we attended several public meetings and con-
ducted 13 semi-structured interviews between February 2014 and June 2016. We 
selected respondents involved in one of the two cases working at the national water 
authority, regional authorities or private companies. See Appendix A for an overview of 
the respondents’ affiliations and interview specifics. In the interviews, we discussed the 
motives, goals and ways of working of each respondent’s home organisation and the 
collaboration with the other stakeholders involved. With the private actors, who are the 
target group of the authorities’ discursive framing, we additionally discussed how they find 
the government’s position and (lack of) action, the way the authorities frame and fill their 
role, and how they act upon that. We used these last interviews to learn more about the 
effects of the authorities’ use of discursive framing.
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3.4 caSE DEScription
Energy from water at the afsluitdijk
In the first case, the Afsluitdijk, the national authorities are preparing a large renovation 
of the dam because, since 2006, the dam no longer meets the safety criteria. The as-
set owner, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, and the executive asset 
manager, RWS, want to give external actors the chance to seize the opportunity of this 
renovation to add functions, including energy generation, to the dam. Since 2005, local 
firms have had pilot installations for the generation of tidal and osmotic ‘blue’ energy at 
the dam, and they have the ambition to extend these installations. The national authorities 
support the local initiatives because they believe that this will secure local and national 
goodwill for the renovation. They facilitate the projects by, for example, joining the private 
initiators in thinking about the possibilities and easing the permit procedure. However, re-
quests from the external initiators for more help and support—by the national authorities 
buying the generated energy or adjusting the planning of the renovation, for instance—go 
unanswered.
brouwersdam tidal power plant
In the second case, Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant, national and local authorities includ-
ing asset manager RWS plan to make a breach in a dam for water quality reasons. They 
see an opportunity for the installation of a tidal power plant in this breach. If turbines are 
installed in the water at the breach, energy can be generated from the tide. This plan has 
been in existence since 2010. At the start of a formal investigation in 2013, the authorities’ 
hope was that the breaching procedure, a very costly undertaking, could be financed 
with the revenues from energy generation. Research showed, however, that this is not 
possible. The construction of a tidal power plant will rather cost extra money. Despite 
this, the authorities are in favour of a power plant. The asset manager has the ambition 
to contribute to sustainability and innovation with its asset. The authorities further believe 
that a power plant will boost the local economy and the reputation of the Netherlands as 
a forerunner in delta technology.
Asset manager RWS collaborates closely with two local municipalities and two 
provinces. They together set up a project bureau and conducted an extensive research 
programme and market consultation to involve possible partners and explore the techno-
logical, financial and organisational possibilities. Despite all their efforts and ambitions, the 
authorities are not willing to finance, commission and/or exploit a power plant themselves. 
They aim for non-governmental, private initiators. The authorities are now (October 2016) 
preparing an integrative tender; they hope to attract a private commissioner that will 
construct both the breach and the power plant. The authorities will, however, only pay for 
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the breach; the additional costs and risks of the power plant will be the responsibility of 
the private commissioner.
In both cases, the national authorities are thus in favour of sustainable energy genera-
tion at the waterworks but do not want to design, build, finance or operate the generation 
itself; instead, they want to facilitate external actors to do so. The cases thereby form a 
good example of the government in its new metagovernance role as facilitator. Discursive 
framing is one of the tactics used by the facilitating authorities to realise their goals. In 
the Brouwersdam case, the authorities are adopting a more active approach in searching 
for private initiators. We expect that discursive framing in this case is used mainly for the 
mobilisation of external actors. In the Afsluitdijk case, the authorities are more passively 
facilitating existing external initiatives. Our expectation here is that discursive framing is 
used mainly to justify their own facilitative role.
3.5 analySiS
After the first round of analysis in which we selected the diagnostic, prognostic and moti-
vational text fragments on energy generation on the waterworks, we conducted a second 
round of qualitative, inductive coding. In this second round, we searched for the elements, 
or building blocks, of the authorities’ facilitation frames in the two cases. By an inductive 
process, going back and forth between the text and the codes and merging and splitting 
codes, we identified ten facilitation frame elements, presented in Table 3.2. The majority 
of these frame elements are present in both cases, but frequency and dominance differ. 
We discuss the identified discursive framing in the two cases, followed by a comparison 
of the two.
table 3.2 Facilitation frame elements
type of frame Frame Element characteristics
Diagnostic 1. Visualisation Visualises options; sums up possibilities and opportunities for 
development, e.g. sources of energy that could be produced; 
sketches (mostly bright) image of future situation.
2. Promotion Promotes the location and/or situation as extraordinary and unique; 
great chance; ‘not to be missed’ opportunity for external initiators.
3. Consolidation Describes established partnerships/collaboration between 
government and non-governmental actors and its achievements; 
refers e.g. to a good spirit or willingness to act.
prognostic 4. Presentation Factually presents the authorities involved and their agenda; sets 
out (past and future) process and role distribution. What have 
authorities done and what will be the next process steps.
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table 3.2 Facilitation frame elements (continued)
type of frame Frame Element characteristics
5. Invitation Explicitly invites or asks non-governmental actors to take initiative or 
become process partner; ‘from shareholder to stakeholder’; possibly 
referring to mutual dependence.
6. Demarcation Explicitly demarcates authorities’ capacity and/or willingness to act; 
draws a boundary around government action; e.g. by stating that 
government ‘will solely facilitate’.
7. Designation Designates or assigns certain tasks or actions to non-governmental 
actors; e.g. by stating that something is a task for the market or a 
private actor’s ‘own responsibility’.
motivational 8. Offer Does a facilitation offer to potential non-governmental initiators; 
authority offers e.g. free use of the location, a specific service, 
assistance or cooperation by the government.
9. Lure Sums up concrete, private revenues for non-governmental actors in 
taking action; e.g. referring to growing chances to sell their product 
abroad if they realize this Dutch project.
10. Justification Justifies public-private role distribution; gives arguments or reasons 
for the previously formulated demarcation and/or designation; e.g. 
stating that ‘market is better in innovation’.
the afsluitdijk
Table 3.3 gives an overview of the occurrence of the different frame elements in the 
documents on energy generation at the Afsluitdijk.
table 3.3 Facilitation frame elements in the afsluitdijk case.
type of frame Frame Element number of text fragments
Diagnostic Visualisation 32
Promotion 8
Consolidation 8
prognostic Presentation 48
Invitation 7
Demarcation 10
Designation 23
motivational Offer 9
Lure 5
Justification 10
total 160
The dominant diagnostic frame element used in this case is visualisation. With visualisa-
tion, the government presents the opportunities of the situation. It sums up all the things 
that could be done (if somebody takes the initiative to do them), such as generating 
energy from wind, the tide or the salinity difference between salt and fresh water. The 
words ‘can’ and ‘could’ are repeatedly used in sentences such as ‘The iconic status 
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[of the dam] could be enhanced by adding sustainable and innovative initiatives’ (‘De 
icoonwaarde kan worden versterkt door het toevoegen van duurzame en innovatieve 
initiatieven’) (Ministerie van Infrastructuur & Milieu, 2011b: 6). The government further 
promotes the Afsluitdijk as a location by stressing its uniqueness and suitability for the 
realisation of innovative projects by, for example, stating that ‘The Afsluitdijk is an icon of 
the past, present and future with potential for sustainability and innovation’ (‘De Afsluitdijk 
is een icoon van verleden, heden en toekomst met toekomstpotentie voor duurzaamheid 
en innovatie’) (Rijksoverheid et al., 2014: 3). A future Afsluitdijk is sketched, accommodat-
ing highly innovative projects for renewable energy generation. In this vision, the current 
pilots have evolved into large-scale projects that contribute to the country’s supply of 
sustainable energy.
The dominant prognostic frame elements in the Afsluitdijk case are presentation, 
designation and demarcation. The authorities involved and the distribution of tasks and 
responsibilities among them (who does what) are presented. The planning of the dam 
restoration is set out, as are the deadlines for external initiators to submit their projects 
so that their wishes can be taken into account in the planning process. The government’s 
ambitions concerning energy generation are virtually absent in the texts, however. There 
is hardly any mention of the government’s demands or desires. Both presentation and 
explanation are quite plain. The situation and the plans are presented as facts. Why 
things will happen in a certain way or who will benefit from this are not mentioned.
The government further clearly designates certain tasks to external actors by, for 
example, stating that ‘the generation of sustainable energy is a task for private actors’ 
(‘Het opwekken van duurzame energie is een taak van marktpartijen’) (Rijkswaterstaat, 
2011: 6). In discussions about what the government will do with regard to the facilitation of 
sustainable energy generation, the most recurring phrase is ‘giving space’. Often, it is not 
specified to/by whom and how this space will be given. In the text fragments, the subject 
is often unclear or the infrastructure itself is put down as the subject in, for example, 
stating that ‘the dam offers great opportunities’. In a few documents, the national govern-
ment’s restoration work is put forward as creating certain opportunities. The formulation is 
vague, however, as in the sentence: ‘The restoration possibly offers the opportunity for an 
approach in which there is a place for a wide range of ambitions’ (‘dat deze opknapbeurt 
mogelijk kansen biedt voor een aanpak waarin een breed scala aan ambities tot zijn recht 
komt’) (Ministerie van Infrastructuur & Milieu, 2011a: 9).
Furthermore, all the proposed government actions are reactive; they presuppose 
action by external actors. The authorities will, for example, ‘facilitate’, accommodate’, 
‘make possible’, or ‘create beneficial conditions for’ the actions of others. The actions 
range from passively ‘not making external action impossible’ to more actively ‘stimulating’. 
Overall, the authorities’ stance is quite reserved; one of the text fragments states that 
the government will ‘do its best to cooperate’ (‘inspannen om medewerking te verlenen’) 
66
CHAPTER 3
(Rijksoverheid et al., 2014: 4). The government also clearly demarcates what it will not do, 
that is, generate energy, make financial investments or become a partner in exploitation.
The facilitation frame in the Afsluitdijk case is not very motivational. Some benefits 
for private initiators are sketched: with their projects on the Afsluitdijk, the companies 
will increase their international reputation and competitiveness. As stated, however, the 
authorities refrain from a clear ‘facilitation offer’ to support external actors in doing this. 
The most dominant motivational frame element is justification, but the government mostly 
does not go beyond just stating that generating sustainable energy is ‘a task for private 
actors’ or that the development of the Afsluitdijk is ‘not just a government task’. In a 
number of documents, there is reference to an RWS management decision not to make 
financial investments in sustainable energy projects a justification. Table 3.4 shows the 
configuration of the different frame elements in this case.
Table 3.4 Configuration of the facilitation frame in the Afsluitdijk case.
type of 
frame
Frame element characteristics
Diagnostic Visualisation Summing up all the innovative things that could be done on the dam.
prognostic Presentation Presenting authorities, ambitions, planning, procedures, deadlines.
Designation Designating sustainable energy generation to external actors.
Demarcation Demarcating governments’ support for sustainable energy generation.
motivational Justification Assigning public and private tasks, referring to management decision.
The image that we deduce from the documents resonates with the interviews with the 
actors involved. The project manager from the national water authority speaks of a clear 
task division between national authorities, local authorities and non-governmental project 
initiators. The renovation is clearly the national government’s first priority. Adding func-
tions such as energy generation is allowed only if it does not interfere with the renovation 
process and the accompanying narrow budget and time schedule. The minister, however, 
repeatedly speaks of the Afsluitdijk as becoming an ‘icon of the future’, including innova-
tive energy projects, but this does not result in a greater mandate or financial resources for 
the asset manager. The discrepancy between the expressed ambitions and the govern-
ment’s limited willingness to actually contribute to them leads to frustration on the private 
initiators’ side. One of our respondents says about his interaction with the authorities: “I 
constantly have to keep their minds on the matter. I recently asked [the local governor]: 
‘Do these public ambitions still apply and, if yes, can you please act according to them?’”.
brouwersdam tidal power plant
Table 3.5 gives an overview of the occurrence of the different frame elements in the 
documents on the governance of the Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant.
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table 3.5 Facilitation frame elements in the brouwersdam case
type of frame Frame Element number of text fragments
Diagnostic Visualisation 33
Promotion 9
Consolidation 23
prognostic Presentation 29
Invitation 13
Demarcation 5
Designation 10
motivational Offer 19
Lure 11
Justification 9
total 161
The dominant diagnostic frame elements in this case are visualisation and consolida-
tion. The visualisation of opportunities is focused on the realisation of a tidal power plant 
(in contrast to the frame elements in the Afsluitdijk case that mention a wide range of 
ways to generate energy). The future Brouwersdam area is visualised as an icon of 
Dutch delta technology, with an ‘appealing appearance for the region, the country and 
the world’. Again, the word ‘could’ is repeatedly used to indicate both opportunity and 
conditionality (the presented options will take place only if somebody takes the initiative). 
The Brou wersdam and the surrounding area are promoted as a perfect location for the 
realisation of an innovative ‘low tide’ tidal power plant. The national and local govern-
ments conducted an extensive market and stakeholder consultation, and the results of 
this project are stressed to consolidate what has been achieved already. The existing 
energy generation and the willingness of non-governmental actors to participate in the 
realisation of a tidal power plant is repeatedly referred to, for example by stating that 
‘private actors already formed a consortium’ and that there are ‘multiple initiatives’ for 
energy generation. The shared responsibility is made clear by sentences such as ‘There 
has been an intensive collaboration process (co-creation) between private constructers 
and the public project bureau. It turned into a shared search for viable solutions’ (‘Dat 
gebeurde in een intensieve samenwerking (cocreatie) tussen waterbouwers en het pro-
jectbureau Getijdencentrale Bouwersdam. Het werd een gezamenlijke zoektocht naar 
haalbare oplossingen’) (Projectbureau Getijdencentrale Brouwersdam, 2015: 2).
The dominant prognostic frame elements in the Brouwersdam case are presentation 
and invitation. The different authorities involved and their collaboration in the project bu-
reau are presented, as also the past and future process steps. In contrast to the Afsluitdijk 
case in which external actors are invited to realise energy projects themselves, in this 
Brouwersdam case, external actors are invited to join the government in exploring the 
possibilities for energy generation by stating, for example, that ‘The private actors are 
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all very knowledgeable. They are asked to join in thinking about public conditions and a 
viable business case’ (‘De marktpartijen hebben allen veel kennis in huis. Aan hen wordt 
gevraagd om mee te denken over de publieke randvoorwaarden en over een haalbare 
business case’) (Projectbureau Getijdencentrale Brouwersdam, 2014: 13). The invitation 
thus takes the form of a partner proposal; government and non-governmental actors are 
presented as equal partners.
The dominant motivational frame elements in the Brouwersdam case are offer and 
lure. The government’s financial investments in water quality are presented as the gen-
erator (‘flying wheel’) of non-governmental actors’ initiatives. The government offers to 
create ‘beneficial conditions’ for private initiators and says that it is willing to ‘contribute’ 
to the realisation of a power plant by, for example, providing a suitable location. As in the 
Afsluitdijk case, however, the government does not really explicate this facilitation offer to 
external actors. In some documents, the offer is even formulated as a question to potential 
external initiators: ‘What can the involved authorities do so that private actors can create a 
viable business case? What conditions should be met?’ (‘Hoe kunnen de betrokken over-
heden er voor zorgen dat marktpartijen aan de Brouwersdam een goed project met een 
robuuste business case aan hebben? En in het bijzonder: aan welke randvoorwaarden 
moet [worden voldaan]?’) (Rijkswaterstaat et al., 2013: 8). External actors are lured into 
participation by the enumeration of some private benefits, such as the development of a 
successful product for exportation and other commercial gains: ‘The potential realisation 
of a tidal power plant contributes to the technological development of sustainable energy 
supply. In this case, private actors have direct revenues from selling energy. In addition, 
there are “green” investment opportunities for individual and institutional investors’ (‘Een 
eventuele uitvoering met een getijdencentrale, draagt bij aan de technische ontwikkeling 
van duurzame energievoorzieningen. Private partijen kunnen in dat geval directe baten 
uit de verkoop van energie genereren en er ontstaan ”groene“ beleggingsmogelijkheden 
voor particuliere en institutionele investeerders’) (Ministerie van Infrastructuur & Milieu, 
2014: 36). Table 3.6 shows the configuration of the different frame elements in this case.
Table 3.6 Configuration of the facilitation frame in the Brouwersdam case.
type of 
frame
Frame element characteristics
Diagnostic Visualisation Numerating tidal power plant options and additional benefits.
Consolidation Stressing established cooperation, enthusiasm and willingness to act.
prognostic Presentation Setting out followed path and steps to come.
Invitation Inviting external actors as partners in exploration and exploitation
motivational Offer Offering facilitation, beneficial conditions, accommodation.
Lure Summing up some commercial gains for private actors.
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The interviews confirm the findings of our content analysis. The national water author-
ity’s project manager admits that the government had difficulty formulating its own goals 
regarding energy generation after it became clear that a power plant would not generate 
money to finance the restoration but rather cost extra money. The authorities repeatedly 
had to adjust their expectations about the private actors’ capacity to finance, realise and 
exploit a power plant. They had to alter their ideas about the potential amount of gener-
ated energy, possible revenues and the private sector’s willingness to run this project. 
Even now that an extensive subsidy scheme has been set up, it is uncertain whether 
private actors can take up the role the government envisages for them. The private 
actors involved display some frustration about the absence of clear public goals and 
about the mismatch between the authorities’ exhibited enthusiasm and their willingness to 
contribute financially. A private sector representative says in this regard: ‘I want to say to 
the government: “find the necessary budget (…) show your greatness and do it!” Private 
actors are not able to finance this. The matter is being shuffled back and forth. What we 
need is government steering, facilitation is not enough’.
case comparison: afsluitdijk versus brouwersdam
To some extent, the discursive framing in the two cases is alike; in both cases, for ex-
ample, the government uses visualisation to highlight the opportunities in the situations. 
However, especially in the prognostic and motivational frames, there are significant differ-
ences between the cases. Table 3.7 gives an overview.
table 3.7 comparison of the facilitation frames in the two cases.
type of frame afsluitdijk brouwersdam
Diagnostic Visualisation Visualisation
Consolidation
prognostic Presentation Presentation
Demarcation Invitation
Designation
motivational Justification Offer
Lure
restrained facilitation invitational facilitation
The facilitation frame in the Afsluitdijk case is built mainly upon the elements visualisation, 
presentation, designation, demarcation and justification. We call this form of facilitation 
‘restrained’. The authorities are in favour of the realisation of renewable energy projects 
at the location; they show this by mentioning the different opportunities in their policy 
documents and depicting a future in which these projects figure. They present their own 
work on the dam as a unique opportunity to help potential external initiators to plan their 
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activities. What the authorities are willing to contribute to the energy projects is limited, 
however; they act somewhat aloofly towards the initiatives. The authorities clearly de-
marcate their own limited willingness to act and, through designation, they make clear 
that non-governmental actors should take the lead in the realisation of energy projects or 
nothing will happen. Through justification, the government explains why this division of 
responsibilities is chosen.
The facilitation frame in the Brouwersdam case is constructed with the elements 
visualisation, consolidation, presentation, invitation, offer and lure. We call this form of 
facilitation ‘invitational’. The authorities express their enthusiasm about a tidal power plant 
through visualisation of opportunities and a bright future including such a power plant. 
In this form of facilitation, the authorities present themselves as more cooperative; they 
actively invite non-governmental actors to join the governance process. Private actors are 
invited to share their knowledge, ideas and desires to come to a shared understanding of 
what is feasible at the Brouwersdam. Consolidation is another indicator of the collabora-
tive character of this form of facilitation. By stressing the partnerships already established 
and enthusiasm generated, the authorities consolidate the collaboration. They make a 
facilitation offer to potential initiators and further try to mobilise them by spelling out pos-
sible gains for them if they take action.
two facilitating logics: restrained and invitational facilitation
There are different reasons why governments would want to facilitate the actions of ex-
ternal, non-governmental actors. External—public or private—actors can bring resources 
into the governance process that the government lacks, such as knowledge or money, 
especially in times of austerity (Roodbol-Mekkes & Van den Brink, 2015). Facilitation of 
external initiatives can in this way foster the delivery of public goods; public goals can be 
met that could not have been met otherwise (Skelcher, et al., 2005: 589). Facilitation of 
non-governmental initiatives can also lead to more innovative solutions to public problems 
(Van Buuren et al., 2015). It can further increase stakeholder involvement and strengthen 
(local) support for governmental measures (Skelcher, et al., 2005: 574).
To profit from these potential benefits of facilitation, both the authorities that employ 
restrained facilitation and the authorities that employ invitational facilitation try to entice 
private actors to take the lead in project realisation. The first part of the facilitation frame 
that they employ is therefore the same. The authorities inform external actors about the 
situation and the actions they themselves are undertaking in the region; they promote the 
location and try to engage external actors by visualising opportunities. The authorities build 
their framing upon the unique possibilities that they, as the owner of public waterworks, 
have available for other actors to realise. They further communicate their public task as 
an opportunity for other actors to join them in order to create more public value together. 
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The subsequent prognostic and motivational frame elements differ, however, depending 
on the form of facilitation. In Table 3.8, we summarise the two frame configurations.
table 3.8 context and characteristics of restrained and invitational facilitation.
restrained facilitation invitational facilitation
context There is a general opinion that the 
government has to enable public value 
creation, although there are no formal policy 
goals that oblige public actors to help private 
initiatives to succeed.
There is a public ambition to realize a 
certain goal, which cannot be realized 
without private help.
Storyline Private initiatives are welcome but the public 
contribution for realizing them is necessarily 
limited and the focus of the public actors is 
upon their own assignment.
Private initiatives are indispensable for 
realizing the public assignment, thus as 
much public facilitation as possible will be 
made available.
Structuring 
elements
Initiatives are primarily the own 
responsibility of private actors. Limited 
public role as unavoidable due to legal and 
policy constraints.
There is a common interest between 
public and private actors. It is necessary 
to strengthen each other where possible, 
due to the innovative character of this 
endeavour.
narrative 
validity
The narrative gives actors hope for public 
support, but the emphasis on its limited 
character generates doubts.
The narrative remains unclear about what 
public actors actually can do because the 
limitations are not defined.
In the case of restrained facilitation, the authorities emphasise their limitations in what 
they are able or willing to contribute. Unambiguously, they designate certain actions and 
responsibilities to non-governmental actions; through justification, they give an expla-
nation for the envisioned role division. An advantage of this approach is that potential 
initiators know what they can expect. A possible downside of this restrained form of 
facilitation is that it is somewhat aloof; that external actors do not feel invited, nor suf-
ficiently enthused or convinced about what the government has to offer to them in terms 
of support. Authorities might choose such an approach if they have little interest in project 
realisation. Another possibility is that they believe that external initiators will show up 
and succeed anyway; if authorities believe that private actors will realise their project 
without their discursive encouragements or support, the authorities can afford to adopt a 
restrained stance.
In the case of invitational facilitation, authorities are more involved, less aloof, but 
also less clear about their own ambitions and limitations. With this form of facilitation, 
authorities will probably arouse non-governmental actors’ interest and willingness to 
participate. A possible danger is the emergence of a deadlock, in which government and 
non-governmental actors both expect the other to take the lead, as witnessed in the 
Brouwersdam case. Invitational facilitation can result in high transaction costs and false 
expectations, and can even harm the government’s reputation as a trustworthy and reli-
able partner.
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3.6 conclUSionS
In the practice of politics and public administration, ‘the narrative of collaboration between 
stakeholders’ is becoming more dominant (Skelcher, et al., 2005: 573). Societal actors’ 
self-organisation and a more modest, reactive, facilitative role for the government are hot 
topics (Bryson et al., 2014; Taylor, 2007). Despite this, however, there is relatively little 
research into governance processes in which the government assumes this facilitative 
role (Westerink et al., 2017). Our study shows that facilitation is not such a straightfor-
ward, easy act for the government as it might seem. Partnerships between government 
and non-governmental actors are not all about ‘mother love and apple pie’ (Dickinson & 
Sullivan, 2014; McLaughlin, 2004: 103).
Using content analysis of relevant documents, we identified ten facilitation frame 
elements: visualisation, promotion, consolidation, presentation, invitation, demarcation, 
designation, offer, lure and justification. We find that these frame elements combine into 
two forms of facilitation: restrained and invitational. The forms are constituted by a differ-
ent set of frame elements and have their own origin, advantages and downsides. The two 
frame configurations can be seen as illustrations of more hands-off (restrained) and more 
hands-on (invitational) forms of facilitation.
We can conclude that facilitation and communication about facilitation is a balancing 
act between, on the one hand, enthusing external actors, consolidating the achieved 
collaboration, and enticing external actors to take the lead in public good production by 
summing up potential benefits and, on the other hand, being clear about what is expected 
from external actors and what the authorities themselves are willing or not willing to do; 
in other words, what the facilitation offer exactly entails. Too often it remains unclear what 
exactly the government has to offer to external actors. This facilitation offer, ranging from 
‘giving space’ to ‘creating beneficial conditions’, is often elusive. Equally indefinite is what 
the authorities hope to achieve. Often, there is hardly any mention of what their goals 
are and what they are willing to do to reach these goals. Consequently, both restrained 
and invitational facilitation can cause unrealistic expectations on the external actor’s part 
about what the government is actually willing and able to do to support their initiatives. 
Private actors’ standard response is ‘in for a penny, in for a pound’.
We conclude that, although not easily done, if governments aim to mobilise and 
facilitate non-governmental actors in the production of public goods, they have to com-
municate in both a restrained and an invitational way. Before that, however, an accurate 
assessment of the private actors’ capacity to realise the envisioned public goals is es-
sential. Discursive framing and an appealing facilitation offer, no matter how enticing, will 
not automatically lead to private action. If the potential initiators just lack the necessary 
capacity to act, there is only so much discursive framing can do. The government’s facili-
73
FACILITATION AS A GOVERNANCE STRATEGY
tative role then needs to go hand in hand with more ‘traditional’ government roles, such 
as those of provider, contractor and/or financier.
3.7 DiScUSSion
Today’s authorities increasingly explore new ways to collaborate with other actors to deal 
with pressing societal issues. The energy sector is one of the sectors in which the impor-
tance of bottom-up initiatives (both private and societal) is growing. Authorities search for 
ways to relate to these initiatives and to develop a new repertoire to deal with them. In 
our study, we analysed how authorities use discursive framing to invite non-governmental 
actors to generate energy at public waterworks. We explored new forms of public–private 
collaboration at the project level. In the envisioned task division, private actors initiate, 
realise and finance projects; authorities ‘solely facilitate’.
Our cases reflect public authorities’ more general search for public value creation 
(Bryson et al., 2014; Stoker, 2006). The Dutch national water authority tries to enable 
value creation by choosing a rather safe role, based upon facilitating non-governmental 
initiatives. Despite the shortcomings of this strategy, it sticks to this strategy because of 
legal, financial and political constraints. The cases that we studied reflect the need for 
public value pragmatism (Alford & Hughes, 2008). In this approach: ‘the organization is 
open to the utilization of any of a variety of means to achieve program purposes, with 
the choice of these means focused on what is most appropriate to the circumstances, 
consistent with the important values at stake’ (Alford & Hughes, 2008: 131).
From our analysis, the question arises as to whether the context in which public asset 
managers have to work allows for this form of pragmatism. After all, there are many 
regulatory barriers that make private involvement difficult; and, for public water authori-
ties, it is difficult to provide a stimulating context for these types of initiatives because of 
their rather strictly delineated role and responsibilities. Regulatory adjustments to give 
asset owners and asset managers the incentive or even the responsibility to contribute 
to energy transition, and regulatory innovation to simplify and broaden the possibilities 
for private actors to use public works, seem to be logical steps to overcome the permis-
siveness of facilitation and to enable more pragmatism in facilitating bottom-up initiatives.

4 Government Facilitation of External Initiatives: How Dutch 
Water Authorities Cope with Value 
Dilemmas
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abStract
Water authorities search for new collaborations with nongovernmental actors, with the aim 
of facilitating societal initiatives. A comparative case study was conducted to analyze the 
value dilemmas faced by water authorities when they choose to facilitate and how they 
cope with these dilemmas. The study found that the most prevalent dilemma is between 
traditional democratic values and efficiency-related values. In the chosen solutions, the 
latter seem to prevail over the former. Casuistry, cycling and hybridization are common 
coping mechanisms. The study shows the potential of non-governmental initiatives in the 
water sector while also reflecting critically on dominant administrative values.
This chapter has been published as Grotenbreg, S., & Altamirano, M. (2017). Government 
facilitation of external initiatives: how Dutch water authorities cope with value dilemmas. 
International Journal of Water Resources Development, 35 (3), 465-490. doi:10.1080/07
900627.2017.1374930
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4.1 introDUction
As in all sectors of public administration, the water sector has shifted from hierarchical 
and highly institutionalized forms of government rule towards a more collaborative ap-
proach (Fliervoet & Van den Born, 2017; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Termeer, Dewulf, & Van 
Lieshout, 2010). Water authorities increasingly collaborate with individual water users, 
communities, private actors and non-profit organizations to reach their policy goals (Pahl-
Wostl, 2007; Watson, 2015). The involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making 
process has become common practice in many countries (Koontz, 2014; Petts, 2007; 
Schoeman, Allan, & Finlayson, 2014). The involvement of non-governmental actors in 
other phases of the policy process, such as policy implementation and evaluation, is less 
prevalent (Mees et al., 2016).
Recently, however, water authorities have started to explore new, more encompass-
ing forms of working with non-governmental actors (Edelenbos, Van Buuren, Roth, & 
Winnubst, 2017a). They advocate the self-organization of stakeholders and encourage 
non-governmental actors to take more responsibility for flood risk management, for ex-
ample (Johnson & Priest, 2008; Nye, Tapsell, & Twigger-Ross, 2011; Watson, Deeming, 
& Treffny, 2009). Authorities aim to work with non-governmental actors as equal partners 
or even limit their own role to the facilitation of external actors’ actions (Grotenbreg & Van 
Buuren, 2018). The initiating leadership in projects then lies with the non-governmental 
actors (Westerink et al., 2017). Pahl-Wostl, Jeffrey, Isendahl, and Brugnach (2011) speak 
of a new water management paradigm in which a new balance is set between bottom-up 
and top-down processes and in which narrow stakeholder participation is replaced by 
broad stakeholder participation.
Water authorities have a lot to gain in these forms of collaboration: embracing external 
initiatives may result in cost savings, generate public support, and lead to innovative 
solutions to public problems (Alexander et al., 2016; Nikolic & Koontz, 2008). But the 
authorities also have something to lose when they choose to facilitate external initiatives: 
they have to share discretion over the use of public authority and public funds with non-
governmental actors (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2006). This may result in administrative 
value conflicts (Van Buuren et al., 2015; Hood, 1991).
In traditional forms of water management, in which the government is the main initia-
tor, financier and definer of the measures taken, classical, democratic values such as 
state sovereignty, public authority, legality and impartiality dominate. In alternative forms 
of collaboration in which the government facilitates external initiatives, other adminis-
trative values, such as customization, flexibility and effectiveness, are more important 
(Edelenbos et al., 2017b). Despite the wish for more collaboration with non-governmental 
actors, water authorities are also still expected to uphold the classical, democratic values. 
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Choosing to facilitate can thus lead to contradictory demands and value dilemmas for 
water authorities (Meijerink & Dicke, 2008). This study examines these dilemmas.
Existing research predominantly describes practices of stakeholder involvement 
initiated by government. Self-organizing initiatives that develop autonomously in society 
are much less studied (Mees et al., 2016). Despite growing scholarly attention to new 
forms of collaboration between state and non-state actors in the water sector, much is 
still unknown about the dilemmas encountered by water authorities when they choose 
to facilitate external initiatives, how they deal with these dilemmas, and with what result. 
These questions form the starting point of this study.
A comparative case study was conducted of two cases in which the Dutch national 
water authority, RWS, aimed to facilitate an external initiative. The Dutch water authority 
is an informative object of study because the Dutch water sector is traditionally strongly 
government-led, publicly funded, and focused on risk avoidance (Van Buuren et al., 2015). 
Collaboration with non-governmental actors is generally seen as a threat to decisive and 
uncompromised action (Warner, 2006). Recently, however, RWS started exploring the 
facilitation of societal and private initiatives (Frantzeskaki et al., 2016). The water author-
ity wants to go beyond the principal–agent relationship common to formal public–private 
partnerships (PPPs) (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2018). This leads to a situation is which 
many value dilemmas can be expected.
A comparative case study design was chosen to find the relation between different 
value dilemmas, coping mechanisms, and results. In the first case, the water authority 
accommodated the initiative of a non-profit organization to create a nature reserve. In 
the second case, the water authority searched for private initiators to realize and exploit 
a tidal power plant in a public dam. This selection covers two forms of facilitation: accom-
modating facilitation, in which the authorities react to an existing initiative; and invitational 
facilitation, in which authorities have a role in mobilizing external actors to initiate a project 
that the authority can subsequently facilitate (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2017). There-
fore, the effects of different forms of facilitation can be identified.
In the next section, four common ways in which private-sector and civil society initia-
tives are accommodated worldwide in the water sector are briefly discussed. In the third 
section, the relevant literature on government facilitation is examined, highlighting the 
advantages and disadvantages for water authorities of embracing external initiatives. An 
overview is presented of three types of administrative values that can conflict in facilitation 
practices and different mechanisms employed by authorities to cope with these dilem-
mas. The fourth section presents the research design, and the fifth describes the selected 
cases. The next section discusses the analysis and case comparison. The final section 
closes the article with a discussion and conclusions.
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4.2 From GoVErnmEnt to GoVErnancE in thE WatEr 
SEctor
In the government-led Dutch water sector, water management is perceived as a public 
task, and water authorities rely heavily on their duty of care (Kraak, 2011). Water security 
is publicly funded by taxes, ensuring full cost recovery. As in most countries, there is 
still a strong prediction and control regime (Pahl-Wostl, 2007), and water management 
is predominantly focused on risk avoidance (Van Buuren et al., 2015). Participation by 
non-governmental actors is often seen as a threat to decisive and uncompromised action 
(Warner, 2006). Recently however, new forms of collaboration with non-governmental 
actors are being introduced in the Netherlands. Gradually, and relatively late compared 
to other sectors and other countries, external actors are being admitted into the arena 
(Edelenbos et al., 2017a).
policy instruments for the inclusion of non-governmental actors 
worldwide
Other countries are generally more progressive than the Netherlands in terms of granting 
non-governmental actors an active role in the provision of services in the water sector. 
There are various instruments through which participation by private and societal actors is 
promoted worldwide. First, PPPs enable projects to be (partly) financed by private consor-
tia. The PPP finance structure gives governments access to alternative debt and equity 
that traditional public (debt) finance cannot provide (Reynaers & De Graaf, 2014; World 
Bank Group, 2014). Second, viability gap funding is an instrument that enables funding 
by a combination of taxpayers’ and users’ payments. It reduces the upfront capital costs 
of pro-poor investments by providing grant funding, which can be used in the construction 
phase of a project (Farquharson, Torres de Mästle, Yescombe, & Encinas, 2011).
Third, in unsolicited proposals, private actors propose a PPP project to the govern-
ment. Submissions are treated confidentially in their initial stages, but once the financial 
viability of the project has been demonstrated and the government declares it of national 
interest, the project is often put out to public tender, enabling open competition among 
other private consortia. Fourth, tax swaps allow companies to invest in projects proposed 
by local authorities and receive a tax reduction in the following years until the equivalent 
of the investment is achieved (Deloitte, 2014). Whereas the first two instruments are ap-
plicable mainly to private initiatives where a more traditional public commissioner–private 
consortium model applies, the last two can be used by societal actors such as NGOs, 
cooperatives, and local companies interested in making a contribution to their community.
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Government facilitation of non-governmental initiatives and its benefits
Government facilitation, as discussed in this article, can be seen as another governance 
instrument through which non-governmental initiatives are accommodated in the water 
sector. It combines elements of PPP and unsolicited proposals. In government facilitation, 
private or societal actors take the initiative to produce public goods or services, and the 
government facilitates this initiative. Ownership of the initiative lies (predominantly) with 
the non-governmental initiator, and there is no principal–agent relation in the sense that 
the government does not act as the commissioner of a project. Government facilitation 
exists in different forms and intensities (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011). Authorities can for 
example actively entice non-governmental initiatives, or they can passively await such 
action. The amount and form of support can also differ; authorities might change rules 
and regulations in favour of the initiative and contribute financially, or they might solely 
provide a platform for non-governmental actors to meet and further develop their plans 
(Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2018).
Facilitation of non-governmental initiatives can have many benefits for authorities. 
It can enlarge the reservoir of available knowledge and financial and organizational re-
sources, thereby complementing the strengths of the public sector. There can be efficiency 
gains (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2006; Reynaers & De Graaf, 2014), and facilitation can 
increase productivity and public value creation (Zhang, Crawley, & Kane, 2015). Things 
can be accomplished that the government could not have done on its own. Embracing 
external initiatives can further generate public support and lead to more innovative solu-
tions to public problems (Van Buuren et al., 2015; Wegerich, Warner, & Tortajada, 2014). 
The facilitated project can function ‘at arm’s length’ from centres of political authority; this 
may offer greater flexibility in decision making, resource acquisition, management, and 
accountability arrangements (Skelcher et al., 2005).
4.3 thEory oF ValUE DilEmmaS anD copinG mEchaniSmS
Different (interpretations of) administrative values
The administrative values in situations of government facilitation of external initiatives are 
analyzed using Hood’s (1991) distinction between three types of administrative values: 
theta, lambda and sigma. Theta values are democratic values; they secure an honest 
and fair governance process. Lambda values relate to quality; they are about keeping 
things robust and resilient. Sigma values are about being effective and efficient, keeping 
things clean and purposeful (Hood, 1991; Hood & Jackson, 1991). These three value 
types can serve as justification for different administrative doctrines. Many New Public 
Management practices are for example generally justified by the sigma values, efficiency 
and austerity. The values guide how administrations are organized, the role assigned to 
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the government, how public officials perform, what are understood as public goods, and 
what the government aims to achieve (Van Buuren et al., 2015).
Based on the literature on public–private collaboration and government facilitation – 
further elaborated on in the next section – Table 4.1 lists the administrative theta, lambda 
and sigma values that could be at stake in situations where government facilitates external 
initiatives. This overview is used to analyze the dilemmas confronted by the authorities in 
the cases because, in administrative reality, it is hard, if not impossible, to meet all three 
value types at the same time (Rutgers, 2008). The administrative values are not absolute; 
they overlap and may conflict (Koppenjan, Charles, & Ryan, 2008).
table 4.1 relevant administrative values in situations of government facilitation of external 
initiative
theta values lambda values Sigma values
Legality, rule of law, reliability Quality, robustness, validity Delivery
Equality, equity, impartiality, fairness, 
neutrality
Strategic clarity (in contrast to 
complexity)
Austerity, parsimony, thrift
Legitimacy, duty of care, right actor for 
the task
Government control, discretion over 
production
Efficiency, rapidness, 
productivity
Transparency, honesty Security – avoiding risks Flexibility
Democracy, responsiveness Government reputation Effectiveness
Representativeness, inclusiveness Professionalism
Primacy of politics, government 
authority
Government accountability
Public interest, public money for 
common goods
Customization, tailor-made 
solutions
Besides a differentiation between different types of administrative values, there can be 
various interpretations of the same administrative value. This variation in interpretation 
can lead to different evaluations of a governmental practice. In the governance literature, 
some authors mention the gains for democratic legitimacy of involving stakeholders 
and facilitating external initiatives (Lockwood, Davidson, Curtis, Stratford, & Griffith, 
2010; Lupo Stanghellini & Collentine, 2008; Thaler & Levin-Keitel, 2016). They state, for 
example, that societal actors such as non-profit organizations are better than the govern-
ment at identifying citizens’ needs (Bode & Brandsen, 2014). Others authors, however, 
point out that involving non-governmental actors in traditional public services could harm 
democratic legitimacy (Skelcher et al., 2005; Swyngedouw, 2005; Taylor, 2007). The dif-
ference between these authors can be explained by the democracy model that they apply. 
Edelenbos et al. (2017) distinguish a representative, a participatory, and a self-organizing 
democracy model in this regard.
In the representative model, politicians govern on behalf of the electorate, uphold the 
primacy of politics, and are the first to decide on issues that impact society (Edelenbos 
82
CHAPTER 4
et al., 2017b; Held, 2006). This can be threatened if non-governmental actors enter the 
administrative arena (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). Adherents to this model argue that gov-
ernment facilitation of societal initiatives clashes with the public imperatives of democracy 
(Skelcher et al., 2005). In the participatory model of democracy, citizens get the chance 
to take part in the policy- and decision-making process; politicians create the conditions 
for this participation process (Edelenbos et al., 2017b; Pateman, 1976). Adherents to 
this model advocate stakeholder involvement in government-initiated processes because 
it strengthens trust, support, and the legitimacy of government measures (Thaler & 
Levin-Keitel, 2016). In the self-organizing democracy model, social issues are as much 
as possible managed by voluntary and democratically self-governing associations. The 
government’s role is to stimulate and reactively facilitate societal initiatives (Edelenbos 
et al., 2017b; Hirst, 1994). Adherents to this model assume that a focus on societal ac-
tors’ self-organization, accompanied by a modest, facilitative role for the government, 
enhances democratic legitimacy.
Growing attention is being paid to this last model of democracy, in which co-production 
and self-organization have central roles (Mees et al., 2016; Voorberg, Bekkers, & Tum-
mers, 2015). It is argued that, in current times of increasingly complex public problems 
(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016) and decreasing levels of political trust and voter turnout (Mair, 
2005), there is a need for such forms of governance (Michels, 2011). In the practice of 
public administration also, there is a growing tendency to interpret democratic legitimacy 
more from a collaborative or participation perspective (Van Buuren et al., 2012). This per-
spective does not, however, fully replace traditional, representative notions of democracy. 
Especially on the national level, the idea of the primacy of politics is still very strong (Van 
der Steen et al., 2018). This means that alternative democratic notions lead to contradic-
tory demands and value dilemmas for public authorities.
possible value dilemmas in government facilitation of non-governmental 
initiatives
A dilemma, meaning ‘two propositions’ in Greek (Hampden-Turner, 1990), is a special 
form of choice in which a complex issue manifests itself; it involves clashing or conflict-
ing values (Klijn, Edelenbos, Kort, & Van Twist, 2008; Quinn, Fearman, Thompson, & 
McGrath, 1996). The literature suggests that several such values are to be expected in 
situations of government facilitation.
If facilitating authorities choose to support external initiative financially, in cash or in 
kind, non-elected actors gain discretion over the spending of public funds. According to 
some, this can cause a dilemma between the primacy of politics (a theta value) and 
delivery (a sigma value). Facilitating authorities no longer exclusively decide how public 
money is spent, what solution is chosen for a public problem, and who exactly benefits. 
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They, in other words, have to compromise on production, payoff, and preference discre-
tion if they facilitate (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2006).
Collaboration with, and facilitation of, non-governmental actors have an inclusionary 
aim; authorities aim to include external actors in the governance process. This has the 
potential of enhancing the theta values, inclusiveness and representativeness. But of 
course, not all external actors will be included; facilitation of certain actors inevitably ex-
cludes others (Alexander et al., 2016). Unorganized, vulnerable, or less educated actors, 
who are less capable of securing government support, are especially at risk of falling 
behind (Westerink et al., 2017). Government facilitation can thus also endanger theta 
values such as equality and representativeness. It favours certain actors and can lead to 
ignoring alternative solutions (Taylor, 2007).
The facilitation of non-governmental initiatives often requires customization: tailor-
made solutions for a specific project. Customization is a lambda value. This can conflict, 
however, with theta values such as the state’s legality, reliability and impartiality (De Graaf, 
Huberts, & Smulders, 2016). The theta value, transparency, can also be jeopardized 
when authorities and the facilitated external actors come up with tailor-made solutions 
behind closed doors. Facilitation can further harm the lambda value, strategic clarity. The 
involvement of multiple public and private actors leads to great strategic complexity (Klijn 
& Koppenjan, 2016). Facilitated projects are less straightforward and could be structured 
less professionally compared to when the authorities do it themselves (Donahue & Zeck-
hauser, 2006). The lambda value, professionalism, could be jeopardized, depending on 
the quality of the process and its participants.
Facilitating external initiatives can further come at the price of diluted government con-
trol (a lambda value) and, despite expectations of lower implementation costs (a sigma 
value), it can also lead to higher transaction costs. Collaboration with non-governmental 
actors is often time-, resource-, and skill-consuming for the government (Huxham & 
Vangen, 2005; Watson, 2015). There is a dilemma between flexibility and administrative 
values such as clarity, legal certainty, and decisiveness (Van Buuren, Driessen, Teisman, 
& Van Rijswick, 2014). Authorities are also exposed to reputational vulnerability; they can 
be held accountable for things that are out of their hands. Other theta and lambda values 
that could be endangered in facilitated projects are government authority, legitimacy, 
and accountability in the public sphere (Skelcher et al., 2005). Finally, there is a risk of 
diminished administrative capacity; the less an authority performs certain actions itself, 
the less capable it will become of doing them (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2006), and in the 
long term less capable of judging and monitoring their quality.
coping with value dilemmas
When a dilemma between values emerges in administrative reality, a trade-off sometimes 
has to be made (De Bruijn & Dicke, 2006). Seeking a trade-off is not, however, the only 
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way public professionals can deal with a value dilemma (Koppenjan et al., 2008). Building 
on work by Thacher and Rein (2004) and Stewart (2006), Steenhuisen and Van Eeten 
(2008) distinguish six alternative coping mechanisms: cycling, firewalls, casuistry, hybrid-
ization, incrementalism and bias.
In cycling, public organizations address conflicting values sequentially over time. 
Building firewalls means that conflicting values are assigned to different departments; 
the values are decoupled, and each department is made responsible for realizing only 
one of the values (Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 2008). Casuistry entails public officials 
making decisions for each particular value conflict on the basis of their experiences in 
similar cases (De Graaf et al., 2016). In hybridization, conflicting values coexist in different 
policies or practices. This occurs, for example, when additions that reflect different values 
are made to existing policies (De Graaf et al., 2016). Incrementalism means that value 
conflicts are mitigated by incremental changes, for example small norm deviations. In 
bias, certain values are internalized in the organization through the dominant discourse, 
for example by a strong emphasis on ‘safety first’ (Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 2008).
table 4.2 typology of coping behaviour from Steenhuisen and Van Eeten, 2008, p. 148
coping type Explanation of what happens in a value conflict
Cycling Dividing attention on multiple values sequentially over time
Firewalls Separating institutions committed to different values
Casuistry Assessing priorities case-by-case among values on a routine basis
Hybridization Letting policies or practices coexist with different value bases
Incrementalism Mitigating conflicts between values with small stepwise changes
Bias Favouring certain values over others through dominant discourses
Table 4.2 gives an overview of the coping mechanisms. The research on which Steen-
huisen and Van Eeten’s (2008) typology of mechanisms is based is aimed mainly at public 
organizations in general, not at authorities, with the aim of facilitating non-governmental 
initiatives, and not specific projects with a limited time span as in this research. It is 
believed, however, that the typology can help elucidate the behaviour of facilitating au-
thorities when they are confronted with value dilemmas.
4.4 mEthoDoloGy
To answer the research question, comparative case-study research was conducted (Yin, 
1984), with the aim of gaining in-depth knowledge of complex situations. This entailed 
studying a small number of cases in detail to fully understand the situations in all their 
complexity (Blatter & Haverland, 2012; Flyvbjerg, 2001). The two-case comparison re-
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vealed the relation between different value dilemmas, coping mechanisms, and results. 
The cases were selected deliberately, by strategic sampling. Because of the research 
design, the study will not lead to direct generalizability or ready-made solutions to public 
problems (Hufen & Koppenjan, 2015). It does, however, elucidate new governance ar-
rangements in the water sector.
case selection
Two cases were selected in which the Dutch national water authority aimed to facilitate 
non-governmental initiatives: Marker Wadden and the Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant. In 
the first case, the water authority chose to facilitate an environmental NGO’s plan to cre-
ate marsh islands; in the second case, the authority aimed to facilitate a private consortia 
initiative to build and exploit a power plant in a public waterworks. The envisioned form 
of collaboration in the cases is novel in the sense that, in the past, the authorities would 
probably have designed and financed the projects, put them out to tender, and commis-
sioned only their construction, limiting the private-sector role to that of the ‘hired hand’. 
Recently, authorities have been looking for alternative task division and are delegating the 
service provider role more and more to the private sector.
Both cases related to multifunctional use of public assets; water management func-
tions (for safety and for water quality) were combined with, respectively, nature creation 
and energy generation functions. Government involvement in the projects was indispens-
able because the projects related to public assets and because the external initiators 
could not succeed without governmental support. The water authority encountered 
various dilemmas that it tried to tackle with different institutional, relational and regulatory 
arrangements. This makes the cases fit for the research aim. Furthermore, the case se-
lection covers two forms of facilitation, allowing exploration of whether and how dilemmas 
and arrangements differ depending on the form of facilitation.
Data collection
The investigation of documentation relating to the Brouwersdam case started in October 
2013. An important part of the investigation was an extensive document analysis of 
policy documents, news articles, and reports on market consultations. The research team 
conducted 14 semi-structured interviews with the water authority’s project manager, rep-
resentatives of the other national and local authorities involved, private actors and local 
stakeholders. Several stakeholder and market sounding meetings were also observed.
Research on the Marker Wadden case started in October 2015, also with an extensive 
document analysis. Among other things, a large number of documents disclosed under 
the Freedom of Information Act (Wet openbaarheid van bestuur, 1991) containing the 
communication between the government and the external initiator and between differ-
ent government departments were analyzed. Eight semi-structured interviews were 
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conducted with representatives of all the national and local authorities involved and the 
external initiator, Natuurmonumenten. The Appendices A and B give an overview of the 
documents and interviews used in the analysis.
Data analysis
To gain insight into the value dilemmas faced by the authorities and the coping mecha-
nisms they employed to deal with these dilemmas, the process followed in each case was 
reconstructed using the collected documents. The decisions made by the authorities in 
each case – and their timing – were identified, and an overview prepared. In the interviews 
that followed, the research focused on these decisions. The respondents were asked why 
certain choices were made, what alternatives were considered, what the pros and cons 
were of the options available, and how they evaluated the outcome. The respondents 
were further explicitly asked about the dilemmas and difficulties encountered in terms of 
the facilitation of, and collaboration with, the non-governmental actor(s). Case-specific 
situations and government facilitation in general were discussed, and the respondents 
elaborated on the potentials and pitfalls of this governance strategy. The identified deci-
sions and dilemmas were coded using the list of theta, lambda and sigma values (see 
Table 4.1) to determine which dilemmas qualified as a value dilemma. The selection of 
the dilemmas for further analysis was guided by the respondents’ judgements of the value 
dilemmas that they perceived as the most important, pressing, urgent, and/or typical of 
government facilitation situations.
4.5 caSE DEScriptionS
marker Wadden
In the heart of the Netherlands lies a large freshwater lake, created in 1930 by enclosing a 
sea inlet. The southern part of this lake is called the Markermeer. The Markermeer barely 
has natural shores; some compare it with a bathtub, and it is relatively shallow. Sediment 
that had accumulated on the bottom of the lake was churned up by the wind and waves, 
making the water very turbid. The deterioration in water quality had a severe impact on 
the flora and fauna in the area.
Over the years, there were numerous programmes, research projects and policy 
plans to deal with these problems. Most of them stalled because the authorities were 
not willing or able to finance the necessary interventions. In 2012, a market consultation 
was initiated, searching for cost-effective measures to create a future-proof ecosystem in 
the Markermeer area. Three private consortia came up with plans, with estimated costs 
ranging from €282 million to €1194 million. At the same time, a Dutch non-governmental 
organization for nature conservation, Natuurmonumenten, presented a plan for the 
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Markermeer to the government. It proposed to create a marsh, built from the silt sediment 
accumulated at the bottom of the lake. Estimated costs were €75 million for the first 1000 
ha of marsh. The project was named Marker Wadden.
In 2011, Natuurmonumenten was granted a €15 million subsidy for the Marker Wad-
den project from one of the Netherlands’ largest lotteries. Natuurmonumenten asked for 
an additional €30 million financial contribution from the government. The prevailing situ-
ation at the national government was fertile ground for Natuurmonumenten’s proposal. 
There were pressing environmental issues at the Markermeer, but the government did 
not have the resources for an all-encompassing plan. Natuurmonumenten brought a well-
developed, manageable plan and €15 million of its own resources to the table. Stimulating 
non-governmental actors to take the lead in solving public problems was an important 
goal of the government, and this project fitted this vision.
After internal discussions, two ministries decided to contribute €15 million each. Be-
cause of concerns about Natuurmonumenten’s capacity to manage such a large project, 
it was decided that the national water authority RWS would join Natuurmonumenten in a 
collaborative executive organization and would execute the tendering process. To avoid 
allegations of state aid, a unique, open invitation was sent to private and societal actors 
to become partners in the project. Interested actors had to show their commitment by 
co-investing a minimum of €5 million. Because of this high entry requirement, only the 
province of Flevoland was able to step in.
In 2014, the work was commissioned to a private consortium, and by 2016 the con-
struction work had started. After the creation of the first island in 2016, Natuurmonumenten 
was responsible for raising the funds needed to complete the first project phase with 
the creation of four more islands. Local and national authorities contributed another €14 
million, other private and societal actors €11 million. Table 4.3 gives an overview of the 
characteristics of the cases, including the roles and aims of the different actors involved.
brouwersdam tidal power plant
The Brouwersdam, constructed in 1971, is one of the world-famous Dutch delta works. 
The dam fully closes off the water behind the dam from the tide. This led to a deterioration 
in water quality; low oxygen levels caused the disappearance of flora and fauna; and the 
lack of tide led to accumulation of sediment on the lakebed. To improve water quality, as 
dictated by European Union legislation, the government developed a plan to partly reopen 
the dam and restore estuarine dynamics in the water behind. Making a breach would be 
very costly, but, thanks to the increasing potential of tidal energy generation, in 2010 the 
idea emerged to realize a tidal power plant in the future breach that would contribute 
financially to the construction of the breach.
In the first phase of the project, in 2013, a joint project bureau, composed of the 
national water authority RWS, two provinces and two municipalities, was installed to 
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investigate the feasibility of a breach, including a power plant. From the start, the inten-
tion was that private actors would design, build, finance, maintain and operate the plant. 
Because of the many uncertainties regarding the business case for this investment, the 
project bureau started an extensive, pre-competitive dialogue and fact-finding process 
with the market. At the end of 2013, there were dialogues, both public and confidential, 
between the authorities and the interested companies. A range of private actors, such 
as engineering companies and tidal turbine constructors, participated. It became clear 
that a power plant would not lead to the hoped-for revenues to cover the costs of the 
breach; on the contrary, realizing a power plant would result in additional costs. However, 
enthused by the conversation with the private and societal actors and convinced of the 
additional benefits of a power plant, such as a positive impact on the local economy, the 
investigation continued.
In a second phase of the project, in 2014, four private consortia were selected and fi-
nancially compensated to further optimize their plans. Parallel to the market consultation, 
one of the provinces joined an EU-funded project researching the best possible technique 
to generate tidal energy at the Brouwersdam. The results were made available to the 
market. Through the whole process, the authorities involved highlighted the collaborative, 
public–private nature of the process, speaking of co-creation. The authorities invested 
substantial resources, time, energy and manpower in the consultation, while maintaining 
their stance that the market ‘has to do it’ and the government ‘will solely facilitate’. The 
recurring government message was that the aim was to stimulate the market to come up 
with an innovative proposal and a feasible business plan.
In 2016, in the third phase of the project, the national water authority started prepar-
ing an integrative, concession-based tender for making the breach, including the power 
plant. According to this plan, the government would pay only for the breach. The winning 
consortium would be responsible for the design, financing, maintenance and exploitation 
of the power plant, therefore bearing all performance, financial and commercial risks. The 
government planned to facilitate the private initiative by providing several subsidies to the 
winning consortium and by offering compensation for design costs to the private consortia 
participating in the design and tendering phase. The plans to realize a power plant are 
currently on hold. Public and private stakeholders await further political decision making 
on partly reopening the dam, which is a precondition for a power plant. To date (July 
2017), there is insufficient public willingness to finance this reopening. The decision has 
been postponed until after the formation of a new government, after the national elections 
of March 2017.
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table 4.3 case characteristics of marker Wadden and brouwersdam tidal power plant
marker Wadden brouwersdam
physical project 
content
100 ha archipelago of marsh islands in 
freshwater lake
Tidal power plant in breach in primary 
flood defence dam
Environmental 
urgency
Medium urgency, deteriorating flora 
and fauna, sediment accumulation
No immediate urgency for power 
plant
administrative history Decennium of plan making, policy 
development and research
Decennium of investigation into 
possibility of power plant
initiative and initiator NGO took initiative to create 
archipelago and asked the 
government for help
Public authorities invited private 
actors to participate in realization of 
power plant
Form of government 
facilitation
Accommodating Invitational
Government’s aim Support external initiative, benefit from 
additional funds
Financially enable breach in dam, 
support (local) business, support 
renewable energy generation
aim of non-
governmental 
shareholder(s)
Realize appealing project for (future) 
members
Profit making
Stance of non-
governmental 
shareholder(s)
Active, eager to act Awaiting
novelty of governance 
arrangement
Novel, collaborate, public–private 
creation of new land
Novel, public facilitation of private 
use of public infrastructure
Drivers of successful 
realization
Resoluteness of NGO; attractive 
project for both the NGO and 
government; willingness to innovate
Strong public–public collaboration 
and enthusiasm
barriers to successful 
realization
Difficulty finding additional participants 
and funding
Limited public willingness to 
contribute financially
progress (July 2017) First marsh island created, funding for 
four more islands secured
No political willingness to finance 
breach, which is a precondition for 
the power plant
4.6 analySiS
marker Wadden
Dilemmas in the Marker Wadden initiation phase
The first dilemma in the Marker Wadden case became manifest when Natuurmonumenten 
presented its plan to the government. The government had just initiated a market con-
sultation, but Natuurmonumenten decided not to participate officially in this consultation 
because it did not want to comply with the accompanying terms and conditions. The 
authorities saw the benefits of Natuurmonumenten’s plan. It was, among other things, 
substantially cheaper than the proposals of the private consortia that did apply for the 
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market consultation. The situation can be understood as a dilemma between the theta 
values, legality and reliability, and the sigma values, delivery and austerity. As Natuur-
monumenten did not comply with the market consultation terms, it was not operating on a 
level playing field with the private consortia that did comply. Nevertheless, the authorities 
rated Natuurmonumenten’s proposal as ‘too good to ignore’ and decided to include it in the 
consultation’s results. In terms of coping, the authorities applied casuistry (Steenhuisen 
& Van Eeten, 2008); the characteristics of the NGO’s initiative persuaded the authorities 
to make an exception.
Natuurmonumenten contributed €15 million and requested another €30 million from 
the national government. This created a dilemma between the theta values, reliability and 
primacy of politics, and the sigma values, delivery and austerity. The economic crisis had 
hit, and there had been budget cuts in nature development. The government did not have 
the money to realize a large-scale project on its own, and it was therefore happy with 
Natuurmonumenten’s initiative and funds. But it had difficulty finding the requested €30 
million. The entire available budget had been assigned to other policy plans. Eventually, 
the ministries involved decided to revoke and reallocate money previously assigned to the 
provinces for nature development.
Another dilemma emerged when the government decided to collaborate with Natuur-
monumenten and contribute €30 million to this project without conducting a public tender-
ing procedure first. This could harm the government’s impartiality, a theta value. The 
authorities dealt with this by publishing an open call for expressions of interest in joining 
the project. The entry requirements were steep, however – participants had to contribute 
at least €5 million, and thus no other non-governmental actors joined. Besides the open 
call for expressions of interest, the authorities prevented unlawful state aid by not financ-
ing more than half of the total project costs and demanding that any possible revenues be 
reinvested in the project. Fearing that they are neglecting public values in collaborations, 
public authorities often introduce rules and regulations (Koppenjan et al., 2008).
The authorities made more tailor-made agreements with Natuurmonumenten. This 
customization, a lambda value, is often indispensable in such an unconventional public–
private collaboration. There can be a tension, however, between customization and the 
theta values, equality and transparency. A group of landowners filed a complaint about 
non-transparent decision making. Under the Freedom of Information Act (Wet openbaar-
heid van bestuur, 1991), the government had to disclose almost all its communication with 
Natuurmonumenten.
Dilemmas in the planning and design of Marker Wadden
There was internal discussion within the government about the organizational form of the 
collaboration with Natuurmonumenten. Should the government transfer the €30 million 
contribution to the NGO; should the NGO transfer its budget to the government and make 
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it a state-owned project; or should they form a collaborative project organization and work 
together as equal partners? Joining the project would cost the government more money 
(in time, energy, manpower and so on) and affect the sigma value, austerity. Eventually, 
it was decided to form a joint project organization to safeguard lambda values such as 
quality, government control and government reputation. By joining and not only facilitating 
the project, the authorities hoped to have a positive effect on the project outcomes. The 
authorities also decided, at the expense of austerity, to lead the tender of the construction 
work, thus securing the relation established with the market. In terms of coping, this ap-
proach can be labelled hybridization: the authorities allowed the coexistence of practices 
with different value bases (Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 2008).
The government’s project goal (improving water quality by reducing mud accumulation) 
and Natuurmonumenten’s goal (creating a nature reserve) overlap but are not identical. The 
authorities involved had some difficulty safeguarding their project goals and indirectly the 
public interest (a theta value). It proved not to be feasible to make the government’s finan-
cial contribution contingent on the achievement of clearly defined and measurable project 
outcomes. Therefore, the authorities refrained from that. To secure some other public goals, 
such as innovation and knowledge development, the authorities set up (and partly financed) 
a parallel learning programme. This is an example of erecting firewalls; different sections of 
the organization now safeguarded different values (Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 2008).
Natuurmonumenten voiced its concerns about the possibility that the government 
could withdraw its financial contribution after future elections and the formation of a new 
government. The NGO proposed to secure the money by lodging it in an external bank 
account. This caused tension between the primacy of politics, a lambda value – democrati-
cally chosen political bodies should control the spending of public funds – and delivery, a 
sigma value – the NGO would not continue the project without securing the money. The 
authorities gave in, and the external bank account was created. They applied the coping 
mechanism of casuistry in deciding on this solution in this particular case (Steenhuisen 
& Van Eeten, 2008).
Dilemmas in the creation and exploitation of Marker Wadden
In the realization phase, the government encountered some new dilemmas. The water au-
thority RWS, the executive organization, normally follows standardized working methods 
and procedures. This secures legality, a theta value, and efficiency, a sigma value. Some 
of these methods and procedures proved to be a hindrance in the Marker Wadden project. 
The project organization also dealt with this dilemma by casuistry (Steenhuisen & Van 
Eeten, 2008). The organization decided, for example, to bypass the RWS tender board, 
a board that gives binding advice about the tendering approach. Instead, it established 
another tender board with a more limited mandate. Another example of casuistry for 
customization is the changes made regarding the software that RWS normally works with 
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to track project progress and financing, which Natuurmonumenten could not access. The 
project team therefore now works with self-designed systems, custom-made for the Marker 
Wadden project. The customization (lambda) is aimed at enhancing delivery (sigma).
RWS further experienced its dependence on the external initiator, Natuurmonu-
menten. The two parties agreed that the NGO was responsible for raising the additional 
funds necessary to finalize the project. The authority found it not legitimate (a theta value) 
to engage in this task. When Natuurmonumenten had difficulty raising these funds, 
endangering project delivery (a sigma value), the government helped out, and different 
authorities agreed to make additional financial contributions. This coping mechanism 
can be labelled incrementalism; with small, stepwise adaptations conflicting values were 
mitigated (Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 2008).
Table 4.4 gives an overview of the value dilemmas, coping mechanisms and solutions 
chosen in the different phases of the Marker Wadden project. A number of trends can be 
observed. The most recurring dilemma is between democratic (theta) values and delivery 
(sigma) values, and in a majority of situations the sigma value seems to prevail in the 
chosen solution. Nevertheless, the theta value was not fully rejected, as authorities chose 
an arrangement in which delivery or austerity took priority but at the same time the theta 
value at stake was guaranteed to a certain degree. It can also be observed that, when 
lambda values such as quality and professionalism were jeopardized too much, authori-
ties chose to take a more dominant, no longer facilitative role – for a specific project phase 
– at the expense of austerity, a sigma value. An example of such a choice is RWS’ deci-
sion to take care of the tendering process, driven by doubts about Natuurmonumenten’s 
capacity to organize it.
In this case, the authorities responded to an external initiative, and this led to a re-
active way of working. It included finding instant, custom-made solutions in reaction to 
unexpected situations. This approach seemed to work in this case; the actors involved 
are happy with the results to date: the first marsh islands have been created. But the 
process to arrive at this result required significant effort, transaction, and coordination 
costs for the government. This could be because this form of collaboration with a soci-
etal partner is relatively new for the water authority. Future projects could make use of 
developed arrangements as a blueprint and require fewer government resources for their 
preparation. In that case, the resources used could be seen as an investment and part 
of a learning curve to adapt to this new role. But if every new collaborative project is as 
resource-intensive, it is not certain that the authorities will find it worthwhile to continue 
accommodating external initiatives.
Another point for consideration is the long-term consequences of this way of working. 
The three private consortia that submitted their plans at the government’s invitation were 
sidelined the moment Natuurmonumenten showed up. This could harm the government’s 
relation with market parties and weaken the government’s credibility.
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brouwersdam tidal power plant
Dilemmas in the Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant initiation phase
In the initiation phase of the Brouwersdam project, the authorities actively searched for 
private initiators and other societal actors willing to participate. This caused several dilem-
mas. First, the involvement of a large number of actors can lead to a complex and time-
consuming process. Strategic clarity (lambda) and efficiency (sigma) can be jeopardized. 
It does, however, enhance inclusiveness (theta). In this case, the authorities categorized 
stakeholders and shareholders. Selections of them were invited to specific parts of the 
consultation, with a focus on private actors who were expected to provide the neces-
sary private funds and information. In terms of coping, the authorities applied cycling. By 
initially inviting all interested actors and in later sessions making a selection, they applied 
different values sequentially over time (Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 2008).
table 4.4 Value dilemmas and chosen solutions in the marker Wadden case
Situation Value dilemma coping 
mechanism
authorities’ choice, 
outcome
initiation phase
Initiator does not comply with 
market consultation terms
Legality (theta) vs. 
austerity (sigma)
Casuistry Austerity, proposal included 
in consultation result
Initiator requests substantial, 
public, financial contribution
Reliability (theta) vs. 
delivery (sigma)
Casuistry Delivery, budget reallocated
Financial contribution without 
public tender
Impartiality (theta) vs. 
delivery (sigma)
Hybridization Middle way, open call for 
participation
Formal complaint about non-
transparent decision making
Transparency (theta) vs. 
customization (lambda)
Cycling Transparency, under 
Freedom of Information Act
planning and design phase
Discussion about 
organizational design of 
collaboration
Quality (lambda) vs. 
austerity (sigma)
Hybridization Quality, government project 
partner, and contracting 
authority
Public goals do not fully 
match external initiator’s 
goals
Public interest (theta) vs. 
delivery (sigma)
Firewalls Delivery, public goals in 
separate programme
Initiator fears withdrawal of 
public financial contribution
Primacy of politics 
(theta) vs. delivery 
(sigma)
Casuistry Delivery, project budget in 
external bank account
realization and exploitation phase
Standardization does not 
match with project
Legality (theta) vs. 
customization (lambda)
Casuistry Customization, project-
specific procedures and 
methods
Authority dependent on 
initiator’s search for further 
funding
Legitimacy (theta) vs. 
delivery (sigma)
Incrementalism Middle way, authority 
supports initiator in search 
for funding
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Part of the initiation phase was an extensive, precompetitive market consultation. 
In some cases, private actors wanted to share information only behind closed doors. 
This caused a dilemma between the theta values, legality and impartiality, and the sigma 
values, delivery and effectiveness. Confidential dialogues with a selected group of private 
actors could give the latter unfair advantage over their private competitors. But these 
dialogues were essential for the project’s progress. The authorities found a middle ground 
in disclosing as much information as possible but keeping sensitive competition informa-
tion confidential. This can be typified as hybridization: the coexistence of practices with 
different values bases (Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 2008).
Another dilemma emerged in this initiation phase. The authorities aimed to entice 
private actors to take the lead in the realization of a power plant, among other things by 
stressing the governmental support that private initiators would receive. This hopefully 
would enhance project delivery, a sigma value. But the authorities also had to be transpar-
ent (a lambda value) about their own limited capacity to contribute to a power plant and 
their desire to ‘solely’ facilitate. In the Brouwersdam case, the authorities seemed to focus 
on enthusing rather than downplaying expectations. A potential unintended consequence 
was an inactive, awaiting market that expected the government to take the lead (and as 
a consequence, no private delivery at all). In terms of coping, the authorities applied the 
bias mechanism: they discursively focused on the (private) benefits of realizing a power 
plant (Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 2008).
It was uncertain whether the public budget would become available to realize the 
breach in the dam, which was a precondition for the private realization of a tidal power 
plant. Despite this uncertainty, the authorities started the market consultation process. 
There was a dilemma between reliability (theta) and government reputation (lambda) 
versus delivery and flexibility (both sigma). If no public budget became available after all, 
the private actors would be disappointed, and the government’s reliability and reputation 
would be harmed. But if the budget did become available, the consultation findings would 
contribute to the quality of the project preparation and speed up its implementation.
Dilemmas in the planning and design of the Brouwersdam Tidal Power Plant
The main dilemma for the authorities in the planning phase of the Brouwersdam project 
was that they wanted a tidal power plant to be realized (delivery, a sigma value), but at 
minimal public risk and costs (austerity, also a sigma value). With the planned tendering of 
a concession, the authorities tried to entice private actors to realize and exploit the power 
plant. The winning consortium would receive a government payment only for the breach; 
the consortium itself would have to finance the power plant, with a limited number of 
subsidies, such as the subsidy for generating renewable energy. This is another example 
of coping by hybridization: the authorities aimed to realize both delivery and austerity by 
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focusing on private responsibility supplemented by public subsidy (Steenhuisen & Van 
Eeten, 2008).
The design costs in the competition phase proved to be too high for the private ac-
tors. This endangered the sigma value, delivery. One of the authorities involved therefore 
decided to reimburse part of the design costs of the power plant if private actors lived up 
to set expectations. But this arrangement came at the cost of the sigma value, austerity. 
The authorities applied casuistry as coping mechanism: the developments in the case led 
them to change their strategy (Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 2008).
Dilemmas in the realization and exploitation of the Brouwersdam Tidal Power 
Plant
Because of its innovative nature, potential private initiators had difficulty attracting investors 
for this project. This again created a dilemma for the authorities between legality (theta) 
and customization (sigma) and between austerity and delivery (both sigma values). As 
stated, the authorities wanted a tidal power plant to be realized at minimum public cost. 
To reduce the risk of private initiators’ not finding the necessary funding and the power 
plant not being realized, the authorities set up an active support scheme for potential 
private initiators. They actively searched for subsidy possibilities; one of the provinces 
lobbied national and European bodies to increase financial support for the power plant. 
In terms of coping, this could be labelled firewalls: the authorities divided tasks in such a 
way that especially the local authorities helped the private actors find financial resources 
(Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 2008).
The fact that a privately initiated tidal power plant would be heavily subsidized caused 
another dilemma. Was not a small group of private actors benefiting disproportionately 
from public money? This can be understood as a dilemma between public interest and 
impartiality, theta values, and, again, delivery, a sigma value. The authorities tried to deal 
with this dilemma by stressing that the private initiators needed to invest a substantial 
amount themselves. Another way of coping with this dilemma was to frame private ben-
efits as also being public benefits. ‘The power plant will be an international showcase 
attracting a lot of visitors to the region’ was the government’s message. This resembles 
the coping mechanism cycling: the authorities alternately stressed private responsibility 
and public–private collaboration (Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 2008).
Table 4.5 gives an overview of the value dilemmas, coping mechanisms and solutions 
in the different phases of the Brouwersdam project. Again, most of the dilemmas were 
between democratic (theta) and delivery (sigma) values. The authorities took a more 
dominant role than the discourse about ‘sole facilitation’ suggested, not because lambda 
values were at stake, as in the Marker Wadden case, but because the sigma value, 
delivery, was endangered. The envisaged private initiators had difficulty raising funds and 
attracting investors, mainly because of the uncertainties regarding the revenue-generating 
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capacity of the project. To ensure project continuation, the authorities supported the pri-
vate actors with lobbying, finding subsidies, and reimbursing part of the design costs. This 
came at the expense of the sigma value, austerity, and the intention to ‘solely facilitate’.
table 4.5 Value dilemmas and chosen solutions in the brouwersdam case
Situation Value dilemma coping 
mechanism
authorities’ choice, 
outcome
initiation phase
Stake- and shareholder 
involvement
Strategic clarity 
(lambda) vs. 
inclusiveness (theta)
Cycling Inclusiveness, few 
boundaries to number of 
participating actors
Confidential talks with selected 
group of private actors.
Legality (theta) vs. 
effectiveness (sigma)
Hybridization Middle way, some 
information behind closed 
doors
Enticing potential initiators with 
public enthusiasm and support
Transparency (theta) 
vs. delivery (sigma)
Bias Delivery, authorities not 
always clear about their own 
limited capacity
Uncertainty about availability of 
public funding for breach
Reliability (theta) vs. 
flexibility (sigma)
Casuistry Flexibility, market 
consultation prior to 
conclusion about budget
planning and design phase
Public desire for innovative 
tidal power plant at minimum 
costs and with limited risks
Austerity (sigma) vs. 
delivery (sigma)
Hybridization Austerity, concession-based 
tender, minimal public 
subsidies
Design costs too high for 
private actors to bear
Delivery (sigma) vs. 
austerity (sigma)
Casuistry Delivery, partial 
compensation for design 
costs
realization and exploitation phase
Total investments too high and 
too risky for private actors
Legality (theta) vs. 
delivery (sigma)
Firewalls Strong public support in form 
of (search for) subsidies
Private initiators benefit from 
public subsidies
Public interest (theta) 
versus delivery (sigma)
Cycling Middle way, private 
investments, framing 
benefits as being public
The outcome of this governance process remains uncertain. To date (July 2017), there is 
insufficient political willingness to finance the reopening of the dam, which is a precondi-
tion for the realization of a power plant. The decision has been postponed until after the 
formation of a new government, after the national elections of March 2017. Only after this 
will the success of the water authorities’ actions become clear. Will the private actors take 
the lead in realizing and exploiting a power plant? Until now, the private actors have been 
relatively positive about the project, but it is too early to really take stock. The authori-
ties took a risk in initiating such an intensive market consultation. If the project does not 
proceed due to a lack of political will, the private actors involved will be disappointed and 
possibly less willing to participate in future consultation processes.
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case comparison
Although very different in nature, the two cases show comparable dilemmas in the project 
phases. These dilemmas can more generally be expected to emerge in situations in 
which water authorities facilitate external initiatives. In the initiation phase, the emerging 
dilemmas mostly relate to how a successful collaboration can be designed. Inclusiveness, 
stakeholder involvement and enhancing local support are important goals of facilitation, 
but inclusiveness inherently encompasses exclusiveness. Certain actors will be excluded, 
leading to dilemmas relating to traditional democratic values such as legality, impartiality 
and representativeness. Here, the discrepancy between a classic representative democ-
racy model and a more collaborative model becomes apparent. In the planning and design 
phase, the details of the collaboration arrangement are established, leading to questions 
about the distribution of risks, costs and benefits. Relatedly, dilemmas concerning public 
interest emerge. How is this guaranteed in a collaboration with an actor that has possibly 
divergent interests? The dilemmas in the realization and exploitation phase are mainly 
about project continuation. How can obstacles be overcome?
Table 4.6 facilitates further comparison of the two projects under study. It becomes 
clear that the value dilemmas, coping mechanisms and outcomes depend largely on the 
characteristics of the non-governmental initiative that an authority facilitates. The charac-
teristics of the initiative partly determine the form of government facilitation, which goes 
hand in hand with certain dilemmas and coping mechanisms.
table 4.6 case comparison marker Wadden and brouwersdam
marker Wadden brouwersdam
Environmental urgency Medium urgency, deteriorating flora 
and fauna, sediment accumulation
No immediate urgency for power 
plant
initiative and initiator NGO took initiative to create 
archipelago and asked the 
government for help
Public authorities invited private 
actors to participate in realization 
of power plant
Form of government 
facilitation
Accommodating Invitational
main value dilemma Theta versus sigma Theta versus sigma
main coping mechanisms Casuistry, Hybridization Cycling, Casuistry, Hybridization
In the Marker Wadden case, the NGO Natuurmonumenten approached the government 
with a well-developed project plan, a significant budget and a clear interest in realizing the 
plan. The water authority subsequently employed an accommodating form of facilitation; 
it reactively accommodated the external initiative. Consequently, the authority seemed 
to lag behind events somewhat; it had to find a way to deal with every new situation 
that popped up. The ad hoc way of working in relation to accommodating facilitation is 
reflected in the coping mechanisms employed. The mechanisms most often employed 
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were casuistry (finding case-specific solutions) and hybridization (letting different values 
coexist).
In the Brouwersdam case, there was no external initiative beforehand; the authorities 
had to employ an invitational form of facilitation. Instead of passively awaiting a non-gov-
ernmental initiator, the authorities actively searched for one. This is reflected in the types 
of dilemmas that emerged, especially in the initiation phase. These dilemmas all related 
to the question of how the authorities could successfully entice external actors to take the 
lead. The fact that the private actors were not as resourceful as the authorities initially 
thought also impacted the coping mechanism that the authorities had to employ. Cycling 
was one of the most employed coping mechanisms, meaning that sequentially over time 
different values became prevalent. In this case, some firewalls were also erected: the 
national and the local authorities divided tasks, the national authority stressed the private 
actors’ own responsibilities, and the local authorities helped the private actors attract the 
necessary funding.
In both cases, the water authority at some points took a more dominant role than 
envisioned beforehand. The reasons for doing this differed, however: quality in the Marker 
Wadden case versus project continuation in the Brouwersdam case. This can also be 
traced back to the characteristics of the initiator: the NGO in the Marker Wadden case 
was less experienced in procuring a project; therefore the water authority felt the need 
to step in.
Another factor that influences an authority’s dilemmas and stance in a project is how 
close the external initiative is to the authority’s own priorities and policy goals. In the 
Marker Wadden case, the national government felt great urgency to do something about 
the deteriorating environmental condition of the Markermeer area and had already con-
ducted a market consultation. In the Brouwersdam case, the national and local authorities 
disagreed about which government was responsible for solving the environmental prob-
lems in the area and how this should be done. If an authority can meet its own obligations 
by facilitating an external initiative, it is willing to do more to let this initiative succeed. In 
the Marker Wadden case, the water authority was willing to make significant adjustments 
to its standard way of working. Significant concessions were made to accommodate the 
NGO’s project.
4.7 DiScUSSion anD conclUSionS
Water authorities search for new forms of collaboration with non-governmental – private 
and societal – actors. The involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making process 
has become common practice, but the involvement of non-governmental actors in other 
phases of the policy process is less prevalent, as is research on this topic (Mees et al., 
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2016). Little has been written about bottom-up initiatives in the water sector; this study 
contributes to knowledge development on this topic.
Increasingly, collaborative and participative views on democracy have reached the 
water sector. But traditional views on democracy in which values such as the primacy of 
politics and government authority are prominent are also still important for water authori-
ties. New forms of collaboration in which authorities facilitate non-governmental initiatives 
therefore lead to dilemmas between various (interpretations of) administrative values. 
There are a few studies that mention these value dilemmas (Meijerink & Dicke, 2008; Van 
Buuren et al., 2015) and the diverging democracy models (Edelenbos et al., 2017b) that 
could hinder new forms of collaboration and self-organization, yet much is still unknown 
about the specific dilemmas authorities face, and how they deal with these dilemmas, and 
with what result.
This study adds to the literature by discussing the advantages and disadvantages 
of government facilitation. Furthermore, it introduces typologies of administrative values 
and of mechanisms to cope with value dilemmas (Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 2008) to 
the academic debate on this topic. The typologies are used to systematically analyze 
dilemmas, coping mechanisms and results. The comparative case study design enables 
an analysis of the relation between these three elements and of the effects of different 
forms of facilitation (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2017), which is also novel to the field.
The analysis shows that the value dilemmas faced by authorities, their coping mecha-
nisms and the results of their actions depend on characteristics of the non-governmental 
initiative and relatedly the form of facilitation employed by the authorities. Another factor 
that influences the dilemmas and authorities’ actions is the extent to which the external 
initiative matches the authorities’ own policy goals and priorities.
In general, the most common dilemma is between traditional democratic values and 
sigma values such as efficiency and austerity. In a majority of cases, the solutions chosen 
by the authorities let sigma values prevail. Nevertheless, in doing so, the authorities do 
not fully reject the other values but take measures to safeguard a minimum level of demo-
cratic values. The conflict between traditional and more collaborative forms of democracy 
manifests itself, for example, in concerns about the public value of the facilitated projects; 
the representativeness of the facilitated external actors; and whether they benefit dispro-
portionately from the government’s contribution.
Common mechanisms to cope with value dilemmas are casuistry (finding case-
specific solutions), cycling (giving different values prevalence sequentially over time) and 
hybridization (allowing the coexistence of practices with different value bases). Another 
common pattern is that authorities end up taking a more prominent role beforehand, 
thereby abandoning the initial intention to ‘solely facilitate’. Authorities do this when the 
quality or continuation of a project is jeopardized.
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In general, the authorities deal with the dilemmas in a relatively ad hoc way. This is 
partly inherent in the spadework they undertake; this form of collaboration with a non-
governmental actor is rather new to the water sector. The question, however, is whether 
the tailor-made solutions they come up with are fit to use in future situations, or whether 
they will have to keep reinventing the wheel. Water authorities might benefit from lessons 
learned elsewhere. In developing countries, for example, working with unsolicited pro-
posals from non-governmental actors is common, and Anglo-Saxon countries are more 
experienced in involving the private sector.
Austerity can be an important reason for authorities to choose facilitation. But this 
study shows that facilitation can be a very resource-intensive governance strategy. And 
an authority that enters a collaboration with an external initiator becomes dependent on 
the (sometimes lack of) capacity and the whims of that actor. This requires great flexibility 
and makes the authority vulnerable. When the continuation of a project is endangered 
because of shortcomings in the external actor’s capacities, the authority involved will feel 
compelled to help out organizationally or financially to save the project and the public 
resources invested. This is not unique to facilitation, however; it is inherent in contract-
ing out the provision of public services to non-governmental actors. When public assets 
and public goods are involved, the government is a shareholder no matter what, and 
consequently a complete transfer of risks is virtually impossible.
Another pitfall of government facilitation relates to the potential discrepancy between 
short- and long-term effects. Short-term ‘sigma wins’, such as speedy delivery and auster-
ity consequent to the facilitation of a non-governmental initiative, could translate into long-
term ‘sigma losses’. A government aiming for more active participation and responsibility 
on the part of non-governmental actors in the provision of water services should carefully 
safeguard administrative values such as impartiality and reliability. If this is not ensured, it 
could harm the government’s relation with market parties and societal actors and weaken 
the government’s credibility, resulting in higher transaction costs in future projects.
This study shows both the potential of facilitation of non-governmental initiatives in the 
water sector and the institutional barriers to it. By doing this, it adds some critical remarks 
and points of reflection to a stream of literature that is generally positive about both the 
desirability and the feasibility of new participation practices. The water sector proves to 
be fertile ground for non-governmental initiatives: they can enhance project quality and 
delivery, and water authorities appear to be able to find creative solutions in these in-
novative collaborations. At the same time, however, government facilitation, driven by 
popular, collaborative views on democracy, leads to value dilemmas that are not easy to 
solve. Living up to traditional democratic values, as is still expected from most authorities, 
requires the development of complex coping strategies.
This study is explorative, in the sense that two cases in the same country in one 
sector are studied in depth. Further research is therefore needed to validate the results 
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and extend our knowledge on value dilemmas, coping mechanisms and results in the 
facilitation of non-governmental initiatives in other settings.

5 The U-Turn in Government Facilitation: How Dutch Water 
Authorities Facilitate Non-
Governmental Initiatives
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abStract
Public authorities in infrastructure, aiming to facilitate societal initiatives, explore new 
forms of collaboration with non-governmental actors. A comparative case study of two 
Dutch initiatives is conducted: energy generation at a public dam and the realization of 
a nature reserve. It is analyzed how and why the authorities’ strategy regarding their 
non-governmental partners changes over time. Authorities’ strategy change is modelled 
on two axes: governmental investments and governmental influence, and a differentiation 
is made between limited facilitation, invitational facilitation, partnering, and Design, Build, 
Finance, Maintain, and Operate. A U-turn-shaped pattern in authorities’ strategy is found: 
Authorities move from partnering to limited facilitation and subsequently revert to invita-
tional facilitation. Institutional factors, process factors, and initiative characteristics are 
identified that explain the strategy changes. It is concluded that government facilitation is 
a dynamic, interactive process and that authorities adapt their strategy to the initiative at 
hand and are pragmatic in their approach.
This chapter has been published as Grotenbreg, S. (2019). The U-Turn in Government 
Facilitation: How Dutch Water Authorities Facilitate Nongovernmental Initiatives. Advance 
online publication. Public Works Management & Policy. doi: 10.1177/1087724x19827026
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5.1 introDUction
Driven by both external and internal factors, today’s authorities explore new forms of col-
laboration with non-governmental actors. Consequent to, among other things, shrinking 
budgets, a societal call to reform democratic practices, and the idea that they can no 
longer solve today’s “wicked” problems on their own, public authorities try to adjust their 
ways of working (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). The shift from government to governance 
is extensively described in the public administration literature (Osborne, 2010; Pierre & 
Peters, 2000). Recently, various authorities seem to have taken the sharing of respon-
sibility and discretion with non-governmental actors another step forward (Kisby, 2010; 
Swyngedouw, 2005). They encourage external actors to “embrace partial responsibility” 
for the delivery of what traditionally have been considered public services (Edelenbos et 
al., 2018; Mees et al., 2016, p. 1). Instead of taking the lead themselves, governments 
aim to facilitate initiatives taken by non-governmental actors (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 
2018).
In the fields of infrastructure and nature development, authorities have also been 
exploring alternative forms of collaboration with their civic and private partners (Donahue 
& Zeckhauser, 2006; Leavitt & Morris, 2007). Traditional public procurement gave way 
to Design, Build, Finance, Maintain, and Operate (DBFMO) contracts in public–private 
partnerships (PPPs; Brown, 2007; Van Hurk, 2018). Now, some authorities are attempting 
to go beyond the PPPs in which they act as principal and commission private actors to 
work on their behalf. Instead, they aim to stimulate and facilitate the self-organization of 
non-governmental actors in the field (Francesch-Huidobro, 2015; Roodbol-Mekkes & Van 
den Brink, 2015).
The facilitation of non-governmental initiatives differs from PPPs in the sense that the 
initiating leadership of a project lies with non-governmental actors, which can be civic or 
private (Westerink et al., 2017). There is no public procurement; the non-governmental 
actors initiate a project on the basis of their own motivation and interest (Boonstra & 
Boelens, 2011). Project ownership stays in the hands of the initiators (Grotenbreg & Van 
Buuren, 2018). They do not work on behalf of the government, and although they might 
receive financial support, for example, in the form of subsidies, they are not paid by the 
government, as would be the case in a PPP or unsolicited proposal (Verweij, Teisman, & 
Gerrits, 2017).
The Dutch authority responsible for waterways and road networks, RWS, has been 
exploring the facilitation of non-governmental initiative (Hueskes, Koppenjan, & Verweij, 
2016; Van Buuren, Eshuis, & Bressers, 2015). RWS awaits civic or private sector initiatives 
that it can subsequently facilitate (Frantzeskaki et al., 2016). RWS opts for government 
facilitation regarding renewable energy generation and the multifunctional use of assets. 
Instead of procuring a piece of infrastructure, such as, for example, an energy-neutral 
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dam, RWS requires non-governmental actors to take the lead in the initiation, realization, 
and exploitation of that infrastructure (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2018).
Government facilitation exists in different forms and intensities (Sørensen & Torfing, 
2011). The amount and form of governmental support can differ: authorities might change 
rules and regulations in favor of the external initiative, they might contribute financially, 
or they might solely provide a platform for non-governmental actors to meet and further 
develop their plans (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2018). There is great variety in the sup-
port received by different non-governmental initiatives from public authorities, and little is 
known about the reasons behind these differences.
Besides the variation in governmental support between different external initiatives, 
there is variation in authorities’ strategy regarding the same initiative over time. A known 
dynamic is that, despite the aim of solely facilitating, projects end with heavy government 
involvement (Boonstra & Boelens, 2011; Brownill & Carpenter, 2009). It is not uncommon 
that authorities find themselves back at the steering wheel when they had the intention to 
work collaboratively on a project with non-governmental actors (Klijn & Teisman, 2003). 
From research into community initiatives, another form of non-governmental initiatives, it 
is also known that authorities have difficulty sustaining new strategies (Edelenbos et al., 
2017b). They change their initial strategy of facilitation and, for example, incorporate the 
external initiative into their own organization (Grotenbreg & Altamirano, 2017).
Despite the growing scholarly attention for new forms of governance in which authori-
ties facilitate non-governmental initiatives (Boonstra & Boelens, 2011; Edelenbos et al., 
2017b; Nederhand et al., 2016), there is not much research yet into the actions of public 
authorities that opt for facilitation. Relatively little is known about the strategies they deploy 
and how these strategies change over time and shape the relation with external initiatives 
(Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk, 2016). More insight into these topics could ease a shift 
to government facilitation and contribute to the understanding between the government 
and its non-governmental partners. Ultimately, this could enhance project realization, as 
previous research shows that, despite their intentions, authorities are now struggling to 
sustain a facilitating strategy (Boonstra & Boelens, 2011; Edelenbos et al., 2017b). More 
indirectly, this is also relevant for society as a whole that has a stake in the successful 
realization of projects that in the past would have been executed by the government but 
are now entrusted to non-governmental actors.
Hence, the research question in this study is as follows: How does public authorities’ 
strategy regarding non-governmental initiatives change over time and how can these 
changes be explained? Dutch authorities’ strategy changes regarding different non-
governmental initiatives are analyzed. The aim is to find out how authorities decide on 
the amount of support an initiative receives. Furthermore, the dynamics of the relation 
between government and non-governmental initiatives are explored, examining when 
“old” administrative behavior comes back into play.
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A comparative case study of two Dutch projects is conducted: energy generation at 
the Afsluitdijk dam and the realization of a nature reserve called Marker Wadden in a 
freshwater lake. In both projects, the authorities changed their strategy regarding their 
non-governmental partners multiple times. The study has a government-oriented per-
spective that originates in the public administration discipline (Warbroek & Hoppe, 2017). 
This means that the cases are analyzed from the perspective of the government; the 
focus is public authorities’ strategy change regarding non-governmental initiatives. The 
aim, besides gaining insight into the explanations for strategy change, is to formulate 
some recommendations for the management of public projects. The term external initia-
tive is used to refer to these initiatives initiated outside the governmental organization; 
they are external from the government’s perspective.
To gain more insight into the changing strategies of public authorities, the potential 
reasons for a shift to government facilitation are first discussed in the following theory 
section. Then, potential barriers to strategy change are elaborated: institutional stability 
and traditional administrative values. Because the facilitation of non-governmental initia-
tive is a new strategy for the authorities in this study, the theoretical knowledge on barriers 
might help to understand their struggles. Third, to learn when and how a new strategy can 
be sustained, the theorized enablers of strategy change are discussed. After the theory, 
the research design of this study is elaborated, after which a description of the cases is 
given. In the analysis section, a model of strategy change is first presented, and then the 
authorities’ strategy changes in the cases are described and subsequently analyzed. The 
article ends with conclusions and discussion.
5.2 thEory
In this study, the shifting strategies of public authorities regarding non-governmental ini-
tiatives are analyzed. Strategy is defined as the “patterns or consistencies” in “streams of 
behaviour” (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985, p. 257). There is a difference between leadership 
plans and intentions, called intended strategy, and what an organization actually does, the 
realized strategy. Sometimes, the realized strategy mirrors the intended strategy, that is 
the strategy is deliberate. In other cases, strategy emerges despite, or in the absence of, 
intentions. These are emergent strategies (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). Through strategic 
learning, organizations change their intentions on the basis of emergent strategies. They 
“respond to an evolving reality rather than having to focus on a stable fantasy” (Mintzberg 
& Waters, 1985, p. 271). These theoretical insights are useful for the study of government 
facilitation because public authorities struggle to sustain a facilitating strategy although 
they intent to; their intended strategy does not mirror the realized strategy (Brownill & 
Carpenter, 2009; Klijn & Teisman, 2003).
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reasons to opt for government facilitation
There are various reasons why public authorities might choose a strategy in which 
they facilitate non-governmental initiatives in the first place (Grotenbreg & Altamirano, 
2017). Facilitation can enhance so-called sigma values. These are efficiency-related 
administrative values, in contrast to democratic theta values and quality lambda values, 
as distinguished by Hood (1991). Facilitation enlarges the available pool of knowledge 
and financial and organizational resources to solve public problems (Klijn & Koppenjan, 
2016). There can be efficiency gains (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2006), and facilitation 
can increase productivity and public value creation (Zhang et al., 2015). Things can be 
accomplished that the government could not have done on its own. Embracing external 
initiatives can further generate public support and lead to more innovative solutions (Van 
Buuren et al., 2015; Wegerich et al., 2014). The facilitated project can function at arm’s 
length from centers of political authority, thereby potentially offering greater flexibility in 
decision-making, resource acquisition, management, and accountability arrangements 
(Skelcher et al., 2005). Finally, depending on the democracy model adopted, government 
facilitation can also enhance democratic legitimacy (Edelenbos et al., 2017b).
institutional stability, administrative values, and government facilitation
Despite the benefits, public authorities often do not sustain their facilitating strategy (Boon-
stra & Boelens, 2011; Brownill & Carpenter, 2009). An important reason why innovative, 
facilitating strategies are hard for authorities to sustain is the stability of institutions (Van 
Buuren et al., 2015; Warbroek & Hoppe, 2017). Institutions are “the rules of the game in a 
society” (North, 1990, p. 3), and the way in which authorities collaborate with non-govern-
mental actors can be considered an institution (Genschel, 1997). Although their stability 
is the prime reason for their effectiveness, over time, misfits emerge between institutions 
and the environment in which they function, because the latter changes whereas the 
former is stable (Genschel, 1997). This is the case in this study: The environment of 
today’s public authorities (literally and figuratively) requires new ways of collaborating, 
and consequently the authorities’ way of collaborating with non-governmental actors has 
to change (Nutt & Backoff, 1995).
In general, there are three overarching reasons why institutions such as the way col-
laborations take shape are hard to change: sunk costs, uncertainty, and political conflict 
(Genschel, 1997). Institutions have large set-up costs, meaning that it takes time, money, 
and effort to become established. Public managers have to get used to the rules and con-
ventions associated with institutions, and organizations develop specific competencies 
and set up a physical infrastructure (e.g., software systems) in line with their institutions 
(Genschel, 1997). This generates sunk costs, which preserve an institution (Lanzara, 
1998). Shifting to another way of working means that established structures lose value 
and new investments have to be made (Pierson, 2000). Second, strategy change implies 
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uncertainty: The costs and effects of new ways of working are hard to predict (Genschel, 
1997). Returns on the investments that have to be made to effect change are uncertain 
and often delayed in time; there is a “slow feedback” (Lanzara, 1998, p. 6). Risk aversion 
therefore is an important hindrance to change in public organizations. Third, strategy 
change by public organizations can lead to political conflict. The status quo has benefi-
ciaries; established institutions often have a distributive bias, meaning that certain actors 
benefit from the way things are organized (Genschel, 1997), and these actors will prob-
ably try to prevent change. These three factors are expected to also be important in the 
cases in this study: Sunk costs, uncertainty, and political conflict are potential barriers for 
a facilitating strategy and might lead authorities back to more traditional ways of working.
A fourth reason why a facilitating strategy is hard for authorities to sustain is that it can 
conflict with traditional administrative values, such as representation, equality, impartial-
ity, and the primacy of politics (Grotenbreg & Altamirano, 2017). In a traditional view on 
representative democracy, politicians govern on behalf of the electorate, they uphold the 
primacy of politics, and are the first to decide on issues that impact society (Edelenbos 
et al., 2017b; Held, 2006). This can be threatened if non-governmental actors enter the 
administrative arena (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). Adherents of this traditional view argue 
that government facilitation of societal initiatives clashes with the public imperatives of 
democracy (Skelcher et al., 2005) and this forms another barrier for change.
A way in which facilitation can conflict with traditional administrative values is that 
when the government chooses to facilitate an external initiative, it no longer exclusively 
decides on how public money is spent and what solution is chosen for a public prob-
lem; the government loses some discretion to non-governmental actors (Donahue & 
Zeckhauser, 2006). Government facilitation might furthermore harm the governments 
impartially because it favors the societal actors that have the capacity to initiate a project 
and reach out for support (Westerink et al., 2017). In addition, to facilitate, authorities 
have to be flexible and find tailor-made solutions to the initiative at hand, and this can 
conflict with values such as transparency, legal certainty, and decisiveness (Brownill & 
Carpenter, 2009; Van Buuren et al., 2014). Other values that could be at stake include, for 
example, professionalism and government accountability (Skelcher et al., 2005). In this 
study, traditional administrative values are therefore also expected to form a barrier to a 
facilitating strategy.
Enablers of strategy change
It is difficult, but not impossible, to change an organization’s strategy and sustain an 
innovative, facilitating strategy. Scholars have identified four countervailing mechanisms 
that enable change: focal points, increasing returns, institutional bricolage, and patch-
ing up (Genschel, 1997; Lanzara, 1998). First, focal points are “seeds” for institutional 
change, signals toward a certain direction provided by, for example, political leaders, 
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social movements, or shared beliefs (Lanzara, 1998, p. 22). Second, increasing returns 
provide positive feedback: If the first investment in the new way of working generates 
small returns, it paves the path for further change (Baumgartner & Jones, 2001; Lanzara, 
1998). Third, institutional bricolage is “the recombination and reshuffling of pre-existing 
available components” (Lanzara, 1998, p. 27) meaning that a new organizational strategy 
might be comprised of components of established strategies. This reduces uncertainty 
and the loss of sunk costs and generally increases the willingness to accept the new strat-
egy (Genschel, 1997; Lanzara, 1998). Relatedly, patching up means replacing only parts 
of the established way of working. Only certain components of a strategy are changed, 
leading to fewer costs, fewer risks, and less political conflict. Patching up often happens 
in specific parts of a public organization; there is no central coordination and this makes it 
less threatening to the (beneficiaries of) the status quo (Genschel, 1997).
Previous research into the facilitation of non-governmental initiatives by public au-
thorities shows the value of these mechanisms. Regarding local energy initiatives for 
example, local authorities use a patched up strategy that is incidental and limited to ad 
hoc and episodic adaptations, thereby avoiding explicit struggles with the status quo 
(Warbroek & Hoppe, 2017). In the water sector, pilots, which are a form of patching up, 
are frequently used to introduce governance innovations (Van Popering-Verkerk & Van 
Buuren, 2017). In addition, institutional bricolage is used in this sector to safeguard tradi-
tional administrative values when new ways of working are introduced. Through so-called 
auxiliary arrangements, it is assured that a new strategy fits into existing organizational 
rules and practices (Van Buuren et al., 2015). The countervailing mechanisms that enable 
the introduction and sustainment of facilitating strategies are expected to also be present 
in the cases under study. Now that the reasons for, barriers to, and enablers of strategy 
change that can be found in the literature are discussed; in the next section, the research 
design of this study is presented.
5.3 Data anD mEthoD
The way in which public authorities change their strategy when facilitating societal ini-
tiatives, the object of this study, is a complex phenomenon. A comparative case study 
design was chosen to analyze this phenomenon. This method suits the topic and the 
research question best; case studies allow in-depth knowledge to be gained of complex 
situations (Stake, 1998; Yin, 2018). As a consequence of the research design, this study 
will not lead to findings that are easy to generalize or to readymade solutions to public 
problems (Hufen & Koppenjan, 2015). The aim is to enhance the available knowledge on 
the dynamics of government facilitation, with a focus on the water sector.
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case selection
Through strategic sampling, two cases were deliberately selected in which Dutch national 
and local authorities were exploring new forms of collaboration with non-governmental 
actors: renewable energy generation at the Afsluitdijk dam and realization of the Marker 
Wadden nature reserve. In the first case, RWS aimed to facilitate private actors’ initiatives 
to generate renewable energy at a public dam. In the second case, two national ministries 
chose to facilitate a nature organization’s plan to create marsh islands in an inland lake. 
In the past, these authorities would probably have designed and financed the projects 
themselves, putting the projects out to tender and commissioning a private actor for the 
construction work. The fact that this approach was new for the authorities makes the 
cases interesting for this study. The cases fulfil another prerequisite for answering the re-
search question: The authorities changed their strategy regarding their non-governmental 
partners multiple times. Finally, this selection suits a comparative case study because the 
cases are comparable but different. The sector, actors involved, and time path are alike, 
but the characteristics of the societal initiative and the outcomes are different. One of the 
differences is the type of good that will be realized: At the Afsluitdijk, the main good is 
renewable energy; at Marker Wadden, it is a natural amenity.
Data collection
The study of the Afsluitdijk case started in October 2013 with a document analysis of 
policy documents, news articles, and market consultation reports. Use was also made of 
research conducted before on the case by Lenferink et al. (2012) and by Janssen et al. 
(2014). Between February and December 2014, 10 in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with representatives of the national and local authorities involved and 
private project initiators. See Appendix A for an overview. The Marker Wadden case was 
followed from October 2015. This study also started with an extensive document analy-
sis. Among other things, a large number of documents, disclosed under the Freedom of 
Information Act, containing the communications between the government and the initiator 
Natuurmonumenten and between different government departments were analyzed. 
Between January and May 2016, eight semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
representatives of all the national and local authorities involved and Natuurmonumenten.
To gain insight into the strategies and strategy changes deployed by the authorities 
regarding their non-governmental partners, the respondents were asked to reflect on the 
decisions that were made, the alternatives considered, the pros and cons of the available 
options, and how they evaluated the outcome. Furthermore, the respondents were asked 
about the dilemmas and difficulties encountered in terms of facilitation of, and collabora-
tion with, the non-governmental actors. Case-specific situations and government facilita-
tion in general were discussed, and the respondents were asked to elaborate on the 
potentials and pitfalls of facilitation strategies, in their opinion. The interviews, combined 
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with the information gathered in the document study, led to the analysis and conclusions 
in the remainder of the article. All the presented statements are the result of the author’s 
analysis; no literal quotes are used in the text.
5.4 caSE DEScriptionS
renewable energy at the afsluitdijk dam
The location of the first case of this study, the Afsluitdijk (literally Enclosure dam), is a 
32-km-long dam in the north of the Netherlands. The dam was constructed over the period 
1927 to 1932 to enclose a saltwater inlet of the North Sea to protect the land from flooding 
and create new farmland. With the enclosure, the Netherlands acquired a freshwater lake 
in the heart of the country, called Ijsselmeer. Figure 5.1 shows the location of the Afsluit-
dijk and Marker Wadden. Since 2006, the Afsluitdijk no longer meets the safety criteria. 
The Ministry of Transport and Water Management conducted a market consultation for a 
redesign of the dam. This resulted in various comprehensive plans from private consortia 
combining the necessary renovation of the dam with ideas for recreation, nature develop-
ment, and energy generation. The ministry, however, decided to procure solely a simple 
renovation for flood protection. Ideas and initiatives to upgrade the dam with, among 
other things, renewable energy generation were left to non-governmental actors. The 
three municipalities and the two provinces in which the dam is located took the stance 
that initiating, financing, and realizing energy projects were primarily the responsibility of 
non-governmental actors.
North
Sea
Afsluitdijk
closure dam  
Lake
IJssel
Houtrib
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Amsterdam
Figure 5.1 location of afsluitdijk and nature island marker Wadden in the north of the nether-
lands. Source. dutchwatersector.com.
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Two local private firms, located at the Afsluitdijk, both took the initiative to expand their 
pilot installations to generate renewable energy. A private turbine construction company 
that operates an installation for the generation of tidal energy wanted to expand this 
installation. In addition, it wanted to realize a second installation at another location on 
the dam. Another firm had the ambition to generate blue energy, using the difference in 
salinity between fresh and salt water, at the Afsluitdijk.
RWS, as the executive organization of the ministry, and the local authorities gave some 
more support to these initiatives than they initially envisioned. For the local authorities, the 
energy projects were important because it was believed that they would give a much-need-
ed boost to the local economy. RWS had a more ambiguous attitude toward the projects. 
It was not willing to take responsibility for them, but the minister was enthusiastic about the 
Afsluitdijk becoming a so-called energy dam. Therefore, RWS felt unofficially obliged to 
support the local energy projects and agreed to help the firms and the local authorities to 
implement their plans. It facilitated the energy projects by engaging in discussions with the 
private initiators about the possibilities and about easing the permit procedure.
The blue energy firm received subsidies from both national government and the local 
authorities and realized its pilot installation on the dam in 2014. In 2015, the turbine 
construction company expanded its installation, also partly financed by public subsidies. 
To date, however (November 2018), it has not managed to realize the aspired second 
installation. Requests from the firm for more help and support, for example, for RWS to 
buy the generated tidal energy or to adjust the planning of the construction work in favor 
of the tidal energy installation have gone unanswered.
the marker Wadden nature reserve
The location of the second case of this study is the freshwater lake, enclosed by the 
Afsluit dijk in 1932, from which from 1936 onward, parts were reclaimed to create new 
land. In 1976, a dam was built to enclose the southern part of the lake, called the Marker-
meer, but the planned reclamation of this water never happened. What remained was a 
“bathtub,” a relatively shallow lake with barely natural shores. An accumulation of sedi-
ments in the Markermeer makes the water very turbid, and the flora and fauna in the area 
have declined severely.
Over the years, there have been numerous programs, research projects, and policy plans 
to deal with the problems in the Markermeer. Most of them foundered because the national 
and local authorities involved were not willing or able to finance the necessary interventions. 
In 2012, the national government in collaboration with the two provinces located around the 
lake set up a market consultation, comparable with the one in the Afsluitdijk case, searching 
for cost-effective measures to restore the flora and fauna in the Markermeer area. This 
resulted in three comprehensive and costly designs from private consortia, ranging from 
€282 million to €1,194 million. The national government, however, decided not to procure 
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one of these plans. Instead, the two ministries responsible for the Markermeer area entered 
a collaboration with the non-governmental organization (NGO) Natuurmonumenten, which 
took the initiative to realize an archipelago of marsh islands in the lake.
In 2011, Natuurmonumenten was granted a €15 million subsidy for the Marker Wad-
den project from one of the Netherlands’ largest lotteries. Natuurmonumenten asked 
for an additional €30 million financial contribution from the national government. The 
prevailing situation at the responsible ministries provided fertile ground for Natuurmonu-
menten’s proposal. There were pressing environmental issues at the Markermeer, but the 
ministries did not have the resources for an all-encompassing plan. Natuurmonumenten 
brought a well-developed, manageable plan and €15 million of its own resources to the 
table. Stimulating non-governmental actors to take the lead in solving public problems 
was an important goal of the government, and this project fitted this vision. After internal 
discussions, the two ministries involved decided to contribute €15 million each.
The ministries’ initial idea was to facilitate Natuurmonumenten’s project from a 
distance. Over time, however, they became more and more involved. So, whereas in 
the Afsluitdijk case, the national government distanced itself from the non-governmental 
initiatives, in the Marker Wadden case the opposite happened. Because of concerns 
about the NGO’s capacity to manage such a large project, it was decided that RWS 
would join Natuurmonumenten in a collaborative organization and would execute the 
tendering process. In 2014, the work was commissioned to a private consortium; in 2016, 
the construction work started. Because Natuurmonumenten did not manage to raise the 
money needed to complete this first phase of the project, the ministries involved and two 
provinces decided to contribute another €15 million approximately. Figure 5.2 shows the 
location of Marker Wadden in the Markermeer.
Marker Wadden
HoutribdijkHoorn
Enkhuizen
Markermeer
IJsselmeer
Lelystad
Urk
Figure 5.2 location of marker Wadden in the markermeer. Source. noS/lars boogaard.
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5.5 ranGES oF pUbic aUthoritiES’ StratEGy chanGE
The first step of the case analysis is an inventarisation of the ranges of change of the 
public authorities’ strategies. The strategies varied in the amount of influence claimed 
by the authorities in the projects and in the resources that they invested. To enhance 
the analysis, a model is constructed in which these variables are visualized as two axes 
(see Figure 5.3). Four ideal types of public–private arrangements are consequently dis-
tinguished. First, in the case of a Design, Build, Finance, and (potentially) Maintain, and 
Operate contract, the government has to make few investments and has a large amount 
of influence. The government procures public work, leaves the initial investments to the 
private contractor, and pays availability fees when the work is delivered. This resembles 
contracts in the UK Private Finance Initiative (Klijn, Edelenbos, & Hughes, 2007; Van 
Hurk, 2018). This arrangement never prevailed in the cases; although both cases started 
with a market consultation, the authorities did not aim for a DBF(MO) contract.
Second, if the amount of governmental influence and level of investments are high, it 
is called partnering. The authority works together with non-governmental actors as part-
ner. They share the ownership of a project and both make significant investments. Such 
a collaborative project can be initiated by both public and private actors. The third type is 
called limited facilitation, as governmental influence and investments are low (Grotenbreg 
& Van Buuren, 2017). In the case of limited facilitation, authorities accommodate societal 
initiatives to create public value, but the support received by the external initiators is 
restricted. The authority might, for example, support the initiative by adjusting rules or 
regulations that form an obstruction (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2018). The initiating 
leadership of the project lies with non-governmental actors (Westerink et al., 2017), and 
they are subsequently the ones responsible for realization and exploitation (Grotenbreg 
& Van Buuren, 2017).
Fourth, invitational facilitation is distinguished if the government claims little influence 
and makes substantive investments in a societal initiative. In the case of invitational 
facilitation, supporting non-governmental initiatives is a policy intention of a public au-
thority; a public authority actively invites non-governmental actors to initiate a project 
(Van Buuren, 2017). With a discourse that emphasizes the opportunities and benefits for 
non-governmental actors, the authority tries to entice them to take action (Grotenbreg 
& Van Buuren, 2017). Initiators can count on a significant amount of different forms of 
support from the government. Besides regulatory support in the form of adjusted rules 
and regulations, the initiative might receive analytical support in the form of information 
and advice, coordination support in the form of access to networks and fora, and financial 
support, for example, in the form of subsidies (Grotenbreg & Van Buuren, 2018).
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large amount of governmental influence
1. DbF(mo) 2. partnering
few governmental
investments
high level of
governmental investments
3. limited facilitation 4. invitational facilitation
little governmental influence
Figure 5.3 ranges of public authorities’ strategy change in public–private arrangements.
public authorities’ strategy change in the afsluitdijk case
The constructed model is first used to analyze the strategy changes of the public au-
thorities in the Afsluitdijk case. In 2008, the national Ministry of Transport and Water 
Management conducted a market consultation in preparation for a public procurement to 
renovate the Afsluitdijk. At that time, the ministry’s strategy was to procure a full renova-
tion of the dam, including various side projects to generate renewable energy. It aimed to 
collaborate with a wide range of societal actors on this. The economic crisis hit however, 
and driven by austerity measures and government reform, all side projects were left to 
non-governmental actors. The ministry decided to finance solely a simple renovation for 
flood protection. Non-governmental actors that wanted to add functions to the dam could 
count on minimal support; the government’s strategy shifted from partnering to limited 
facilitation. Over time, however, for different reasons, the provinces and RWS decided 
to give more support to the non-governmental project initiators; the strategy of these 
authorities shifted from limited facilitation toward invitational facilitation. These strategy 
changes are visualized in Figure 5.4.
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few governmental
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little governmental influence
Figure 5.4 public authorities’ strategy change in the afsluitdijk case.
public authorities’ strategy change in the marker Wadden case
In the Marker Wadden case, a collaboration between the national and the local gov-
ernment conducted a market consultation in preparation for a public procurement for 
restorative measures for flora and fauna in the Markermeer area. Similar to the Afsluitdijk 
case, the responsible ministries then changed their strategy and decided not to procure 
any work. Instead, they decided to facilitate the initiative of an NGO to realize a nature 
reserve in the area; the government in this case too shifted from partnering to limited 
facilitation. Despite the initial plan to leave the ownership of the project with the NGO and 
invest few governmental resources, RWS ended up as a full project partner contributing 
substantial resources to the project; the strategy shifted from limited facilitation back in 
the direction of partnering, as visualized in Figure 5.5.
large amount of governmental influence
1. DbF(mo) 2. partnering
few governmental
investments
high level of
governmental investments
3. limited facilitation 4. invitational facilitation
little governmental influence
Figure 5.5 public authorities’ strategy change in the marker Wadden case.
In the two cases, a similar U-turn shape can be seen in the change of strategy regarding 
facilitation. The authorities involved started off enthusiastically, with extensive plans for 
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all-encompassing projects and collaborations with a wide range of societal actors, and 
then they seemed to revert to known, traditional ways of working in which they focused 
on their own core tasks, after which they returned to a more moderate form of facilitation 
in which they worked with societal actors on their terms adapted to the situation at hand. 
In the next section, these two moves in the authorities’ change of strategy are analyzed 
more elaborately.
5.6 ExplanationS For pUblic aUthoritiES’ StratEGy 
chanGE
Explanations for a shift from partnering to limited facilitation
The starting point of the analysis in both cases was a market consultation conducted by 
the national government. In both cases, the government had the intention to realize an 
integrative project combining flood protection with additional functions such as energy 
generation, recreation, and nature development. The intended strategy was to collaborate 
with a wide range of civic, public, and private actors in this. It was planned to put part of 
the work out to tender and to commission a private consortium. Governmental influence 
and investments were going to be large in the sense that the government intended to 
initiate, finance, and determine the content. In both cases, however, the government 
changed its strategy to limited facilitation. In the Afsluitdijk case, RWS decided to focus 
solely on flood protection and leave any additional functions to local authorities and non-
governmental actors. In the Marker Wadden case, the two ministries involved chose to 
facilitate a relatively small initiative by an NGO, instead of procuring one of the more 
encompassing plans that resulted from the market consultation.
An important explanation for this strategy change is a reshuffling and compartmental-
ization of administrative responsibilities. The national government made substantial cuts 
in the budgets for nature development and innovation and partly transferred these policy 
domains to local governments. This, in combination with austerity measures, affected 
RWS’s strategy. The energy initiatives in the Afsluitdijk case, for example, besides gener-
ating energy, contributed to innovation and economic development. In the new situation, 
these were no longer the responsibility of the water authority. The non-governmental 
initiatives no longer enhanced the authority’s policy goals. RWS also had to strictly safe-
guard its own renovation work at the dam, not allowing any interference from the energy 
projects. The authority thus opted for limited facilitation, because the external projects’ 
goals did not match its own and even interfered at some points.
A more positive policy change proved to be an incentive for a shift to limited facilitation: 
In the Marker Wadden case, one of the ministries decided to explore new public–private 
arrangements and be more open to non-governmental initiatives, which it believed would 
119
THE U-TURN IN GOVERNMENT FACILITATION
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization and add to its legitimacy. 
Facilitation of the NGO’s initiative fitted this policy intention nicely. In this situation, the 
realized strategy is the intended strategy; the government deliberately chose to change 
its approach, adjusted its policy, and acted accordingly.
Another reason for the change to limited facilitation is simply the existence of a 
competent external initiative. In the Marker Wadden case, the NGO Natuurmonumenten 
approached the government with its initiative. The NGO was known as a reliable partner, 
and it presented a well thought through project plan. This, in combination with the policy 
changes, made it easy for the responsible ministries to choose a strategy of facilitating a 
non-governmental initiative instead of taking the lead itself. The authorities in both cases 
initially chose a strategy in which they claimed little influence in the facilitated projects 
and made relatively few investments. A reason for choosing limited rather than invita-
tional facilitation is a fear of jeopardizing traditional administrative values such as legality, 
impartiality, and legitimacy. Concerned about accusations of unwarranted state aid, the 
authorities in both cases hesitated to support the non-governmental projects financially. 
Traditional, administrative values and, relatedly, uncertainty about the outcomes of a new 
approach and sunk costs of established ways of working are known barriers to strategy 
change (Genschel, 1997; Van Buuren et al., 2015).
In the Marker Wadden case, this was dealt with by an open call for other societal 
actors to join the project. In the Afsluitdijk case, RWS set strict conditions to its sup-
port for the energy projects. A solid business case and fully developed project plan were 
preconditions for the inclusion of the project in the authority’s procurement of the renova-
tion. A financial contribution could be obtained only if all the other (non-governmental) 
financiers had confirmed their contribution to the project. This can be seen as a type of 
institutional bricolage; by facilitating external initiatives, RWS tried something new, but it 
built in provisos to reduce uncertainty (Lanzara, 1998).
Explanations for a shift from limited facilitation to invitational facilitation
As discussed, after the decision not to enter a public–private collaboration to realize a 
large, multifunctional project, the authorities retreated to a strategy of limited facilitation. 
Over time, however, they started making more investments and claimed more influence 
in the facilitated projects than initially planned. This U-turn is seen in both cases, but in 
the Marker Wadden case, it is more extreme. RWS in this case eventually became a 
project partner and the ministries involved invested significant amounts of money; in the 
Afsluitdijk case, the authorities’ support was more limited.
There are various explanations for the U-turn toward invitational facilitation. In both 
cases, policy was changed to be more open toward multifunctional use of public water 
works and new forms of collaboration with non-governmental actors, for reasons of 
efficiency and legitimacy. In addition, in the Marker Wadden case, the external project 
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helped the ministries involved to fulfil their own policy goals. The initiative contributed to 
nature development in the area, for which the ministries were responsible. This also partly 
explains the difference between Afsluitdijk and Marker Wadden. In the Afsluitdijk case, 
RWS, by supporting the energy projects, hoped to secure local support for its own work: 
the renovation of the dam. The facilitation thus served an indirect goal, but generating 
renewable energy, the main purpose of the initiatives, was not on the to-do list of the 
water authority. One could say that the ministries had more responsibility in the Marker 
Wadden case because nature is a public good in the sense that nature is nonrival and 
nonexcludable in consumption (although Natuurmonumenten could close off the island; 
Webster & Wai-Chung Lai, 2003).
A second explanation for the difference between the cases is the resources of the 
external initiator. In the Marker Wadden case, the ministries decided to support Natuur-
monumenten, which was willing to invest €15 million of its own resources (in contrast to 
the three other private consortia that participated in the market consultation and expected 
full cost recovery). In the Afsluitdijk case, RWS was not fully convinced of the business 
case for the energy projects and the capacity of the initiators to realize these projects 
successfully. Natuurmonumenten, in contrast, presented a well-organized project and 
was considered a competent and reliable partner.
Doubts about the competence of the non-governmental initiator to live up to the 
authorities’ standards, however, also proved to be a reason to invest more and gain 
more influence. In the Marker Wadden case, several RWS departments pleaded for a full 
takeover of the project from the NGO; the organization had difficulty adapting to the new 
role of partner instead of principal. RWS eventually decided to lead the tendering process 
and procurement of the construction work and subsequently became the project’s legal 
contract manager. This decision was driven by the view that leaving it to the NGO would 
harm the continuation of the project and the authority’s relation with the private market. 
RWS also opted to acquire more influence to ensure that public money was well spent 
and that the investments advanced the government’s policy goals. RWS thus chose invi-
tational facilitation to safeguard traditional administrative values such as professionalism 
and government accountability.
A related explanation for the increase in governmental investments and influence, 
especially in the Marker Wadden case, was lock-in. The two ministries invested signifi-
cantly in Marker Wadden, and when a lack of resources threatened the project’s future, 
the ministries decided to contribute even more.
A last explanation for why facilitation in the Marker Wadden case was less limited than 
in the Afsluitdijk case is the way in which it could be organized within the governmental 
organization. In neither case did facilitation fit with the prevailing regulations, working 
methods, and organizational culture. For that reason, the external initiatives were isolated 
in the Afsluitdijk case to safeguard the RWS’s priority: the renovation of the dam. In the 
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Marker Wadden case, the mismatch between the external initiative and the bureaucratic 
organization was bypassed by explicitly setting up the project as a pilot, in relative isola-
tion from the rest of the organization. Consequently, the people working on the project 
had greater discretion to deviate from the organization’s standards, resulting in a more 
invitational form of facilitation (Van Popering-Verkerk & Van Buuren, 2017). This is an 
example of patching up: only part of the bureaucratic organization changed its strategy, 
and this made it less threatening to the status quo (Genschel, 1997).
The change from limited to invitational facilitation is explained mostly by process fac-
tors and the characteristics of the external initiative at hand. Consequently, the realized 
strategy was mostly emergent: It emerged in response to current events rather than policy. 
The theorized enablers of strategy change, such as increasing returns and patching up, 
eased the shift to invitational facilitation (Baumgartner & Jones, 2001; Lanzara, 1998).
overview: institutions, process factors, and the initiative’s characteristics 
as explanations for strategy change
Table 5.1 gives an overview of the identified explanations for strategy change by public 
authorities that aim to facilitate non-governmental initiative. The literature on public 
strategy (Genschel, 1997; Lanzara, 1998) and on government facilitation (e.g., Boonstra 
& Boelens, 2011; Whitehead, 2003) focuses mostly on institutional barriers to strategy 
change. In this study, process factors and the characteristics of the non-governmental 
initiatives also proved to be important. In the table, a distinction is made between these 
three explanations for strategy change.
The table shows that the shift to limited facilitation can be largely explained by insti-
tutional factors: Compartmentalization, austerity measures, and traditional administrative 
values led the government to revert to a strategy of limited facilitation. The non-govern-
mental initiatives had broad objectives, such as innovation and regional development. 
Consequent to the reshuffling and compartmentalization of policy responsibilities and 
budget cuts, it was unclear which governmental organization was in charge. The strictly 
defined responsibilities and the government’s inability to work in an integrative way thus 
formed a barrier to supporting the non-governmental initiators. This finding is in line 
with literature that stresses the difficulty for bureaucracies to facilitate societal initiatives 
(Edelenbos et al., 2017b; Warbroek & Hoppe, 2017). Other research (e.g., Skelcher et 
al., 2005; Westerink et al., 2017) also mentions that bureaucratic values, such as legality 
and impartiality, make public authorities hesitant to invest in external initiatives. The sunk 
costs of standardized working methods and procedures are also important here (Lanzara, 
1998).
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table 5.1. main Explanations for Strategy change regarding the Facilitation of non-govern-
mental initiatives.
towards limited facilitation towards invitational 
facilitation
institutional factors Compartmentalisation; austerity; 
administrative values
Governance policy; 
administrative values
process factors Presence of societal initiative Lock-in, positive feedback; 
increasing returns
characteristics external 
initiative
Initiator’s capacity; contribution 
to policy goals
Besides the institutional factors, a process factor that explains the shift to limited facilita-
tion is simply the presence of a viable non-governmental initiative. Natuurmonumenten’s 
proposal gave the responsible ministries the opportunity to pull back, transfer responsibil-
ity to the NGO, and refrain from investing in a resource-intensive PPP.
Table 5.1 further shows that, for the shift to invitational facilitation, institutional factors 
proved to be of less importance. The characteristics of the external initiatives are the 
main explanation for this strategy change. The authorities in the cases were willing to give 
more support to an initiative that enhanced their own policy goals. This corresponds with 
findings of, among others, Boonstra and Boelens (2011) and Van Buuren et al. (2015). 
Furthermore, the authorities decided to give more support to the Marker Wadden initiative 
because it had a high chance of success but at the same time could not succeed without 
government support. An initiator’s incapacity could thus also be an incentive to gain more 
influence in a project; the water authority took over part of the project because the project 
goals were important for the ministries involved and there were doubts about the NGO’s 
capacity to successfully realize the project on its own. The government was pragmatic in 
its choice of strategy here.
A related explanation is lock-in; at a certain point, the continuation of the Marker 
Wadden project was endangered by a lack of resources. Because the ministries had 
made significant investments already, they decided to invest even more. Other research 
has also found that such process factors can be an explanation for authorities’ strategy 
regarding societal initiatives (Edelenbos et al., 2018; Emerson et al., 2012).
The theorized enablers of strategy change were also present in the Marker Wadden 
case as process factors: The successful collaboration with Natuurmonumenten gave 
positive feedback, leading to a willingness to make more investments, bringing increasing 
returns (Baumgartner & Jones, 2001). The facilitation of this eye-catching initiative thus 
served as a focal point that further enhanced the facilitating strategy (Lanzara, 1998).
Governance policy, or the wish to introduce new forms of collaboration with non-
governmental actors and be more facilitative because it would enhance the efficiency 
and legitimacy of the organization, was an institutional explanation for a shift to invi-
tational facilitation. Remarkably, traditional administrative values such as accountability 
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and professionalism drove both less and more governmental involvement in the external 
initiatives. The authorities in the cases chose limited facilitation because they feared facili-
tation might harm these values but, when they became involved anyway, the authorities 
invested more resources to safeguard these values.
Our analysis shows that government facilitation is context dependent and results from 
the interaction between government and societal actors; they react and adapt to each 
other’s characteristics and wishes. The fact that government facilitation is a dynamic 
process and that the government’s behavior can be largely explained by the process and 
the initiative’s characteristics is neglected in most of the existing literature (e.g., Brownill 
& Carpenter, 2009; Warbroek & Hoppe, 2017). This literature focuses mostly on static, 
institutional factors, such as the political system, bureaucracy, and administrative values 
that hinder government facilitation of societal initiatives (e.g., Boonstra & Boelens, 2011; 
Edelenbos et al., 2017b).
5.7 conclUSion anD DiScUSSion
Public authorities are exploring new forms of collaboration with non-governmental actors 
(Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). In the fields of infrastructure and nature development also, 
authorities are searching for alternative ways to collaborate with their civic and private 
partners (Francesch-Huidobro, 2015). They aim to be more open to societal initiatives 
and facilitate the work of non-governmental actors (Roodbol-Mekkes & Van den Brink, 
2015). Relatively little is known yet about the strategies and actions of public authorities 
that aim to facilitate non-governmental initiatives (Edelenbos et al., 2018). To enhance 
our understanding about the barriers and enablers of government facilitation, this study 
follows two initiatives over time and analyses how and why the authorities changed their 
strategy regarding these initiatives.
Most of the literature on government facilitation focuses on static factors that hinder 
facilitation (e.g., Boonstra & Boelens, 2011; Edelenbos et al., 2017b; see for exceptions 
Edelenbos et al., 2018; Van Buuren et al., 2015; Westerink et al., 2017). This study shows 
that process factors and the characteristics of the facilitated initiative are also impor-
tant explanations for the behavior of facilitating authorities, indicating that government 
facilitation is an interactive process. The government is pragmatic, and the strategy that 
it deploys is context dependent; authorities change their strategy in reaction to the (also 
changing) characteristics of the initiative at hand. This process of facilitation is neglected 
in a lot of the literature (e.g., Brownill & Carpenter, 2009; Skelcher et al., 2005).
Another finding is that traditional administrative values, in the literature identified 
mainly as barriers to innovative collaborations (e.g., Skelcher et al., 2005; Westerink et 
al., 2017), also prove to be a driver of invitational facilitation. As other research shows, au-
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thorities are hesitant to facilitate non-governmental initiatives because they fear that they 
will jeopardize values such as government accountability and professionalism (Brownill 
& Carpenter, 2009; Van Buuren et al., 2015). This study shows that when authorities, 
for other reasons, start facilitating anyway, they opt to obtain significant influence in the 
initiative to safeguard these values.
Based on the findings, the conclusion is that, to attract government support, a non-
governmental initiative should enhance government’s policy goals or at least not interfere 
with them. This also applies to traditional administrative values; facilitation of the initiative 
should not jeopardize these values (too much). In addition, the public authority involved 
should be willing and able to facilitate. This is not a matter of course, because facilitation 
requires different skills than traditional governing, and as authorities do not operate in a 
vacuum, political and managerial support from the top of the organization for this way of 
working is another precondition. Last but not least, the non-governmental initiators should 
be both competent and in need of government support. To be eligible for facilitation, an 
initiative should thus have a high chance of success, but at the same require some gov-
ernment support to achieve that success.
The two Dutch cases on which these conclusions are based can be considered extreme 
cases (Yin, 2018) in the sense that, in The Netherlands, the water sector has traditionally 
been in the hands of the government, with a strong prediction and control regime focused 
on risk avoidance (Van Buuren et al., 2015). Even more than in other countries, facilitating 
non-governmental initiatives is innovative for Dutch water authorities compared with their 
traditional ways of working (Grotenbreg & Altamirano, 2017). Although other countries are 
generally more progressive in terms of granting non-governmental actors an active role 
in the provision of public services, they are also searching for new forms of public–private 
collaboration and a more facilitative role for the government (Buser, 2013; Mees et al., 
2016; Taylor, 2003). The expectation is that the theory-based mechanisms found in this 
explorative, qualitative study will also be present in other sectors and other countries, but 
more research is needed to further corroborate the conclusions.
In terms of recommendations for practitioners, this study shows the value of the en-
ablers of strategy change for authorities that aim to explore new forms of collaboration 
with their civic and private partners (Genschel, 1997; Lanzara, 1998). By retaining parts of 
the established working method, patching up, and institutional bricolage, the uncertainty 
that accompanies facilitation of external initiatives can be reduced. This can help a bu-
reaucratic organization to grow into a new strategy. A facilitating strategy that fits with the 
existing organizational structure and values is an emergent strategy: It takes shape over 
time and is hard to spell out in policy beforehand (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Van Buuren 
et al., 2015). Government facilitation is trial and error, and when some first steps are taken, 
for example in a pilot, positive feedback and increasing returns can pave the way for more 
facilitation (Baumgartner & Jones, 2001; Van Popering-Verkerk & Van Buuren, 2017).
6 Conclusions and Discussion
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6.1 introDUcinG thE conclUSionS
Public authorities are exploring new ways to relate to non-governmental – public and pri-
vate – actors. They aim to collaborate with these actors, and recently authorities worldwide 
also increasingly seem to opt to facilitate the actions of these non-governmental actors. 
Politicians speak of a ‘Big Society’ (Kisby 2014: 484), a ‘do democracy’, or a ‘participation 
society’ (Rijksoverheid, 2013a) in which non-governmental actors take the lead in public 
value creation and authorities facilitate their actions instead of taking action themselves 
(Blunkett, 2003; Taylor, 2003). The ‘new’ government is presented as small, lean, humble, 
and obliging to an energetic society, making room, giving space, and (only) helping where 
necessary (Hajer, 2011; Kisby, 2010; Van der Steen et al., 2018). This new order of things 
is sketched as being rather bright and unambiguous, government facilitation as uncom-
plicated. An optimistic picture is painted about governments facilitating non-governmental 
initiatives (Ossewaarde, 2014). The Dutch government, for example, simply states that 
society has a growing ‘self-organising capacity’ and, in reaction, the government will ‘let 
go, facilitate, and give space’ to societal initiatives (doedemocratie.net). It is believed that 
this form of governance will increase democratic legitimacy (Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk, 
2016), enable budget cuts (Meijer, 2016), and lead to more public value (Bryson et al., 
2014) and to more innovative solutions to public problems (Sørenson & Torfing, 2011, 
2012).
In Chapter 1 the emergence of facilitation in governments’ discourse was discussed, 
leading to the conclusion that there is relatively little research on this form of governance 
and that the available literature is mainly theoretical. Not much is yet known about what 
authorities that aim to facilitate actually do, what their struggles and successes are, and 
with what effects they facilitate non-governmental initiatives. This observation formed the 
start of this thesis.
The picture that emerges from our study of the facilitating government is one of a 
seeking and a struggling government; a government that feels the need to do things 
differently, tries to do things differently, encounters significant barriers and dilemmas in 
doing this, and in reaction sometimes sees no other solution than to revert to familiar ways 
of working. Our research results add some footnotes to the optimistic, uncomplicated, and 
unambiguous image of government facilitation that emerges from governments’ discourse 
and some of the literature (Ossewaarde, 2014).
In the remainder of this concluding chapter, we first discuss the reality of government 
facilitation; unlike the uniform picture sketched in governments’ discourse, the practice 
of facilitating is rather diverse. We differentiate between two forms of facilitation and four 
administrative capacities that authorities employ to support non-governmental initiatives. 
We show that the dominant focus on coordination, bringing relevant actors together and 
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creating a platform for their collaboration, is misleading: for an initiative to succeed the 
government often needs to employ all four capacities.
In section 6.3, we discuss the difficulties and dilemmas faced by authorities that aim 
to facilitate; these are not prominent in the positive discourse of modern governments. 
Our research shows how institutional stability, traditional administrative values, and a 
misfit between the capacities of the bureaucratic organisation and the needs of a dynamic 
societal initiative causes unexpected unease for authorities. The choice of facilitation, 
which seems a logical response to societal and economic developments, often proves to 
be an ill-considered one. Facilitating non-governmental initiatives proves to be complex 
and demanding.
In section 6.4, we describe the various ways in which authorities cope with the dif-
ficulties that they encounter and how these sometimes lead to a shift away from facilita-
tion. Authorities introduce performance criteria to track an initiative’s results or they take 
a role as network manager, and this means that their activities resemble those of the 
government in New Public Management or New Public Governance. We state that, in 
coping with the difficulties and dilemmas that come with facilitation, authorities move to 
other forms of governance. This raises the question of whether government facilitation is 
sustained as a separate mode of governance. In section 6.5, we discuss the results and 
unintended consequences of authorities’ choice of facilitation.
It is not all doom and gloom however; our research shows some practices of govern-
ment facilitation in which authorities give external initiators space but do not leave them to 
themselves; where authorities enthuse non-governmental actors with a rousing discourse 
but do not raise false expectations; and where initiatives receive sufficient support but 
are not taken over by the government. In the sixth section, of this conclusion we sum up 
several factors for successful government facilitation that we derive from our research, 
leading to the formulation of some recommendations for authorities that aim to facilitate. 
We then discuss what our research results mean for government facilitation as scientific 
concept, and we end by discussing the generalisability of our findings and suggestions 
for future research.
6.2 thE DiVErSity in GoVErnmEnt Facilitation
administrative capacities and facilitative actions
In the available literature the descriptions of what facilitating authorities actually do are 
rather general (e.g. Salamon, 2001; Vigoda, 2002). Governments’ discourse might lead 
one to believe that facilitating non-governmental initiatives is rather straightforward. An 
image is sketched of a government that does less, thereby giving space to societal initia-
tives that, with a little governmental support, will automatically blossom. Our research 
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shows, however, that there is more to it than the unspecified ‘letting go’ and ‘giving 
space’. The focus in Chapter 2 is on how public authorities facilitate non-governmental 
initiatives. A distinction is made between four capacities, and associated actions, that 
facilitating authorities can employ. Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 gives a detailed overview of how 
authorities can employ their analytical, coordination, regulatory, and delivery capacity to 
facilitate non-governmental initiatives. This classification makes it possible to undertake 
a structured evaluation of government facilitation, compare cases, and evaluate the ef-
fectiveness and results of different facilitating actions.
A number of things stand out: first, we find that authorities that the aim to facilitate are 
keen to employ their coordination capacity. They choose, for example, to organise net-
work meetings or create an online platform for stakeholders to connect. From our analysis 
of authorities’ discourse, discussed in Chapter 3, it also appears that the authorities see 
bringing relevant actors together and facilitating their collaboration as a prominent part 
of their envisioned role as facilitator. These activities are relatively cheap to conduct and 
involve few risks; the government does not make investments and does not have to take 
a stand in politically sensitive cases. It can be necessary to bring relevant external actors 
together and facilitate their collaboration. Our research shows, however, that in the Dutch 
water sector often it is insufficient to let initiatives succeed. Frequently, there is a lack of 
internal communication between the various authorities involved to ensure public align-
ment (Duijn et al., 2019).
Secondly, the employment of analytical capacity – for example by opening up govern-
mental data, pro-actively exploring possibilities with external initiators, and commission-
ing research that will benefit the initiatives – is an important tool for facilitating authorities. 
Authorities have access to essential information that non-governmental actors often lack, 
for example about public assets or environmental conditions. It is not straightforward, 
however, for authorities, to employ this capacity, especially not in the Dutch water sector, 
where collaboration with non-governmental actors is relatively new and sharing informa-
tion does not fit with the dominant regime focused on prediction and control (Van Buuren 
et al., 2015).
Thirdly, employing regulatory capacity also proves to be a necessary and effective tool 
for facilitating governments. Besides (temporarily) abolishing and adjusting existing rules 
and regulations that hinder a non-governmental initiative, it is sometimes necessary to set 
up new rules. In the tidal energy projects in our study, the authorities had to decide how 
much fish mortality caused by the rotating turbines they allowed. The absence of rules to 
assess the conditions under which an initiative is allowed can be as much of a hindrance 
as too many rules. Close collaboration with the external initiators is essential here to 
arrive at tailor-made solutions. Authorities generally are hesitant to adjust rules but over 
time find that it is necessary for external initiatives.
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Lastly, authorities are not always keen to employ their delivery capacity; direct financial 
support is not easily given to non-governmental initiatives. This might be because authori-
ties initially chose facilitation as an austerity measure and because they do not consider 
that making investments a task of a facilitator. Indirectly however, facilitating authorities 
do employ a substantial amount of delivery capacity, for example it terms of working hours 
invested by civil servants. However, direct financial support from the government, for 
example in the form of a subsidy, is frequently needed for an initiative to succeed.
two forms of facilitation
Looking at the use of various administrative capacities, combined with other charac-
teristics such as a certain discourse, we differentiate between two forms of facilitation: 
invitational facilitation and accommodating (in other chapters of this thesis also called 
restrained and limited) facilitation (see Table 6.1). This is another manifestation of the 
diversity in government facilitation.
In the case of accommodating facilitation, authorities accommodate non-governmental 
initiatives, but the support they give is limited. Authorities might, for example, support an 
initiative by adjusting rules or regulations that obstruct the initiative. Just like investments, 
the influence the government’s influence in an initiative is generally low. The initiating 
project leadership lies with non-governmental actors, and they are consequently the ones 
responsible for realisation and exploitation. In their discourse, authorities that employ this 
form of facilitation emphasise the limitations of what they are able or willing to contribute. 
They unambiguously assign certain actions and responsibilities to non-governmental ac-
tors. An advantage of this approach is that potential initiators know what they can expect. 
A possible downside of this restrained form of facilitation is that it is somewhat aloof: 
external actors feel neither invited nor sufficiently enthused or convinced about what the 
government has to offer to them in terms of support. Authorities might choose such an 
approach if they had little interest in project realisation. Another possibility is that they 
believe that external initiators will materialise and succeed anyway; if authorities believe 
that non-governmental actors will realise their project without their discursive encourage-
ments or support, the authorities can afford to opt for a restrained stance.
In the case of invitational facilitation, supporting non-governmental initiatives is a 
policy intention of a public authority; a public authority actively invites non-governmental 
actors to initiate a project. Initiators can often count on a significant amount of support of 
various kinds from the government. Besides regulatory support in the form of adjusted 
rules and regulations, the initiative might receive analytical support in the form of informa-
tion and advice, coordination support in the form of access to networks and fora, and 
financial support, for example in the form of subsidies. With a discourse that emphasises 
the opportunities and the benefits for non-governmental actors, authorities try to entice 
them to take action. A disadvantage of this discourse is that authorities’ ambitions and 
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limitations are less clear. Authorities will probably arouse non-governmental actors’ inter-
est and willingness to participate, but a possible danger is the emergence of a deadlock, 
as witnessed in the Brouwersdam case. Because of the government’s proactive approach 
and enthusiastic communication, non-governmental actors expect the government to 
take the lead in project realisation. The government, however, aims for a facilitative role. 
Invitational facilitation can result in high transaction costs and false expectations, and can 
even harm the government’s reputation as a trustworthy and reliable partner.
table 6.1 context and characteristics of accommodating and invitational facilitation
accommodating facilitation invitational facilitation
context Public willingness to accommodate 
non-governmental initiative but 
government focuses on own tasks
Public ambition to enhance non-
governmental initiative to reach certain policy 
goals
Government’s 
discourse
Factual and restrained, clear about 
initiators responsibilities, not very 
encouraging
Used to entice external actors to take the 
initiative, enthusiastic about opportunities, 
unclear about role divisions and limitations of 
governmental support.
Governmental 
support
Limited, on external initiators’ 
requests, mainly regulatory and 
analytical, e.g. advice about permit 
application
Substantial, offered to potential initiators 
proactively, employment of all administrative 
capacities, including financial support
6.3 DiFFicUltiES anD DilEmmaS For thE FacilatinG 
GoVErnmEnt
The literature on government facilitation mentions various reasons why it is difficult 
for authorities to facilitate non-governmental initiatives, for example because they are 
ultimately held accountable for the delivery of public services (McGuire, 2006; Meijer, 
2016). Additionally, there are scholars that think government facilitation is undesirable, for 
example because it may have a negative impact on equality and democratic legitimacy 
(Haveri et al., 2009; Taylor, 2007). In governments’ discourse however, facilitating non-
governmental initiatives is mostly presented as rather straightforward and uncomplicated 
(Ossewaarde, 2014). Authorities focus on highlighting the opportunities for initiators and 
benefits for society. They envision a situation in which the government gives space by 
doing less, and non-governmental initiatives blossom with a little governmental support. 
There is relatively little attention for the downsides and difficulties of facilitating societal 
initiatives. Our study of authorities that actually tried to employ government facilitation 
gives insight into the complexity of this form of governance. We now highlight several of 
the difficulties that they encounter.
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too little versus too much involvement
The differentiation between two forms of facilitation, invitational and accommodating, 
relates to a challenge for the facilitating government: finding a balance between, on the 
one hand, helping an initiative, giving it the necessary support for it to succeed and, on the 
other hand, leaving the initiative in the hands of the non-governmental actors, not taking 
it over as government.
Authorities find it difficult to stick to a collaborative or facilitative approach (Boonstra 
& Boelens, 2011; Brownill & Carpenter, 2009; Edelenbos et al., 2017b; Klijn & Teisman, 
2003). Our cases show how difficult it is for authorities to find the right balance: authori-
ties act too restrainedly for initiatives to succeed, as in the Afsluitdijk case; they are so 
involved that one could wonder whether their approach could still be called facilitation, 
as in the Marker Wadden case; or they are so dominant that non-governmental actors do 
not feel the need to take action and the government crowds out external initiative, as in 
the Brouwersdam case. The Oosterscheldekering is a case in which the authorities did 
find a good balance between supporting and giving space: the initiative received various 
forms of support from the authorities involved, who aligned their support in such a way 
that the private initiator got all the support they needed. At the same time, however, the 
project is now clearly in the hands of the turbine constructer that initiated it; this company 
is responsible for project realisation and exploitation.
There are various explanations for the tendency for both too little and too much 
involvement by facilitating authorities. Authorities can feel too restrained by traditional 
administrative values, such as equality and representativeness, to give the necessary 
support. They can become too involved because of to a lock in: after initial investments, 
authorities acquire a stake in project finalisation. We elaborate these dynamics in Chapter 
5, and in paragraph 6.5 of this conclusion.
Being flexible versus being clear
A related dilemma for authorities that emerges from our study is the balance between be-
ing clear and being flexible. The facilitating government must be clear about what it wants 
to achieve and what it is willing to do to achieve this. Our analysis of the Brouwersdam 
case shows the downside of inadequate expectation management. In this case, the public 
authorities employed a form of invitational facilitation: they repeatedly expressed their 
enthusiasm for the realisation of the tidal power plant without being explicit about the 
limits of the governmental support that private initiators could receive. As a consequence 
of this approach, combined with opportunism and unfamiliarity with this new form of gov-
ernance on both sides, potential private initiators took a waiting stance. They expected 
the government to take the lead in financing the project. Besides managing expectations, 
it is important for a facilitating government to be flexible, to give space, find tailor-made 
solutions, and move along with the changing needs of a non-governmental initiative. It 
133
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
is a challenge for authorities to strike a balance between being clear about expectations 
and their willingness to contribute to an initiative and being flexible enough to change 
these things when necessary. This balance is further discussed in the recommendations 
in section 6.5.
Facilitation versus negotiation
It is a widely shared belief that government facilitation is a reaction to growing civic en-
gagement and the willingness of non-governmental actors to initiate public value creation 
(Edelenbos et al., 2018). Although it is not hard to understand why non-governmental 
actors would take matters into their own hands, there are also good reasons for these ac-
tors to await government action, for example because in some cases the government can 
create public value faster, more cheaply, or better. Our research shows that there can be 
a difference in interest between initiators and the government. We add this observation to 
the literature that mentions the potential differences in interest between societal initiators 
and the wider population (Edelenbos et al., 2018; Meijer, 2016). In our study, the private 
actors in the Brouwersdam case, whose initiatives the government aims to facilitate, do 
not necessarily have an interest in the government having a facilitating role. They would 
prefer to act as a contractor and get paid by the government. What the authorities in this 
case describes as a ‘shared search’4 into the feasibility of a power plant can sometimes 
better be described as a negotiation. There is a dilemma between, on the one hand, col-
laboration and facilitation of non-governmental actors and, on the other hand, negotiating 
with them.
Non-governmental actors that are invited by the government to create public value 
can consequently have an interest in downplaying their own resources, capacity, and 
willingness to act. This way, they hope to receive as much support from the government 
as possible. Another reason why private actors might not fully disclosure their capacities 
in, what the government sees as, a ‘shared search for viable solutions’ is competition 
and commercially sensitive information. This will be the case especially if multiple private 
actors, potentially competitors, are participating. This image of the facilitation process, of 
a process full of strategy, negotiation, and opposing interests, does not accord with the 
image generally sketched in some of the literature in which the facilitating government 
brings together non-governmental actors, creates a forum for their peaceful collabora-
tion, and streamlines the process as an objective outsider (e.g. Edelenbos et al., 2017b; 
Sørenson & Torfing: 2011, 2012). The government often is as much of a stakeholder as 
non-governmental actors are, especially in the Dutch water sector which we studied.
4 ‘Het werd een gezamenlijke zoektocht naar haalbare oplossingen’ (Verslag van de precompetitieve fase 
Getijdencentrale, p. 2).
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Traditional democratic values and organisational misfits as explanations 
of the difficulties encountered
In Chapter 4, we conceptualise the dilemmas encountered by facilitating authorities as 
dilemmas between different types of administrative values: theta, lambda, and sigma 
values (Hood, 1991). Generally speaking, theta values are traditional democratic values, 
lambda values relate to professionalism, and sigma values relate to efficiency. The gen-
eral picture is that the traditional democratic values can form a hindrance to a facilitating 
approach. For facilitation, things such as flexibility, customisation, and making exceptions 
are important. This is often at odds with values such as predictability, representativeness, 
and equal access. Others also point to this tension (Haveri et al., 2009; Meijer, 2016; 
Taylor, 2007). In the Marker Wadden case the government struggled with the initiator’s 
project proposal because it did not meet the requirements of the market consultation that 
the government had just conducted. Consequently, the authorities had to find a way to 
justify their decision to support the initiative financially.
The way public authorities are organised is related to the traditional administrative 
values. Our study shows an organisational misfit between the government and the 
non-governmental initiatives that it aims to facilitate. Bureaucratic organisations are not 
equipped to facilitate external initiatives and lack the necessary tools, resources, and 
competences. An example of an organisational factor that complicates government facili-
tation is the strict compartmentalisation of responsibilities between public organisations. 
The goals of a societal initiative are often not easily ascribed to a particular organisation; 
they can be broad and multidimensional. In the Afsluitdijk case, the private initiatives 
are expected to contribute to regional development, innovation, and sustainability. As a 
consequence, non-governmental actors went from pillar to post in their search for govern-
mental support. In the Oosterscheldekering case, there were no regulations available to 
decide on the unusual request of the private initiator to generate renewable energy at the 
public dam. In the Marker Wadden case, the standardised working methods of the water 
authority obstructed its collaboration with Natuurmonumenten. In Chapter 5, we discuss 
the fact that institutions, such as the way the government works, are hard to change. So, 
although politicians and governors might be in favour of government facilitation, it is not 
easily implemented.
6.4 thE DynamicS oF GoVErnmEnt Facilitation
Strategies to cope with difficulties and dilemmas
We have just concluded that traditional democratic values, such as legality and repre-
sentativeness, can form a barrier to government facilitation. In our cases however, we 
see that authorities that face a dilemma between different values adopt certain strategies 
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to cope with the dilemma. This way, they can sustain their facilitating approach without 
fully abandoning their democratic values. In Chapter 4, we discuss how authorities use 
casuistry, hybridisation, cycling, and firewalls (Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 2008) as coping 
strategies.
In the case of casuistry, authorities assess dilemmas case by case and make pragmatic 
decisions in finding case-specific solutions, including making exceptions. This happened 
in the Marker Wadden case when the government decided to put the project financing in 
an external bank account to safeguard it from future political decision making. In the case 
of hybridisation, authorities let different values coexist, they find a middle way, for example 
by including established practices in new ones. This happened when the government did 
not put the project out to tender but made an open call for participation. Cycling means 
dividing attention on different values sequentially over time and reverting to traditional 
administrative values when necessary. The government employed this strategy when it 
had to open up its communication with Natuurmonumenten after a period of negotiation 
behind closed doors. Erecting firewalls is a coping strategy in which authorities uphold 
traditional administrative values by separating governmental responsibilities between 
different departments of a public organisation. The government set up a knowledge and 
innovation programme in the Marker Wadden case, separate from project realisation, to 
safeguard policy goals.
We find that, in general, the authorities in our cases deal with dilemmas in a relatively 
ad hoc way. This is reflected in the coping strategies most frequently employed: casuistry 
and hybridization. In these specific situations, this generally worked out fine. A question 
is, however, whether the tailor-made solutions authorities come up with are fit to use in 
future situations, or whether they will have to keep reinventing the wheel as facilitating 
authorities.
authorities’ erratic search for a good strategy
The difficulties and dilemmas that facilitating authorities encounter, and the way they deal 
with these, lead to specific dynamics in authorities’ strategy. In Chapter 5, we show how 
authorities in various projects, mostly as a result of institutional factors, move from the 
intention to collaborate with non-governmental actors, to accommodating facilitation, to 
invitational facilitation. After they pull back and retreat to an approach in which they give 
very little support to external initiators, they then gradually increase their investments 
and influence in the non-governmental initiatives, what leads to a U-turn shaped pattern 
in their strategy. The investments they make and the influence they gain reinforce each 
other. In almost all cases under study, the authorities eventually take up a more prominent 
role than envisioned beforehand. The explanations for this change of strategy are mostly 
process factors. Along the way, authorities gain a stake in a project and acquire an inter-
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est in project realisation; they get locked-in and are no longer the objective facilitator on 
the side lines.
In the introduction to this thesis, we make a conceptual divide between three gov-
ernment models: Traditional Public Administration, New Public Management, and New 
Public Governance. New Public Governance consists of two sub-parts: government 
collaboration, and government facilitation. Authorities that have the intention to employ 
government facilitation often end up employing another government model.
Often, the government assumes a prominent and permanent role as network and pro-
cess manager. It becomes an active participant in the governance network itself because 
solely bringing non-government actors together to kick-start their collaboration proves not 
to be enough. The role of the government then resembles the role of a government in the 
government collaboration-side of New Public Governance.
In other cases the government ends up having a role that resembles the government’s 
role in New Public Management because it decides to start a tender procedure and com-
mission a private actor to realise a project. We see this in the Marker Wadden case where 
the government tried to include private actors as project partners at the private actors’ ex-
pense but eventually had to conduct a traditional tender to finance their work. Uncertainty 
about the results of the non-governmental initiative can also lead to the introduction of 
strict performance and output criteria to receive governmental support, again resembling 
New Public Management.
Alternatively, giving support to particular societal initiators and not to others can lead 
to the neglect of traditional administrative values such as impartiality, legality, and legiti-
macy. The facilitating government can respond to this with new rules and bureaucracy, 
resembling Traditional Public Administration. Another reason why a facilitating govern-
ment turns to a more traditional role is doubt about the professionalism and quality of an 
external initiative. As the government is held ultimately accountable, it might not resist the 
urge to take over.
Our analysis shows how difficult it is to sustain a facilitating strategy. Metaphorically 
speaking one could say that facilitation is in the middle of a web of government models; 
Traditional Public Administration, New Public Management, and government collabora-
tion pull a facilitating government towards them like magnets, as visualised in Figure 
6.1. It is a continuous balancing act for authorities. They are, for example, balancing 
between supporting but not taking over, and between letting go but not letting an initiative 
drop. Often, authorities end up employing a form of governance that contains so many 
elements of another model that one can ask whether what they are doing can still be 
called facilitation.
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Government 
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New Public 
Management
Government 
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Figure 6.1 Government models pull a facilitating governments towards them
6.5 rESUltS oF GoVErnmEnt Facilitation
In Chapter 5, we analyse why the public authorities in our cases opt for government 
facilitation. Their motives mirror the reasons for government facilitation mentioned in the 
literature (e.g. Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk, 2016; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; Meijer, 2016; 
Thaler & Levin-Keitel, 2016). The idea that there will be better, more innovative solutions 
to public problems, that are more supported in society, and at less cost to the government 
is especially widespread among the authorities in our study.
Regarding the hope for better solutions to complex public problems, we can say that, 
in our cases, several innovative pieces of infrastructure have been realised. In the Marker 
Wadden project, hundreds of acres of new land have been formed in the Markermeer. 
Now, these marsh islands are inhabited by several plant and animal species and can be 
visited by boat. In the Oosterscheldekering, turbines to generate tidal energy have been 
installed in a primary flood defence, just as in the Afsluitdijk. At the Grevelingendam, a 
centre to test tidal turbines is under construction and the plans to realise a tidal power 
plant in the Brouwersdam are still in place. The national government recently decided to 
reserve €75 million to make a breach in the dam, which is a prerequisite for the realisation 
of a power plant.
In all these cases, non-governmental actors, facilitated by the government, invested 
resources that government lacked, such as innovative ideas, perseverance, persuasion, 
and knowledge about technical details. It is hard to say, however, whether the realisation 
of these innovative projects can be ascribed to the government’s choice of facilitation. 
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We do not know what the results would have been if the government had not opted for 
facilitation but had, for example, put the projects out to contract.
We can say that, by opting for facilitation and letting other actors take the lead, the 
government lost its exclusive right to specify the results. Besides recourses, the non-
governmental actors brought their own goals, and these were not necessarily the same 
as the government’s goals. The results of initiatives facilitated by the government thus 
are not always the solutions as formulated by the government. The main environmental 
problem in the Markermeer area is an accumulation of sediments on the bottom of the 
lake but, contrary to what was hoped for, the Marker Wadden project does not really 
constitute a solution to this problem. Natuurmonumenten’s main objective is to create a 
bird sanctuary.
Regarding societal support and satisfaction among stakeholders and shareholders, 
the projects in our study can generally count on broad support. They are innovative, 
appealing, and receive plenty of positive attention in the media. The role of the govern-
ment and its collaboration with non-governmental actors is also positively reported on. 
The non-governmental initiators of the projects that succeeded (the Oosterscheldekering, 
the Grevelingendam test centre, blue energy at the Afsluitdijk, and the Marker Wadden) 
are generally satisfied with the authorities’ facilitation and with the results. All of them, 
however, have also experienced difficulties in their collaboration with the government; 
they complain about bureaucracy, lengthy procedures, and ongoing uncertainty about 
subsidies. Most of them had hoped for more governmental support.
Regarding the authorities’ hope to reduce costs by choosing facilitation, our study 
shows that government facilitation generally is a resource-intensive governance strategy. 
Depending on the capacity and willingness of non-governmental actors to take action, the 
government has to invest substantially to activate them, bring them together, and let them 
collaborate. Furthermore, the support needed by the initiators is ongoing, not limited to 
the start-up phase, and not limited to non-financial resources. Often, a significant financial 
contribution from the government, for example in the form of a subsidy, is indispensable. 
Consequently, there is probably less cost reduction for the government than it expected 
or hoped for when it opted for facilitation. However, compared to procuring an integrated 
energy and water works or new nature reserve by itself, letting non-governmental actors 
realise them at their expense is in all probability cheaper.
Besides these results in terms of assets, support, and cost reductions, a more indirect 
result of the government’s facilitation of these initiatives is the learning experienced by 
authorities. Because this form of collaboration with external actors is new to the authori-
ties in our study, the effort, transaction, and coordination costs are high. In all cases, the 
authorities worked in an ad hoc way; they repeatedly had to find instant, custom-made 
solutions in reaction to unexpected situations. Future projects could make use of the 
developed arrangements as a blueprint and might require fewer government resources. 
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In that case, the resources now used could be seen as an investment and part of a 
learning curve to adapt to this new role of facilitating government. However, a certain 
degree of customisation, flexibility, and adaptation is unavoidable; it is inherent in the 
practice of government facilitation. In Chapter 5, we show that the dynamics in every 
project are different and depend on the characteristics of the external initiator and the 
interaction between initiator and authority. There can be no standard procedure set in 
stone to facilitate non-governmental initiatives.
Unintended consequences
To take stock of the results of government facilitation, it is important to look also a look 
at possible side effects or unintended consequences. Several scholars point to negative 
consequences in terms of inequality and legitimacy (Meijer, 2016; Taylor, 2007). Accord-
ing to some, democratic legitimacy can be harmed instead of enhanced by a choice of 
government facilitation (Alexander et al., 2016; Haveri et al., 2009). Our findings are con-
sistent with the literature that stresses the Janus-faced nature of government facilitation; 
it can privilege certain actors and disadvantage others, especially less well-organised 
ones (Swyngedouw, 2005). In our study, we encountered this in the Marker Wadden case 
where the government issued an open call for participation but set the entry requirement 
very high: participants had to contribute at least €5 million. Several actors were disap-
pointed that they could not join the project.
Besides equality, other administrative values can be at stake when authorities opt 
for facilitation. Because existing procedures often do not fit with the practice of facilita-
tion, authorities come up with ad hoc procedures. In Chapter 4, we show how these 
procedures sometimes jeopardise traditional administrative values such as transparency, 
predictability, and reliability. In the Marker Wadden case, a group of landowners filed 
a complaint about the non-transparent decision making between the government and 
Natuurmonumenten. Under the Freedom of Information Act, the government then had to 
disclose its confidential communication with that NGO.
A related unintended consequence of a government’s choice of facilitation is the harm 
it can cause to its relations with its external partners. In Chapter 5, we show how the gov-
ernment first employed a strategy of partnering in two cases; the authorities conducted 
an extensive market consultation and invited private actors to submit extensive plans for 
full area development. Then, they shifted to a strategy of limited facilitation and severely 
restrict the scope of the work and the role that the government will play in it. In the Marker 
Wadden case, the three private consortia that submitted their plans at the government’s 
invitation were side-lined the moment Natuurmonumenten appeared. Such shifts leave 
the private actors feeling empty handed, weaken the government’s credibility, and harm 
its relations with the private market.
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6.6 SUccESS FactorS anD rEcommEnDationS For 
GoVErnmEnt Facilitation
Success factors for government facilitation
Authorities that aim to facilitate non-governmental initiatives face various difficulties and 
dilemmas, they have to find ways to deal with these, and in doing this they have a hard 
time sustaining their facilitating approach. It is not all doom and gloom however; there 
are various cases in which the government has successfully facilitated external initiatives 
despite the difficulties and dilemmas. From our research, we derive several factors that 
contribute to such successful facilitation.
First, it proves to be beneficial if the government’s communication both entices non-
governmental actors to take action and also makes it clear what the government is willing 
and not willing to do to support potential initiators. Authorities have to find a balance 
between invitational and clear communication. With an upbeat discourse, the government 
attracts a lot of non-governmental actors, but, if the government’s limits are not clear, 
such actors await public action. In multiple cases, we see that the government’s failure to 
manage expectations caused confusion and irritation among non-governmental actors, 
reducing rather than increasing their willingness to act.
What appears obvious is that a prerequisite for successful government facilitation is 
the presence of a well-organised, competent initiative with goals that are (somewhat) in 
line with the government’s goals. Authorities that aim to facilitate do not always seem to 
realise this though. Clear communication can contribute to the emergence of such an 
initiative. What is also important for potential non-governmental initiators is that there is 
really something in it for them (to earn, to learn, to demonstrate). A factor that contributes 
to successful facilitation thus is authorities not pressing their own policy goals too much 
and giving external initiators space to pursue their goals.
In the realisation phase of an initiative, a success factor is the employment of all 
administrative capacities to support the initiative: delivery, coordination, analytical, and 
regulatory. These capacities do not have to be employed by one and the same public 
authority; through public alignment various authorities can complement one another. Dif-
ficulties and dilemmas will inevitably occur, and, if the government manages to cope with 
these by introducing certain arrangements, this will contribute to a better fit between the 
public organisation and the external initiative. Positive feedback and increasing returns 
can subsequently lead to a virtuous circle towards more facilitation.
recommendations for the facilitating government
This summing up of success factors leads to the formulation of several recommendations 
for authorities that aim to facilitate non-governmental initiative. The first recommendation 
for authorities is that they make up their mind. Concretely: think beforehand about why 
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you are opting for facilitation, what you want to achieve, and what you are willing and not 
willing to do to achieve this. Authorities should think about what actions and investments 
they expect from other actors and what capacities they are able and willing to employ to 
support them. The type of facilitation authorities can best choose depends on this.
A central question should be whether there are specific policy goals that can be better 
achieved by, or together with, non-governmental actors. Then, invitational facilitation is a 
good choice. Necessary condition for this choice of strategy is that the authority is able 
and willing to invest a substantial amount of resources, become project partner and stay 
involved after the initiation phase. It might also be necessary to activate potential initiators 
if there are no initiatives present yet.
Are there no pressing policy goals but is an authority nevertheless able and willing 
to facilitate an external initiative if it emerges? Then accommodating facilitation is a fit. 
Authorities should realise, however, that this form of facilitation can be costly too in terms 
of adjusting the organisation’s standard working methods and finding tailor made solu-
tions for the initiative at hand. Table 6.2 gives an overview of this choice and necessary 
conditions for the two forms of facilitation.
table 6.2 ideal situation and conditions for accommodating and invitational facilitation.
accommodating facilitation invitational facilitation
ideal situation Government is willing to accommodate 
non-governmental initiative, but does 
not aim to achieve specific policy goals 
with it
Government has specific policy goals that 
it aims to achieve by facilitating non-
governmental initiative
realistic goals Enhance democratic legitimacy and 
general goodwill in society, create extra 
public value
Achieve specific policy goals by, or 
together with, non-governmental actors
communication 
strategy
Clear about opportunities and 
responsibilities for non-governmental 
actors; emphasises limited involvement 
and contribution by government
Activating and enthusing; invitational, 
highlights opportunities for non-
governmental actors; clear about 
government goals, proposed role 
divisions, and (limits of) government’s 
contribution
necessary 
conditions
(Part of) governmental organisation 
is willing and able to accommodate 
initiative, find tailor-made solutions, 
and make exceptions and concessions
Government is willing and able to 
activate non-governmental actors, bring 
them together, give ongoing support, be 
involved for a longer duration of time, and 
invest financially
What authorities should also asses is the presence and capacity of non-governmental 
initiators. This will not be easy, because external actors might have an interest in not 
being frank; they can overstate their capacities to attract the government’s interest or 
downplay their capacities to generate more governmental support. Another part of the 
inventory is an assessment of other public authorities’ willingness to join and also facilitate 
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external initiatives. This allows for public alignment; others might be willing to supply the 
capacities that one lacks.
It is important that authorities clearly communicate their choices to potential initia-
tors and manage their expectations. This all might seem somewhat counterintuitive; the 
general idea is that a facilitating government should have an open, wait-and-see attitude. 
It is characterised as operating reactively and at a distance (Van der Steen et al., 2018) 
and with little emphasis on reaching set results or outcomes (Edelenbos et al., 2017b). On 
the basis of our research however, we recommend authorities to take stock and speak out 
when they opt for facilitation. This does not mean that choices are set in stone; a facilitat-
ing strategy is likely to change along the way when an authority reacts responsively to the 
developments in a project and to the needs of an initiative.
What seems obvious is that a non-governmental initiative will emerge only if there is 
really something to gain for potential initiators. Authorities that employ invitational facilita-
tion are very much focused on their own policy goals and can lose sight of the wins for 
external actors. Authorities have a role in creating beneficial conditions for an initiative, for 
example by allowing private actors to make money by using public assets and by lowering 
the administrative burden for an initiative.
When considering whether it should facilitate a specific initiative, an authority should 
evaluate whether the initiative enhances its own policy goals (in the case of invitational fa-
cilitation) or does not interfere with these goals (in the case of accommodating facilitation). 
This also applies to traditional administrative values; facilitation of the initiative should not 
jeopardise these values too much. Furthermore, the non-governmental initiators should 
be both competent and in need of government support. To be eligible for facilitation, 
an initiative should thus have a high chance of success but at the same require some 
government support to achieve that success.
Despite an authority’s inventory of its own goals and capacities and those of the other 
actors involved prior to facilitating, there will be difficulties and dilemmas on the way no 
matter what, if only because facilitation does not match with an organisation’s institutions 
and established ways of working. The coping strategies discussed in Chapter 4 of this 
theses can help to deal with the difficulties encountered as a result of institutional stability 
and the dominance of traditional, administrative values. Conflicts can be mitigated, for 
example, by introducing changes step-by-step or by erecting firewalls, meaning that gov-
ernmental responsibilities are divided between different departments. The new practice of 
facilitating an external initiative is then conducted separately from the rest of the organisa-
tion, for example in a pilot project. Positive feedback from this pilot can subsequently pave 
the way for more facilitation.
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6.7 GoVErnmEnt Facilitation aS a SciEntiFic concEpt
In the introduction to this thesis, we discuss how various public administration scholars 
conceptualise government facilitation as a separate model of government (e.g. Arn-
stein, 1969; Edelenbos et al., 2017b; Van der Steen et al., 2018; Vigoda, 2002). After 
our research, what can we say about government facilitations right to exist as a distinct 
government model?
In Chapter 2, we analyse how Dutch national and local authorities facilitate four 
external initiatives. The policy instruments they use are not new, but the specific mix of 
instruments employed and the emphasis placed on some of them by the government is. 
In Chapter 3 we further analyse governments’ discourse regarding facilitation. We show 
that authorities describe its own role as a small one, focused on coordination between ex-
ternal actors. Many of the proposed governmental actions are reactive; they presuppose 
non-governmental action. On the basis of government communication, one could thus 
say that a facilitating government indeed is a different government than a government in 
Traditional Public Administration, New Public Management, or New Public Governance. 
Its role is different, more reactive and smaller, just as the literature states (Edelenbos et 
al., 2017b; Van der Steen et al., 2018; Vigoda, 2002; Westerink et al., 2017).
Our research, however, is not limited to the literature and governments’ communi-
cation; we also studied the facilitating government in action. We show that ideal type 
facilitation as described in theory and in policy documents often does not endure in the 
fuzzy reality of governing. For the government, facilitating non-governmental initiative 
leads to several difficulties and dilemmas, which we describe in Chapters 4 and 5, and, 
dealing with these dilemmas, the facilitating government often ends up employing a dif-
ferent government model than intended.
Facilitation as intention
We conclude that government facilitation in many cases is mainly an intention of the 
government. It is the starting point of a collaboration with non-governmental actors, a 
position that an authority takes to make its intentions clear. It includes the intention not to 
be the main initiator, owner, and financier of a project and focus on facilitative and coordi-
native acts such as bringing societal actors together and supporting them, for example by 
removing obstructive regulations. Maintaining this position is difficult; institutional stabil-
ity, path dependency, and other barriers, difficulties, and dilemmas pull the facilitating 
government to other models. However, even though the actual actions of a facilitating 
government change over time and in practice there is a lot of overlap between what a 
facilitating government does and what governments in other models do, governments’ 
intentions, and relatedly their discourse, are actually different.
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It is important to study this intention and discourse because they affect a government’s 
relation with non-governmental actors and they put a stamp on the eventual governance 
arrangement between them. Discourse is not just a governmental tool through which to 
inform about changed relations between government and society, it is a means to change 
these relations (Kjær, 2011; Skelcher et al., 2005). As Dickinson and Sullivan (2014: 17) 
state: such discourses ‘have political purposes that are (…) about influencing actors to 
engage in processes of change through altering perceptions of what and how services 
should be delivered.’ We therefore stick to the claim that it is important to conceptually 
distinguish government facilitation from government collaboration, as sub-parts of New 
Public Governance. They are, at least in theory substantially different, authorities increas-
ingly seem to opt for facilitation and there is little research on this part of New Public 
Governance.
6.8 GEnEraliSability oF oUr FinDinGS anD FUtUrE 
rESEarch
Generalisability of our findings
In the introduction to this thesis, we elaborate our choice of research design and the 
consequences of this choice for the generalisability of our findings. We believe that 
government facilitation, being a complex and relatively little studied topic, can best be 
explored through qualitative case studies (Blatter & Haverland, 2012; Flyvbjerg, 2001). 
Conducting case studies allows in-depth knowledge to be gained in dynamic environ-
ments and situations. It leads to a detailed and contextualized understanding of the object 
under study; it does not allow for direct generalisations to other contexts or situations (Yin, 
2014; 2018). This does not mean that our findings cannot be useful for practitioners and 
scholars studying government facilitation outside the Dutch water sector. Our hypothesis 
is that many of our findings will also apply to other situations of government facilitation, 
but to a lesser extent. We expect that the dynamics, the difficulties, and the dilemmas that 
authorities encounter, and the strategies needed to cope with these difficulties, are larger 
and more extreme in the Dutch water sector compared to other sectors. Facilitation might 
be easier and less complicated in other sectors.
Our cases can be considered as extreme cases (Yin, 2018) because the Dutch water 
sector is strongly government-led, publicly funded, and anchored in laws and regulations 
with a focus on risk avoidance (Roovers & Van Buuren, 2014; Van Buuren et al., 2015). 
Facilitating non-governmental initiatives is genuinely new for the authorities in this sector 
and substantially different than their institutionalised way of working. Because the initia-
tives are innovative and are located at public assets, which are owned and managed by 
the government and are vital for flood protection, the government cannot stand aside and 
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let the non-governmental actors do their thing; the authorities’ involvement is essential. 
Future research will have to show, however, whether our hypothesis that our findings 
apply also to other situations of government facilitation, but to a lesser extent, can be 
accepted. In other sectors, there will of course also be other kinds of difficulties, coping 
mechanisms, and strategy changes. It would be interesting to compare those to learn 
more about the causes of difficulties and effects of coping strategies and see what differ-
ent sectors might learn from each other.
Furthermore, we believe that the concepts that we use, such as the four administrative 
capacities that authorities can employ to facilitate external initiatives (based on Lodge & 
Wegrich, 2014), the facilitation frame elements, the two forms of facilitation, and the cop-
ing mechanisms (Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 2008) could also be used to study different 
sectors and circumstances. It would be interesting to find out whether and how these 
concepts apply to other situations in which authorities facilitate non-governmental initia-
tives and find out if they can be used to make comparisons between different settings.
Suggestions for future research
A first research question that stems from our results, is what the exact organisational 
conditions are that enable public authorities to facilitate non-governmental initiatives. We 
show that despite the many difficulties and dilemmas, sometimes authorities successfully 
facilitate external initiatives. They pick strategies to cope with the encountered difficulties 
and resist the lure of falling back on traditional ways of working. Future research should 
give more insights into the conditions that should be met, for example in terms compe-
tences and discretionary authority for professionals, tools and resources, and institutional 
frameworks. A follow-up question is what authorities can do to meet these conditions and 
make their organisation fit for facilitation.
Another topic for future research is the strategic game between the government and 
non-governmental actors that emerges when the government opts for facilitation. We 
show that the government is not an objective outsider in government facilitation, it is 
stakeholder and shareholder and its interest often do not match those of external initiators. 
This leads to a process in which both (have to) make strategic choices. Future research 
should provide more insights into the interaction between government and its partners, 
and into the drivers of, and barriers to, their collaboration. Part of this strategic game is the 
government’s communication. Based on our research we state that the communication 
of authorities should both enthuse and inform potential initiators. Those two objectives 
can, however, conflict. It is hard to pinpoint the optimal balance between enthusing and 
activating, and managing initiators’ expectations. Future research, for example in the form 
of an experiment, could help to generate more knowledge about the actual causal effect 
of governments’ communication and help find this balance.
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A last question that stems from our research is if and how government facilitation can 
become more mainstream. We observe that the authorities in our cases work relatively 
ad hoc; they lack behind events somewhat and search for a tailor-made solution to every 
new situation. We raise the question whether government facilitation could ever become 
more of a routine because it will always need a flexible, pragmatic government that moves 
along with the needs of the initiative at hand. We also state, however, that it is important to 
have some general rules or blueprints so that authorities do not have to keep reinventing 
the wheel. Future research should help to develop these.
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INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED
appEnDix a. intErViEWS conDUctED
afsluitdijk case
respondent function respondent 
organisation
time of 
interview
location of interview
Project manager Energy 
‘The New Afsluitdijk’
Energy Valley February 2014 Erasmus University Rotterdm
CEO ‘Blue Energy’ REDstack February 2014 REDstack, Sneek
Project manager Afsluitdijk Rijkswaterstaat March 2014 Rijkswaterstaat, Utrecht
CEO Tocardo Tidal Turbines March 2014 Tocardo, Den Oever
Project manager
 ‘The New Afsluitdijk
Province of Friesland March 2014 Province Hall, Leeuwarden
Advisor 
‘The New Afsluitdijk’
Province of 
Noord-Holland
April 2014 Province Hall, Haarlem
Stakeholder manager project 
Afsluitdijk
Rijkswaterstaat April 2014 Rijkswaterstaat, Utrecht
Project manager 
‘Sustainable Energy’
Strukton May 2014 Strukton, Utrecht
Project manager ‘
Tidal Energy Afsluitdijk’
Tocardo Tidal Turbines June 2014 Tocardo, Den Oever
Project manager 
‘The New Afsluitdijk
Province of Friesland December 2014 Province Hall, Leeuwarden
oosterscheldekering case
respondent function respondent 
organisation
time of 
interview
location of interview
Policy advisor 
Energy and Climate
Province of Zeeland July 2013 Province Hall, Middelbrug
Policy advisor RIjkswaterstaat July 2014 Rijkswaterstaat, Rotterdam
Program manager 
OP-Zuid subsidy
Stimulus September 2014 Eindhoven
Policy advisor 
Energy and Climate
Province of Zeeland October 2014 Province Hall, Middelbrug
Grevelingen test centre case
respondent function respondent 
organisation
time of 
interview
location of interview
Managing director BT Projects July 2014 Erasmus University Rotterdam
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brouwersdam tidal power plant case
respondent function respondent organisation time of 
interview
conducted by 
colleague
Project director Tidal Power Plant 
Brouwersdam
Rijkswaterstaat May 2014
Consultant Antea Group May 2014 x
Policy advisor Brouwersdam Province of Zeeland May 2014 x
Policy advisor Brouwersdam Province of Zeeland May 2014 x
Policy advisor Brouwersdam Province of South Holland May 2014 x
Advisor Water Governance Ministry of Infrastructure 
and Environment
May 2014 x
Policy advisor Brouwersdam Ministry of Economic Affairs May 2014 x
Policy advisor Brouwersdam Ministry of Infrastructure 
and Environment
May 2014 x
Director Marina Port Zélande May 2014 x
Policy advisor Brouwersdam Municipality Schouwen- Duiveland May 2014 x
Policy advisor Brouwersdam Province of Zeeland June 2014 x
Business development manager Tocardo July 2014 x
Project director Tidal Power Plant 
Brouwersdam
Rijkswaterstaat May 2016
Policy advisor Waterways Rijkswaterstaat May 2016
Project member Tidal Power Plant 
Brouwersdam
Province of South-Holland June 2016
marker Wadden case
respondent function respondent 
organisation
time of 
interview
location of interview
Project manager Marker 
Wadden
Rijkswaterstaat January 2016 Rijkswaterstaat, The Hague
Research manager 
Marker Wadden
Top sector Water February 2016 Rijkswaterstaat, The Hague
Former policy advisor Ministry of Economic 
Affairs
February 2016
Policy advisor Ministry of Infrastructure 
and Environment
February 2016 Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Environment, The Hague
Project director Marker 
Wadden
Natuurmonumenten February 2016 Province Hall, Lelystad
Policy advisor Marker 
Wadden
Province of Flevoland April 2016 Food and Consumer Product 
Safety Authority, Utrecht
Project control manager Rijkswaterstaat May 2016 Rijkswaterstaat, Utrecht
Advisor on Public-private 
partnerships
Taskforce Delta 
technology
May 2016 Private address, Hagestein
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DOCUMENTS ANALYSED
appEnDix b. DocUmEntS analySED
afsluitdijk case
Appendix B
Documents included in document analysis chapter 3
Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu (2011a). Nota van antwoord. Behorende bij de structuurvisie 
Toekomst Afsluitdijk. December. Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu (2011b). Structuurvisie Toekomst Afsluitdijk. 23 December. 
Retrieved from www.deafsluitdijk.nl/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Structuurvisie-Toekomst-
Afsluitdijk_tcm174-313551.pdf
Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu & Ministerie van Economische Zaken (2013). Deltaprogramma 
2014. Werk aan de delta. Kansrijke oplossingen voor opgaven en ambities. September. Retrieved 
from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu & Ministerie van Economische Zaken (2015). Deltaprogramma 
2016. Werk aan de delta. En nu begint het pas echt. September. Retrieved from https://rijksover-
heid.archiefweb.eu
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat (2007). Nederland veroveren op de toekomst. Kabinetsvisie op 
het waterbeleid. Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Rijksoverheid (2008). Ontwerp Nationaal Waterplan. 27 December. Retrieved from https://rijksover-
heid.archiefweb.eu
Rijksoverheid (2013b). Troonrede. 17 September. Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Rijksoverheid, Provincie Fryslând, Provincie Noord-Holland, Gemeente Súdwest- Fryslând, 
Gemeente Hollandse Kroon, & Gemeente Harlingen. (2014). Samenwerkingsovereenkomst 
Duurzame Energie Afsluitdijk. 27 November. Retrieved from www.deafsluitdijk.nl/wp-content/
uploads/2014/05/overeenkomst-samenwerkingsovereenkomst-energie.pdf
Rijksoverheid, Provincie Fryslând, Provincie Noord-Holland, Gemeente Súdwest- Fryslând, Ge-
meente Wieringen (2011). Bestuursovereenkomst Toekomst Afsluitdijk. 23 December. Retrieved 
from
Rijkswaterstaat (2013). Startdocument planuitwerking Afsluitdijk. 1 August. Retrieved from www.
deafsluitdijk.nl/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Startdocument-planuitwerking-Afsluitdijk_tcm174-
355254.pdf
Rijkswaterstaat (2013). Nota van Antwoord. Behorende bij Startdocument Planuitwerking Afsluit-
dijk. 10 December. Retrieved from www.deafsluitdijk.nl/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Nota-van-
antwoord-planuitwerking-Afsluitdijk_tcm174-355255.pdf
Rijkswaterstaat, Provincie Fryslând, Provincie Noord-Holland (2009). Dijk en meer. Eindrapportage 
verkenning Toekomst Afsluitdijk. March. Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Rijkswaterstaat, Provincie Fryslând, Provincie Noord-Holland, Gemeente Súdwest- Fryslând, 
Gemeente Hollandse Kroon, & Gemeente Harlingen (2016). Realisatieovereenkomst Duurzame 
Energie. Retrieved from www.deafsluitdijk.nl/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/RWS-3069827-v1-
Realisatieovereenkomst_ROK_Afsluitdijk_Duurzame_Energie_31110198_getekend.pdf
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brouwersdam tidal power plant case
Documents included in document analysis chapter 3
Ministerie van Economische Zaken, Landbouw en Innovatie, Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, 
Provincie Zeeland, & Zeeland Seaports (2011). Green Deal van Provincie Zeeland met de Ri-
jksoverheid. Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu (2014). Gebiedsontwikkeling Nieuwe Stijl: eerste stappen in 
de praktijk. Van Vinken naar Vonken. March. Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu (2014). Ontwerp-rijksstructuurvisie Grevelingen en Volkerak-
Zoommeer. October. Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu (2014). Waterinnovaties in Nederland. Een beknopt overzicht. 
March. Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu & Ministerie van Economische Zaken (2014). Deltaprogramma 
2015. Werk aan de delta. De beslissingen om Nederland veilig en leefbaar te houden. September. 
Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Projectbureau Getijdencentrale Brouwersdam (2014). Hoofdrapport. Verslag van de marktconsulta-
tie. 28 January. Retrieved from www.gcbd.nl
Projectbureau Getijdencentrale Brouwersdam (2014). Maatschappelijke consultatie. Verslag van de 
openbare informatiebijeenkomst. 12 March. Retrieved from http://gcbd.nl/Documenten+openbaar/
default.aspx#folder=261996
Projectbureau Getijdencentrale Brouwersdam (2015). Getijdencentrale Brouwersdam. Del-
tatechnologie impuls voor regionale economie. 11 March. Retrieved from http://gcbd.nl/
Documenten+openbaar/default.aspx#folder=333552
Projectbureau Getijdencentrale Brouwersdam (2015). Rapport. Verslag van de precompetitieve 
fase. 4 February. Retrieved from http://gcbd.nl/PF/default.aspx
Rijkswaterstaat (2011). Voet aan de grond. Rijkswaterstaat Duurzaam. June. Retrieved from https://
rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Rijkswaterstaat, Provincie Zeeland, Provincie Zuid-Holland, Gemeente Goeree-Overflakkee, & 
Gemeente Schouwen-Duiveland (2013). Consultatiedocument Getijdencentrale Brouwersdam. 
20 September. Retrieved from www.gcbd.nl
marker Wadden case
BoerCroon (2013). Van droomproject naar stapsgewijze realisatie. Overzicht van maatschappelijke 
baten van Marker Wadden. 17 June.
Boskalis (2015). Inschrijving deel 2. EMVI 2 - Landschappelijke kwaliteit vogelparadijs. 29 May.
Gemeente Lelystad & Natuurmonumenten (2013). Milieueffectrapport ten behoeve van het bestem-
mingsplan Marker Wadden. June. Retrieved from https://docplayer.nl/8065103-Milieueffec-
trapport-ten-behoeve-van-het-bestemmingsplan-marker-wadden-definitief-gemeente-lelystad-
natuurmonumenten.html
Natuurmonumenten. (2011). Marker Wadden. Droom van een vogelparadijs. September. Retrieved 
from https://docplayer.nl/12325188-Marker-wadden-droom-van-een-vogelparadijs.html
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Natuurmonumenten (2012). Marker Wadden. Sleutel voor een natuurrijk en toekomstbestedig 
Markermeer. 13 July. Retrieved from https://docplayer.nl/15631070-Marker-wadden-sleutel-voor-
een-natuurrijk-en-toekomstbestendig-markermeer.html
Natuurmonumenten (2013). Marker Wadden. Notitie Reikwijdte en Detailniveau. March.
Natuurmonumenten & Rijkswaterstaat (2014). Uitvoeringsovereenkomst Eerste Fase Marker Wad-
den. 28 November. Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Natuurmonumenten, Rijksoverheid, Provincie Flevoland & Stichting Groenfonds (2014). Kad-
erovereenkomst Eerste Fase Marker Wadden. 11 March. Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.
archiefweb.eu
Natuurmonumenten, Rijksoverheid & Provincie Flevoland (2014). Samenwerkingsovereenkomst 
Eerste Fase Marker Wadden. 28 November. Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Rijk-regioprogramma Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer (2011). Naar een toekomstbestendig ecolo-
gisch systeem. Optimalisatierapport Werkmaatschappij Markermeer-IJmeer. 17 November.
Rijk-regioprogramma Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer (2012). Een toekomstbesteding Markermeer-
IJmeer. Eindrapport Werkmaatschappij Markermeer-IJmeer. 27 September. Retrieved from 
https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Rijk-regioprogramma Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer (2013). Bestuursovereenkomst RRAAM. 13 
November. Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Rijk-regioprogramma Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer (2013). Rijksstructuurvisie Amsterdam-
Almere-Markermeer. November. Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Rijksoverheid & Natuurmonumenten (2013). Uitnodiging tot samenwerking realisatie Eerste fase 
Marker Wadden. 10 September. Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Rijksoverheid & Natuurmonumenten (2014). Overeenkomst tot vestiging erfpacht. Eerste Fase 
Marker Wadden (Markermeer). 14 March. Retrieved from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
Rijkswaterstaat (2015). Projectplan Waterwet ‘Eerste Fase Marker Wadden’. 11 June. Retrieved 
from https://rijksoverheid.archiefweb.eu
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appEnDix c.  nUmbEr oF coDED tExt FraGmEntS For 
contEnt analySiS chaptEr 3
Appendix C
coding number of quotations
Diagnostic Frame 58
Prognostic Frame 11
Prognostic Frame for authorities 100
Prognostic Frame for external actors 60
Motivational frame 28
Motivational frame for authorities 19
Motivational frame for external actors 23
total quotations 299
total unique quotations 198
coding number of quotations
Visualisation 65
Promotion 17
Consolidation 31
Presentation 77
Invitation 20
Demarcation 15
Designation 33
Offer 28
Lure 16
Justification 19
total quotations 321
total unique quotations 224
Summary

173
SUMMARY
thE EmErGE oF GoVErnmEnt Facilitation
Public authorities are exploring new ways to relate to non-governmental – public and pri-
vate – actors. They aim to collaborate with these actors, and recently authorities worldwide 
also increasingly seem to opt to facilitate the actions of these non-governmental actors. 
Politicians speak of a ‘Big Society’ (Kisby 2014: 484), a ‘do democracy’, or a ‘participation 
society’ (Rijksoverheid, 2013a) in which non-governmental actors take the lead in public 
value creation and authorities facilitate their actions instead of taking action themselves 
(Blunkett, 2003; Taylor, 2003). The ‘new’ government is presented as small, lean, humble, 
and obliging to an energetic society, making room, giving space, and (only) helping where 
necessary (Hajer, 2011; Kisby, 2010; Van der Steen et al., 2018). This new order of things 
is sketched as being rather bright and unambiguous, government facilitation as uncom-
plicated. An optimistic picture is painted about governments facilitating non-governmental 
initiatives (Ossewaarde, 2014). The Dutch government, for example, simply states that 
society has a growing ‘self-organising capacity’ and, in reaction, the government will ‘let go, 
facilitate, and give space’ to societal initiatives (doedemocratie.net). It is believed that this 
form of governance will increase democratic legitimacy (Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk, 2016), 
enable budget cuts (Meijer, 2016), and lead to more public value (Bryson et al., 2014) and 
to more innovative solutions to public problems (Sørenson & Torfing, 2011, 2012).
While authorities increasingly seem to opt for facilitation, there is relatively little re-
search on this form of governance. In most of the available literature, for example on 
collaborative governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008), public–private partnerships (Greve & 
Hodge, 2013) and collaborative innovation (Sørensen & Torfing, 2012) the government 
still plays a very prominent role. Furthermore, the available literature on government 
facilitation is mainly theoretical and the government’s role is discussed in rather general 
terms (e.g. Salamon 2001; Vigoda, 2002). Not much is yet known about what authorities 
that aim to facilitate actually do, what their struggles and successes are, and with what 
effects they facilitate non-governmental initiatives.
rESEarch qUEStionS anD rESEarch DESiGn
The empirical observation of public authorities’ focus on the facilitation of non-govern-
mental actors, combined with the (lack of accurate) academic knowledge on this topic, led 
to the formulation of the following research question and sub-research questions:
Why, how, and with what effects do governments facilitate the actions of non-governmental 
actors to produce public goods?
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1 What is and is not facilitation? How does government facilitation relate to government 
models such as Traditional Public Administration, New Public Management, and New 
Public Governance?
2 What do (and do not) public authorities do when they facilitate the actions of non-
governmental actors? What tools do they use? What forms of facilitation can be distin-
guished?
3 Why do public authorities (choose to) facilitate the actions of non-governmental actors? 
What are the explanations behind such a strategy?
4 What are the conditions for successful government facilitation? What capacities, re-
sources, relations, and networks do public authorities need in order to facilitate?
5 With what effects do public authorities facilitate non-governmental actors? How does 
the choice of specific forms of facilitation affect the governance processes?
We answer our research questions by conducting five in-depth case studies. In the four 
empirical chapters of the thesis different sets of these cases are discussed and compared 
to answer the research questions. This multiple case study design fits the topic and the 
type of questions that we aim to answer. Our study is explorative (Blatter & Haverland, 
2012; Flyvbjerg, 2001); the case study design allows in-depth knowledge to be gained 
on the complex phenomenon that government facilitation is (Stake, 1998; Yin, 2018). The 
aim is to gain a better insight into the dynamics of government facilitation by studying a 
small number of cases in detail. A consequence of our research design, our study will not 
lead to empirical knowledge that is easy to generalise.
Through strategic sampling, we selected five cases in which Dutch water authorities 
facilitate, or aim to facilitate, non-governmental initiatives. The initiatives are taken by 
private actors and by an NGO. The Dutch water sector is an interesting sector in which to 
study government facilitation because traditionally, the sector is government-led, publicly 
funded, and strongly anchored in laws and regulations (Van Buuren et al., 2015). Water 
management focuses primarily on controlling water, safety, and risk avoidance (Roovers 
& Van Buuren, 2014; Van Buuren et al., 2015). Values that are important in government 
facilitation, such as adaptation, flexibility, and responsiveness, thus seem at odds with the 
dominant values in the Dutch water sector. The selected cases can therefore be consid-
ered extreme cases (Yin, 2018). The selection includes four cases in which the authorities 
aim to facilitate sustainable energy generation by private actors at public water works 
(Afsluitdijk, Oosterscheldekering, Brouwersdam tidal power plant, and Grevelingendam 
tidal test centre) and one case in which an NGO (Natuurmonumenten) took the initiative to 
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realise a new nature reserve (Marker Wadden) in a freshwater lake. We collected our data 
through a combination of document analysis, interviews, and (participant) observations.
rESEarch rESUltS anD conclUSionS
The picture that emerges from our study of the facilitating government is one of a seeking 
and a struggling government; a government that feels the need to do things differently, tries 
to do things differently, encounters significant barriers and dilemmas in doing this, and in 
reaction sometimes sees no other solution than to revert to familiar ways of working. Our 
research results add some footnotes to the optimistic, uncomplicated, and unambiguous 
image of government facilitation that emerges from governments’ discourse and some of 
the literature (Ossewaarde, 2014).
Four administrative capacities to facilitate non-governmental initiative
In Chapter 2 of the thesis we analyse how public authorities facilitate non-governmental 
initiatives. A distinction is made between four capacities that facilitating authorities can 
employ: analytical, coordination, regulatory, and delivery capacity. This classification 
makes it possible to undertake a structured evaluation of government facilitation, compare 
cases, and evaluate the effectiveness and results of different facilitating actions.
We show that authorities that the aim to facilitate are keen to employ their coordination 
capacity. They organise network meetings or create an online platform for stakehold-
ers to connect. Our research shows, however, that in the Dutch water sector often it 
is insufficient to let initiatives succeed. Secondly, the employment of analytical capac-
ity – for example by opening up governmental data, pro-actively exploring possibilities 
with external initiators, and commissioning research that will benefit the initiatives – is an 
important tool for facilitating authorities. It is not straightforward, however, for authorities, 
to employ this capacity, especially not in the Dutch water sector, where collaboration with 
non-governmental actors is relatively new and sharing information does not fit with the 
dominant regime focused on prediction and control (Van Buuren et al., 2015).
Thirdly, employing regulatory capacity also proves to be a necessary and effective 
tool for facilitating governments. Besides (temporarily) abolishing and adjusting existing 
rules and regulations that hinder a non-governmental initiative, it is sometimes neces-
sary to set up new rules. Close collaboration with the external initiators is essential 
here to arrive at tailor-made solutions. Authorities generally are hesitant to adjust rules 
but over time find that it is necessary for external initiatives. Lastly, authorities are not 
always keen to employ their delivery capacity; direct financial support is not easily given 
to non-governmental initiatives. Indirectly however, facilitating authorities do employ a 
substantial amount of delivery capacity, for example it terms of working hours invested by 
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civil servants. However, direct financial support from the government, for example in the 
form of a subsidy, is frequently needed for an initiative to succeed.
two forms of facilitation
Looking at the use of various administrative capacities, combined with other charac-
teristics such as a certain discourse, we differentiate between two forms of facilitation: 
invitational facilitation and accommodating facilitation
In the case of accommodating facilitation, authorities accommodate non-governmental 
initiatives, but the support they give is limited. Just like investments, the influence the 
government’s influence in an initiative is generally low. The initiating project leadership 
lies with non-governmental actors, and they are consequently the ones responsible for re-
alisation and exploitation. In their discourse, authorities emphasise the limitations of what 
they are able or willing to contribute. An advantage of this approach is that potential initia-
tors know what they can expect. A possible downside of this restrained form of facilitation 
is that it is somewhat aloof: external actors feel neither invited nor sufficiently enthused or 
convinced about what the government has to offer to them in terms of support.
In the case of invitational facilitation, supporting non-governmental initiatives is a 
policy intention of a public authority; a public authority actively invites non-governmental 
actors to initiate a project. Initiators can often count on a significant amount of support of 
various kinds from the government. With a discourse that emphasises the opportunities 
and the benefits for non-governmental actors, authorities try to entice them to take action. 
A disadvantage of this discourse is that authorities’ ambitions and limitations are less 
clear. Because of the government’s proactive approach and enthusiastic communication, 
non-governmental actors expect the government to take the lead in project realisation. 
Invitational facilitation can result in high transaction costs and false expectations.
Difficulties and dilemmas for the facilitating government
In Chapter 4 we discuss the difficulties and dilemmas that authorities face when they 
aim to facilitate non-governmental initiatives. In the thesis’ conclusion we highlight three 
of these difficulties as an example. First, authorities struggle to, on the one hand, help 
an initiative, giving it the necessary support for it to succeed, and, on the other hand, 
leaving the initiative in the hands of the non-governmental actors, not taking it over as 
government. Second, they have a hard time finding a balance between being clear about 
expectations and the willingness to contribute to an initiative, and being flexible enough 
to change these things when necessary. Third, although the government sees itself as 
an outside facilitator, it is as much of a stake- and shareholder as the non-governmental 
actors in a project. The process of facilitation show to be full of strategy, negotiation and 
opposing interest. Authorities struggle to deal with this, for example when they aim for a 
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shared search with external actors for solutions to public problems but these actors have 
a stake in keeping their knowledge and information for themselves.
Using Hood (1991) we conceptualise the dilemmas encountered by facilitating au-
thorities as dilemmas between different types of administrative values: theta, lambda, 
and sigma values. Generally speaking, theta values are traditional democratic values, 
lambda values relate to professionalism, and sigma values relate to efficiency. The gen-
eral picture is that the traditional democratic values can form a hindrance to a facilitating 
approach. For facilitation, things such as flexibility, customisation, and making exceptions 
are important. This is often at odds with values such as predictability, representativeness, 
and equal access. The way public authorities are organised is related to the traditional 
administrative values. Our study shows an organisational misfit between the government 
and the non-governmental initiatives that it aims to facilitate. Bureaucratic organisations 
are not equipped to facilitate external initiatives and lack the necessary tools, resources, 
and competences. In Chapter 5, we discuss the fact that institutions, such as the way the 
government works, are hard to change. So, although politicians and governors might be 
in favour of government facilitation, it is not easily implemented.
the dynamics of government facilitation
The authorities in our cases deal with the difficulties and dilemmas they encounter using 
so called coping strategies (Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 2008), this leads to certain dynam-
ics in their strategy. In Chapter 5, we show how authorities in various projects, mostly as a 
result of institutional factors, move from the intention to collaborate with non-governmental 
actors, to accommodating facilitation, to invitational facilitation. After they pull back and 
retreat to an approach in which they give very little support to external initiators, they then 
gradually increase their investments and influence in the non-governmental initiatives, 
what leads to a U-turn shaped pattern in their strategy. The investments they make and 
the influence they gain reinforce each other. In almost all cases under study, the authorities 
eventually take up a more prominent role than envisioned beforehand. The explanations 
for this change of strategy are mostly process factors. Along the way, authorities gain a 
stake in a project and acquire an interest in project realisation; they get locked-in and are 
no longer the objective facilitator on the side lines.
We further show that authorities that have the intention to employ government 
facilitation often end up employing another government model. The government for 
example assumes a prominent and permanent role as network and process manager. It 
becomes an active participant in the governance network itself because solely bringing 
non-government actors together to kick-start their collaboration proves not to be enough. 
The role of the government then resembles the role of a government in the government 
collaboration-side of New Public Governance. In other cases the government ends up 
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having a role that resembles the government’s role in New Public Management because 
it decides to start a tender procedure and commission a private actor to realise a project.
Uncertainty about the results of the non-governmental initiative can also lead to the in-
troduction of strict performance and output criteria to receive governmental support, again 
resembling New Public Management. Alternatively, giving support to particular societal 
initiators and not to others can lead to the neglect of traditional administrative values such 
as impartiality, legality, and legitimacy. The facilitating government can respond to this 
with new rules and bureaucracy, resembling Traditional Public Administration. Another 
reason why a facilitating government turns to a more traditional role is doubt about the 
professionalism and quality of an external initiative. As the government is held ultimately 
accountable, it might not resist the urge to take over.
Success factors for government facilitation
Despite the difficulties that authorities encounter, there are various cases in which the 
government has successfully facilitated external initiatives. From our research, we derive 
several factors that contribute to such successful facilitation.
First, it proves to be beneficial if the government’s communication both entices non-
governmental actors to take action and also makes it clear what the government is willing 
and not willing to do to support potential initiators. Authorities have to find a balance 
between invitational and clear communication. With an upbeat discourse, the government 
attracts a lot of non-governmental actors, but, if the government’s limits are not clear, 
such actors await public action. In multiple cases, we see that the government’s failure to 
manage expectations caused confusion and irritation among non-governmental actors, 
reducing rather than increasing their willingness to act.
What appears obvious is that a prerequisite for successful government facilitation is 
the presence of a well-organised, competent initiative with goals that are (somewhat) in 
line with the government’s goals. Authorities that aim to facilitate do not always seem to 
realise this though. Clear communication can contribute to the emergence of such an 
initiative. What is also important for potential non-governmental initiators is that there is 
really something in it for them (to earn, to learn, to demonstrate). A factor that contributes 
to successful facilitation thus is authorities not pressing their own policy goals too much 
and giving external initiators space to pursue their goals.
In the realisation phase of an initiative, a success factor is the employment of all 
administrative capacities to support the initiative: delivery, coordination, analytical, and 
regulatory. These capacities do not have to be employed by one and the same public 
authority; through public alignment various authorities can complement one another. Dif-
ficulties and dilemmas will inevitably occur, and, if the government manages to cope with 
these by introducing certain arrangements, this will contribute to a better fit between the 
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public organisation and the external initiative. Positive feedback and increasing returns 
can subsequently lead to a virtuous circle towards more facilitation.
GoVErnmEnt Facilitation aS a SciEntiFic concEpt
Our analysis shows how difficult it is to sustain a facilitating strategy. Often, authorities 
end up employing a form of governance that contains so many elements of another model 
that one can ask whether what they are doing can still be called facilitation. In section 
6.7 of the thesis’ conclusion we discuss what this means for government facilitation as 
a scientific concept. We conclude that government facilitation, rather than being a fully-
fledged government model, in many cases is mainly an intention of the government. It 
is the starting point of a collaboration with non-governmental actors, a position that an 
authority takes to make its intentions clear. Although government facilitation might not 
be as distinctive as other government models, we stick to the claim that it is important to 
conceptually distinguish it from these models. It is important because the government’s 
intentions affect the relations between government and societal actors and put a stamp 
on the eventual governance arrangement between them.
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DE WEnS Van DE oVErhEiD om tE FacilitErEn
Overheden wereldwijd verkennen nieuwe manieren om samen te werken met zowel 
publieke als private niet-overheidspartijen. In toenemende mate verkennen ze ook de 
mogelijkheid om de initiatieven van deze partijen te faciliteren. Politici spreken over een 
‘Big Society’ (Kisby, 2014: 484), een ‘doe-democratie’, of een ‘participatiesamenleving’ 
(Rijksoverheid, 2013a) waarin maatschappelijke partijen het voortouw nemen in het 
creëren van publieke waarde en waarin overheden, in plaats van zelf actie te onderne-
men, de initiatieven faciliteren (Blunkett, 2003; Taylor, 2003). Deze ‘nieuwe’, faciliterende 
overheid zou klein zijn, efficiënt, nederig, en in dienst staan van de actieve samenleving. 
Een faciliterende overheid zou ruimte geven, initiatieven mogelijk maken, en deze enkel 
ondersteunen waar nodig (Hajer, 2011; Kisby, 2010; Van der Steen et al., 2018). Deze 
nieuwe situatie waarin een overheid voornamelijk maatschappelijke initiatieven faciliteert, 
wordt over het algemeen neergezet als positief en ongecompliceerd; faciliteren wordt 
gezien als iets dat een overheid moeiteloos doet (Ossewaarde, 2014). De Nederlandse 
overheid stelt bijvoorbeeld simpelweg dat de samenleving een groeiend ‘zelf-organiserend 
vermogen heeft’ en dat de overheid, in reactie daarop loslaat, faciliteert, en ruimte geeft 
aan maatschappelijke initiatief (doedemocratie.net). Het idee bestaat dat faciliteren door 
de overheid de democratische legitimiteit vergroot (Edelenbos & Van Meerkerk, 2016), 
bezuinigingen mogelijk maakt (Meijer, 2016), dat het leidt tot meer publieke waarde (Bry-
son et al., 2014), en meer innovatieve oplossingen voor publieke problemen (Sørenson 
& Torfing, 2011; 2012).
Terwijl overheden in toenemende mate lijken te kiezen voor het faciliteren van maat-
schappelijke initiateven, is er relatief weinig onderzoek naar deze vorm van besturen. In 
de wetenschappelijke literatuur gerelateerd aan het onderwerp, zoals die over ‘collabora-
tive governance’ (Ansell & Gash, 2008), publiek-private samenwerking (Greve & Hodge, 
2013) en ‘collaborative innovation’ (Sørensen & Torfing, 2012) spelen overheden nog een 
prominente rol. Daarnaast is de literatuur over het algemeen sterk theoretisch en wat een 
faciliterende overheid doet, wordt enkel beschreven in generieke termen (bijvoorbeeld 
door Salamon, 2001; Vigoda, 2002). Er is nog niet veel bekend over wat faciliterende 
overheden precies doen, welke moeilijkheden ze daarbij ervaren, en wat de effecten zijn 
van hun keuzes.
onDErzoEkSVraGEn En onDErzoEkSontWErp
De empirische observatie dat overheden steeds vaker lijken te kiezen voor het faciliteren 
van maatschappelijk initiatieven, gecombineerd met het gebrek aan wetenschappelijke 
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literatuur over het onderwerp, heeft geleid tot de volgende onderzoeksvraag en deelvra-
gen:
Waarom, hoe, en met welke effecten faciliteren overheden maatschappelijke initiatieven?
1 Wat is faciliteren door de overheid (niet)? Hoe verschilt faciliteren door de overheid van 
de sturingsmodellen Traditional Public Administration, New Public Management en New 
Public Governance?
2 Wat doen overheden (niet) wanneer ze maatschappelijk initiatieven faciliteren? Welke 
beleidsinstrumenten gebruiken ze? Welke vormen van faciliteren zijn er?
3 Waarom kiezen overheden ervoor om maatschappelijke initiatieven te faciliteren? Wat 
zijn de verklaringen voor deze keuze?
4 Wat zijn de condities voor succesvol faciliteren door de overheid? Welke capaciteiten, 
middelen, en contacten hebben overheden nodig om te kunnen faciliteren?
5 Met welke effecten faciliteren overheden maatschappelijke initiatieven? Welk effect 
heeft de keus voor een specifieke vorm van faciliteren?
We beantwoorden onze onderzoeksvragen door het doen van vijf, kwalitatieve casestu-
dies. In de vier empirische hoofdstukken van deze thesis analyseren en vergelijken we 
verschillende combinaties van deze cases. Vergelijkende casestudies zijn een onder-
zoeksmethode die goed past bij het onderwerp van deze thesis en het soort vragen dat 
we stellen. Ons onderzoek is exploratief (Blatter & Haverland, 2012; Flyvbjerg, 2001) en 
casestudies zijn een geschikte methode voor het doen van kwalitatief onderzoek naar 
een complex fenomeen zoals faciliteren door de overheid. Door een klein aantal cases 
grondig te onderzoeken, hopen we meer inzicht te krijgen in de dynamiek van faciliteren 
door de overheid. Een consequentie van ons onderzoeksontwerp is dat onze resultaten 
niet makkelijk te generaliseren zijn naar andere situaties dan degene die wij onderzoeken.
We hebben vijf cases geselecteerd in de watersector in Nederland waarin overheden 
een maatschappelijke initiatief faciliteerden of dit ambieerden. De initiatiefnemers zijn 
private partijen en een NGO. De Nederlandse watersector is een interessante sector 
voor het bestuderen van faciliteren door de overheid omdat de sector zo goed als volledig 
gefinancierd is door publieke middelen en wordt gekenmerkt door een sterke overheid 
(Van Buuren et al., 2015). De focus in de sector ligt op veiligheid, het voorkomen van 
risico’s, en het onder controle houden van water; dit alles is vastgelegd in strikte wetten 
en regels (Roovers & Van Buuren, 2014; Van Buuren et al., 2015). Waarden die belang-
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rijk zijn voor faciliteren, zoals adaptatie, flexibiliteit, en responsiviteit staan ver af van 
de dominante cultuur in de sector. De door ons geselecteerde cases kunnen daardoor 
beschouwd worden als ‘extreme cases’ (Yin, 2018). Onze selectie bestaat uit vier cases 
waarin overheden initiatieven voor het opwekken van duurzame energie poogden te 
faciliteren, en een casus waarin een NGO het initiatief nam om een nieuw natuurgebied 
te creëren. We hebben onze data over de cases verzameld door middel van document-
analyse, interviews, en (participerende) observaties.
bEVinDinGEn En conclUSiES
Het beeld van de faciliterende overheid dat uit ons onderzoek naar voren komt, is een 
beeld van een zoekende en een worstelende overheid. Ze heeft het idee dat dingen 
anders moeten en probeert dingen anders te doen. Ze ervaart hierbij verschillende 
moeilijkheden en ziet vaak geen andere mogelijkheid dan terug te keren naar haar ver-
trouwde manier van werken. Ons onderzoek plaatst een aantal kanttekeningen bij het 
optimistische, ongecompliceerde beeld van faciliteren dat overheden zelf, en een deel 
van de wetenschappelijke literatuur, schetsten (Ossewaarde, 2014).
Vier bureaucratische capaciteiten voor het faciliteren van maatschappelijk 
initiatief
In Hoofdstuk 2 analyseren we hoe overheden maatschappelijk initiatief faciliteren. We 
maken daarbij onderscheid tussen vier capaciteiten die overheden kunnen inzetten: de 
capaciteiten tot analyseren, coördineren, reguleren, en leveren. Dit onderscheid maakt 
het mogelijk om een gestructureerde evaluatie te doen van faciliteren door de overheid, 
om cases te vergelijken en om de effectiviteit en de resultaten van verschillende vormen 
van faciliteren te beoordelen.
We laten zien dat overheden die willen faciliteren, graag hun capaciteit tot coördine-
ren inzetten. Ze organiseren bijvoorbeeld netwerkbijeenkomsten of creëren een online 
platform waarop belanghebbenden met elkaar in contact kunnen komen. Dit is echter 
vaak een onvoldoende bijdrage van de overheid om maatschappelijke initiatieven te laten 
slagen, zeker in de Nederlandse watersector. De capaciteit om te analyseren is ook een 
belangrijk instrument van faciliterende overheden. Ze delen bijvoorbeeld informatie over 
publieke werken, of doen onderzoek naar de mogelijkheden voor potentiële initiators. Dit 
is niet altijd makkelijk voor overheden, wederom zeker niet in de Nederlandse watersec-
tor waar samenwerken met externe actoren relatief nieuw is en geregeld botst met de 
dominante focus op voorspelbaarheid en controleerbaarheid (Van Buuren et al., 2015).
De capaciteit van overheden om te reguleren blijkt ook nodig om maatschappelijk 
initiatieven te faciliteren. Naast vrijstelling geven van bestaande wet- en regelgeving die 
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een initiatief hindert, kan het nodig zijn om nieuwe regels op te stellen. Om te komen tot 
maatwerk moet dit gebeuren in samenspraak met de externe initiatiefnemers. We zien 
dat overheden in eerste instantie terughoudend zijn om hun capaciteit tot reguleren in te 
zetten, maar gedurende een project komen ze er vaak achter dat het toch nodig is. Ook 
hun capaciteit tot leveren, door het geven van financiële steun aan een initiatief, zetten 
faciliterende overheden niet graag in. Toch zijn er indirect vaak hoge kosten, bijvoorbeeld 
door de inzet van ambtenaren. Directe financiële steun, bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van een 
subsidie, blijkt echter ook vaak onontbeerlijk voor het slagen van een maatschappelijk 
initiatief in de Nederlandse watersector.
twee vormen van faciliteren
Op basis van de inzet van de verschillende capaciteiten door overheden, gecombineerd 
met andere zaken zoals een bepaald discourse, maken we een onderscheid tussen twee 
vormen van faciliteren: uitnodigend en accomoderend faciliteren.
In het geval van accomoderend faciliteren, accommoderen overheden een maat-
schappelijk initiatief, maar de steun die het initiatief ontvangt, is beperkt. Ook de invloed 
die een overheid heeft op het initiatief is klein. De maatschappelijke partijen nemen het 
voortouw en zijn verantwoordelijk voor de realisatie en exploitatie van een project. In 
hun communicatie benadrukken overheden dat hun steun beperkt is. Een voordeel van 
deze aanpak is dat potentiële initiatiefnemers weten waar ze aan toe zijn. Accomoderend 
faciliteren is echter wel wat afstandelijk; initiatiefnemers worden niet geënthousiasmeerd 
door de overheid en kunnen zich onvoldoende welkom voelen. Ook kunnen maatschap-
pelijke partijen twijfelen of zij voldoende steun van de overheid zullen ontvangen wanneer 
ze initiatief zouden nemen.
In het geval van uitnodigend faciliteren, is het ondersteunen van maatschappelijk 
initiatief een duidelijk beleidsdoel van overheden. Ze nodigen maatschappelijke partijen 
uit om initiatief te nemen en deze partijen kunnen op veel (verschillende vormen van) 
overheidssteun rekenen. In hun communicatie wijzen overheden op de kansen en mo-
gelijkheden voor potentiële initiatiefnemers; overheden proberen hen actief in beweging 
te krijgen. Een nadeel van deze aanpak is dat overheden hun eigen ambities en grenzen 
niet altijd duidelijk maken, en door het enthousiasme van overheden kunnen potentiële 
initiatiefnemers onterecht het idee krijgen dat die overheden het voortouw zullen nemen. 
Deze vorm van faciliteren kan daardoor leiden tot valse verwachtingen en hoge transac-
tiekosten.
moeilijkheden en dilemma’s voor de faciliterende overheid
In Hoofdstuk 4 analyseren we de moeilijkheden en de dilemma’s waar faciliterende 
overheden tegenaan lopen. In paragraaf 6.3 van de conclusie voeren we vervolgens drie 
van deze moeilijkheden op als voorbeeld. Ten eerste worstelen overheden ermee om een 
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initiatief wel de nodige steun te geven maar toch voldoende afstand te bewaren en het 
initiatief niet over te nemen als overheid. Ten tweede zien we dat overheden het lastig vin-
den om zich enerzijds duidelijk uit te spreken over wat zij verwachten van initiatiefnemers 
en wat zij bereid zijn bij te dragen aan een initiatief, en anderzijds flexibel genoeg zijn om 
hun opstelling te veranderen als dit nodig is. Een derde moeilijkheid voor faciliterende 
overheden is dat zij tegen verwachting in vaak niet de objectieve buitenstaander zijn in 
een project. Faciliteren is een strategisch spel, waarin partijen, inclusief overheden, vaak 
tegengestelde belangen hebben, en waarin onderhandelen onontkoombaar is. We zien 
dit bijvoorbeeld in de casus Brouwersdam waar de betrokken overheden verwachtten 
samen met private partijen in een open proces te kunnen zoeken naar oplossingen voor 
de problemen in het gebied. De partijen bleken er echter baat bij te hebben hun kaarten 
grotendeels tegen de borst te houden en maar weinig van hun kennis te delen.
We gebruiken het werk van Hood (1991) om de dilemma’s waarvoor faciliterende 
overheden staan te typeren als dilemma’s tussen verschillende bureaucratische waar-
den. We onderscheiden daarbij zogenaamde theta-, lambda-, en sigma-waarden. 
Thetawaarden zijn traditionele democratische waarden, lambdawaarden hebben betrek-
king op professionaliteit, sigmawaarden op efficiëntie. Het algemene beeld is dat vooral 
thetawaarden een belemmering vormen voor faciliteren door de overheid. Voor het faci-
literen van maatschappelijk initiatief zijn dingen als flexibiliteit, maatwerk, en het maken 
van uitzonderingen noodzakelijk. Dit botst vaak met thetawaarden als voorspelbaarheid, 
representativiteit, en gelijkheid.
Gerelateerd aan deze traditionele waarden, is de manier waarop bureaucratische 
organisaties zijn ingericht. We zien een mismatch tussen de publieke, bureaucratische 
organisaties en de initiatieven die ze proberen te faciliteren. De organisaties zijn on-
voldoende uitgerust voor deze taak en ontberen bijvoorbeeld de nodige competenties, 
capaciteiten, en middelen. In Hoofdstuk 5 bespreken we dat instituties, zoals de manier 
waarop publieke organisaties zijn ingericht, moeilijk te veranderen zijn. Hierdoor is het 
voor overheden lastig om maatschappelijke initiatieven te faciliteren, ook al willen politici 
en bestuurders dat wel graag.
De dynamiek van de faciliterende overheid
Om te kunnen omgaan met de moeilijkheden waar ze tegenaan lopen, gebruiken de 
overheden in onze cases zogenaamde coping-strategieën (Steenhuisen & Van Eeten, 
2008) en hierdoor ontstaat er een bepaalde dynamiek in hun aanpak. In Hoofdstuk 5 laten 
we zien dat overheden projecten vaak starten met de intentie om samen te werken met 
externe partijen, vervolgens kiezen ze voor accommoderend faciliteren, om daarna op te 
schuiven naar uitnodigend faciliteren. Nadat de overheden zich dus eerst terugtrekken en 
maar weinig ondersteuning bieden aan initiatiefnemers, nemen hun bijdragen geleidelijk 
toe, net als de invloed die ze claimen in een initiatief. Dit leidt tot een U-bocht in de 
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strategie van faciliterende overheden. In bijna alle door ons onderzochte cases hebben 
de overheden uiteindelijk een meer prominente rol dan zij beoogden. Meestal ligt de ver-
klaring hiervoor in het proces: als een project vordert, krijgen overheden er steeds meer 
belang bij dat het project ook werkelijk tot een goed einde komt. Ze raken ‘ingesloten’ en 
zijn niet langer de faciliterende buitenstander die ze voor ogen hadden.
Overheden met de intentie om te faciliteren, belanden dus vaak in een andere rol dan 
voorzien. Ze worden bijvoorbeeld proces- of netwerkmanager. Ze gaan zelf actief deel-
nemen aan het governance-proces omdat enkel het samenbrengen van externe partijen 
onvoldoende blijkt om het project te laten slagen. In deze gevallen komt de rol van een 
overheid overeen met de rol van een overheid in de collaboratieve vorm van New Public 
Governance. In andere gevallen, als het toch nodig blijkt een project aan te besteden, 
schuift een overheid op naar New Public Management. Twijfels over de kwaliteit van een 
initiatief of de resultaten kan er ook toe leiden dat overheden hun steun gaan verbinden 
aan strikte criteria of dat ze resultaatafspraken willen maken met initiatiefnemers, wat ook 
lijkt op New Public Management. Tot slot kunnen overheden, in reactie op het in gedrang 
komen van traditionele, democratische waarden, zoveel bureaucratie creëren dat hun 
rol weer gaat lijken op de rol van een overheid in Traditional Public Administration. De 
kans hierop is extra groot doordat een overheid uiteindelijk toch vaak verantwoordelijk 
wordt gehouden voor het oplossen van publieke problemen; dit geldt bij uitstek voor de 
Nederlandse watersector.
Succesfactoren voor een faciliterende overheid
Ondanks de vele moeilijkheden waar faciliterende overheden tegenaanlopen, zijn er 
verschillende projecten waarin het wel lukt. Op basis van onze cases, formuleren we een 
aantal succesfactoren voor faciliteren door de overheid.
Ten eerste blijkt het belangrijk dat de communicatie van overheden maatschappelijke 
partijen zowel enthousiasmeert als informeert. Het moet de partijen zowel in beweging 
krijgen als duidelijk maken wat een overheid wil en wat zij hiervoor bereid is (niet) te doen. 
Met uitnodigende woorden kunnen overheden maatschappelijke partijen interesseren 
maar als een overheid zich te enthousiast toont, zullen deze partijen verwachten dat die 
overheid zelf het voortouw neemt.
Een tweede belangrijke voorwaarde voor succesvol faciliteren is natuurlijk de aan-
wezigheid van competente, goedgeorganiseerde initiatiefnemers. Ook al lijkt dit een 
vanzelfsprekendheid, overheden lijken het zich toch niet altijd te realiseren wanneer zij 
eindeloos blijven trekken aan een situatie zonder zicht op een maatschappelijk initiatief. 
Goede overheidscommunicatie kan bijdragen aan de vorming van een initiatief, maar wat 
vooral belangrijk is, is dat er werkelijk iets te halen valt voor externe partijen. Ze moeten 
bijvoorbeeld iets kunnen verdienen, leren, of demonstreren. Overheden moeten dus op-
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passen dat de overheidsdoelen niet te overheersend zijn en dat er voldoende ruimte is 
voor maatschappelijke partijen om hun eigen doelen na te jagen.
Wanneer een project eenmaal van start is, is het tot slot belangrijk dat alle vier over-
heidscapaciteiten ingezet worden. Dit hoeft echter niet te gebeuren door een en dezelfde 
overheid, overheden kunnen elkaar aanvullen. Het is daarvoor vaak wel noodzakelijk 
dat ze dit onderling afstemmen. Er zullen zich onvermijdelijk moeilijkheden voordoen bij 
het faciliteren, wanneer een faciliterende overheid er vervolgens in slaagt hiermee om te 
gaan middels zogenaamde coping-strategieën zal dit leiden tot een betere match tussen 
de overheidsorganisatie en het initiatief. Goede resultaten en positieve feedback uit het 
project kunnen vervolgens leiden tot een opwaartse spiraal en tot nog meer succesvol 
gefaciliteerde initiatieven in de toekomst.
FacilitErEn alS WEtEnSchappEliJk moDEl
Met onze analyse laten we zien hoe moeilijk het is voor overheden om het faciliteren 
vol te houden en niet op te schuiven naar een ander sturingsmodel. In paragraaf 6.7 
van de conclusie bespreken we wat deze constatering betekent voor faciliteren als we-
tenschappelijk model. We stellen dat faciliteren geen volwaardig sturingsmodel is, zoals 
bijvoorbeeld New Public Management. Vaak is het enkel een intentie van een overheid 
om dingen anders te organiseren. Deze intentie vormt het startpunt van een samenwer-
king tussen een overheid en haar partners. Maar ook al beschouwen wij het dus niet als 
volwaardig sturingsmodel, we vinden het wel nuttig om faciliteren in wetenschappelijke 
studies conceptueel te blijven onderscheiden van andere modellen. Dit omdat de intentie 
van een overheid, ook al houdt die geen stand, wel degelijk invloed heeft op de relatie tus-
sen een overheid en haar partners en op het verloop van hun eventuele samenwerking.
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